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Thesis Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of corporate decision 
making regarding foreign direct investments (FDI) by applying two behavioural finance 
concepts, home bias and herding, to the analysis of FDI flows. I contribute to the literature by 
empirically testing for home bias and herding in an FDI context using a very broad panel 
dataset. I also contribute by examining the country policy implications of home bias on FDI 
flows between two countries by estimating the probability of an FDI relationship between two 
countries. In addition, I contribute by providing a generality of the results at a global, regional 
and country levels. The analysis in this thesis is conducted on a large panel dataset of the FDI 
inflows and outflows of 30 OECD member countries with their FDI partners, across 25 years 
in a bilateral country pair format which is a novel application of this dataset for the purpose of 
studying home bias and herding in FDI.  
The findings in this thesis confirm that there is an overall home country bias that is 
demonstrated through the preference for direct investments in places with greater physical, 
institutional and cultural proximity to the investor country. These general findings of home 
bias are observed and confirmed across different data segments: regional and country levels, 
across time and across different income country groups. I do not find that the effects of home 
bias have disappeared or diminished across time or at different geographic locations.  Herding 
is another behavioural finance concept which is considered in the context of FDI outflows. 
Direct investors tend to herd around a perceived world or a regional leader when considering 
investments in faraway places and when they do not have the familiarity factors in common 
with an FDI partner country. Finally, by increasing the institutional and cultural familiarity, 
countries can significantly increase the probability that they will get a direct investment from 
a country with which they might not otherwise be having an FDI relationship. 
Contents 
THESIS ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................ 2 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................. 9 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ 11 
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1. Thesis Motivation ............................................................................................................................. 12 
1.2. Main Contribution ............................................................................................................................ 14 
1.3. Main Findings ................................................................................................................................... 14 
1.4. Near-home bias in Foreign Direct Investment .................................................................................. 16 
1.5. Segmented Analysis of Near-home Bias in FDI Flows ........................................................................ 17 
1.6. Herding in Foreign Direct Investment ............................................................................................... 18 
1.7. Probability of Attracting FDI Flows ................................................................................................... 19 
1.8. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 20 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................................... 21 
2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2. FDI Literature ................................................................................................................................... 22 
Definition of a foreign direct investment ......................................................................................................... 22 
Historical development of FDI literature .......................................................................................................... 25 
Determinants of FDI ......................................................................................................................................... 29 
 4 
Geographical focus of FDI studies .................................................................................................................... 33 
Psychic Distance ............................................................................................................................................... 34 
2.3. Home Bias Literature ........................................................................................................................ 37 
Determinants of home bias .............................................................................................................................. 41 
Possible explanations for home bias ................................................................................................................ 45 
2.4. Herding literature ............................................................................................................................. 47 
Herding strands of literature ............................................................................................................................ 47 
Herding in equity markets ................................................................................................................................ 50 
Herding and foreign direct investments ........................................................................................................... 52 
FDI and Equity Portfolio Flows ......................................................................................................................... 54 
2.5. Probability of an FDI relationship ..................................................................................................... 57 
General use of probabilistic models ................................................................................................................. 57 
Probabilistic models and mode of entry of FDI ................................................................................................ 60 
2.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 63 
3. DATA.......................................................................................................................................... 64 
3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 64 
3.2. Variable definitions .......................................................................................................................... 66 
3.2.1. Dependent variables .............................................................................................................................. 66 
A) FDI outflows ............................................................................................................................................ 66 
B) FDI inflows .............................................................................................................................................. 67 
3.2.2. Independent variables ............................................................................................................................ 67 
A) Institutional Proximity Variable Group ................................................................................................... 67 
B) Cultural Proximity Variable Group .......................................................................................................... 68 
C) Physical Proximity Variable Group .......................................................................................................... 70 
D) Macroeconomic Variable Group ............................................................................................................. 71 
 5 
E) Other Variables ....................................................................................................................................... 72 
3.3. Descriptive statistics ......................................................................................................................... 74 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables.......................................................................................................................... 80 
3.3.2. Independent Variables ....................................................................................................................... 81 
3.3.3. Other data particularities ................................................................................................................... 87 
3.4. Correlation among the variables ...................................................................................................... 95 
3.5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 98 
4. NEAR-HOME BIAS IN FDI FLOWS ................................................................................... 102 
4.1. Theoretical background of the model .................................................................................................... 102 
4.1.1. Gravity Model in Physics ...................................................................................................................... 103 
4.1.2. Gravity Model in International Trade ................................................................................................... 104 
4.1.3. Gravity Model for Foreign Direct Investment ...................................................................................... 106 
4.2. A modified gravity model for near-home bias in FDI ............................................................................. 108 
4.3. Econometric Specifications .................................................................................................................... 110 
4.4. Additional Variables .............................................................................................................................. 111 
4.5. Econometric Estimation......................................................................................................................... 112 
4.6.1 Fixed vs. Random effects ....................................................................................................................... 112 
4.6.2 Hausman test ........................................................................................................................................ 113 
4.6.3 Panel estimation technique................................................................................................................... 114 
4.6.4 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) ............................................................................................ 116 
4.7. Results ................................................................................................................................................... 116 
4.7.1. Near-home bias in FDI outflows ........................................................................................................... 118 
4.7.2. Near-home bias in FDI inflows ............................................................................................................. 122 
 6 
4.7.3. Additional Variables results .................................................................................................................. 125 
4.7.4. Robustness test - GMM (IV) estimation ............................................................................................... 136 
4.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 138 
5. SEGMENTED ANALYSIS OF NEAR-HOME BIAS IN FDI FLOWS .............................. 140 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 140 
5.2. Econometric specification of the model .......................................................................................... 142 
5.3. Segmented analysis of near-home bias in FDI flows results ............................................................ 144 
5.3.1. Near-home bias in FDI by continent ................................................................................................ 146 
I. Europe................................................................................................................................................... 147 
II. Asia-Pacific ............................................................................................................................................ 148 
III. America ................................................................................................................................................. 151 
IV. Africa ..................................................................................................................................................... 152 
5.3.2. Near-home bias by individual countries .......................................................................................... 152 
I. FDI outflows by country ........................................................................................................................ 153 
II. FDI inflows by country .......................................................................................................................... 157 
5.3.3. Near-home bias in FDI flows across time ......................................................................................... 160 
I. FDI outflows .......................................................................................................................................... 160 
II. FDI inflows ............................................................................................................................................ 164 
5.3.4. Near-home bias in FDI outflows across country income groups ..................................................... 166 
I. Near-home bias in FDI outflows to developing or developed countries .............................................. 166 
Developing countries ..................................................................................................................................... 166 
Developed countries ...................................................................................................................................... 168 
II. Near-home bias in FDI outflows according to different income groups ............................................... 170 
Low-income group ......................................................................................................................................... 170 
Lower-Middle Income Group ......................................................................................................................... 171 
Upper-Middle Income Group ......................................................................................................................... 172 
 7 
High Income Group ........................................................................................................................................ 172 
5.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 173 
6. HERDING IN FDI OUTFLOWS ........................................................................................... 175 
6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 175 
6.2. Model ............................................................................................................................................. 176 
6.2.1. Herding around a leader (contemporaneous analysis) ........................................................................ 177 
6.2.2. Herding in FDI (Inter-temporal analysis) .............................................................................................. 182 
6.3. Herding in FDI outflows results ....................................................................................................... 186 
6.3.1. Herding around a world leader ........................................................................................................ 186 
6.3.2. Herding around a regional leader .................................................................................................... 187 
6.3.3. Inter-temporal analysis of herding in FDI flows ............................................................................... 193 
6.3.4. Portfolio investors are herding direct investors .............................................................................. 193 
6.3.5. Total regional FDIs herd other investors .......................................................................................... 196 
6.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 198 
7. PROBABILITY OF ATTRACTING FDI FLOWS .............................................................. 200 
7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 200 
7.2. Model ............................................................................................................................................. 201 
Estimation technique ..................................................................................................................................... 202 
Marginal Effects of the independent variables .............................................................................................. 205 
7.3. Probability of attracting FDI flows results ....................................................................................... 207 
7.3.1. Probability of having an FDI relationship (full panel) ....................................................................... 207 
7.3.2. Probability of having an FDI relationship by continent .................................................................... 213 
7.3.3. Probability of having an FDI relationship by country ....................................................................... 225 
 8 
7.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 230 
8. THESIS CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 232 
8.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 232 
8. 2. Near-home bias in FDI flows ................................................................................................................. 233 
8.3. Segmented Analysis of Near-home bias in FDI flows ............................................................................. 234 
8.4. Herding in FDI flows .............................................................................................................................. 235 
8.5. Predicting the probability of FDI flows .................................................................................................. 236 
8.6. Limitations and future research............................................................................................................. 237 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 241 
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................................... 253 
 9 
List of Tables 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 List of OECD countries  
Table 3.2 OECD member countries - continent statistics  
Table 3.3 Partner countries - continent statistics 
Table 3.4a Descriptive statistics for FDI outflows panel data (used in chapters 4 and 5)  
Table 3.4b Descriptive statistics for additional variables for FDI outflows panel data (used in ch.4) 
Table 3.5a Descriptive statistics for FDI inflows panel data (used in chapters 4 and 5) 
Table 3.5b Descriptive statistics for additional variables for FDI inflows panel data (used in ch.4) 
Table 3.6a Descriptive statistics for FDI outflows panel data used in chapter 6 
Table 3.6b Descriptive statistics for other variables used in chapter 6  
Table 3.7a Descriptive statistics for FDI outflows panel data used in chapter 7 
Table 3.7b Descriptive statistics for FDI inflows panel data used in chapter 7 
Table 3.8a Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5  
Table 3.8b Correlations table for FDI inflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5  
Table 3.8c Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5 (continues from 
table 3.8a)  
Table 3.8d Correlation table for FDI inflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5 (continues from 
table 3.8b)  
Table 3.9a Correlation table for FDI outflows panel data used in the econometric analysis in ch.6 
Table 3.9b Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapter 6  
Table 3.10a Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapter 7  
Table 3.10b Correlations table for FDI inflows panel data used in chapter 7  
Table 3.11 List of all variables 
 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1 Hausman test for the panel analysis in chapters 4 and 5 
Table 4.2 Near-home bias in FDI outflows  
Table 4.3 Near-home bias in FDI inflows  
Table 4.4a Bilateral Trust and Near-home bias in FDI outflows;  
Table 4.4b Bilateral Trust and Near-home bias in FDI inflows;  
Table 4.5a Asymmetric Information and Near-home bias in FDI outflows;  
Table 4.5b Asymmetric Information and Near-home bias in FDI inflows;  
 10 
Table 4.6a Bilateral Tax Treaties and Near-home bias in FDI outflows;  
Table 4.6b Bilateral Tax Treaties and Near-home bias in FDI inflows;  
Table 4.7a Country Governance Factors and Near-home bias in FDI outflows;  
Table 4.7b Country Governance Factors and Near-home bias in FDI inflows;  
Table 4.8 GMM (IV) estimation of Near-home bias in FDI flows;  
 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1 Near-home bias in FDI outflows by continent of sending country 
Table 5.2 Near-home bias in FDI inflows by continent of sending country 
Table 5.3 Near-home bias in FDI outflows by individual country  
Table 5.4 Near-home bias in FDI inflows by individual country  
Table 5.5 Near-home bias in FDI outflows in two sub-periods;  
Table 5.6 Near-home bias in FDI inflows in two sub-periods; 
Table 5.7 Near-home bias in FDI outflows to developing/developed countries 
Table 5.8 Near-home bias in FDI outflows to different income group countries 
 
Chapter 6 
Table 6.1 Hausman Test for the econometric panel estimation in chapter 6  
Table 6.2 Herding as distance in investing from the world leader (US);  
Table 6.3 Herding as distance in investing from the regional leader (UK or Japan); 
Table 6.4 Portfolio equity investments (PEI) are herding FDIs;  
Table 6.5 Regional (European) total direct investments are herding FDI investors;  
 
Chapter 7 
Table 7.1 Probability of having an FDI relationship – full panel  
Table 7.2 Probability of having an FDI relationship – Europe  
Table 7.3 Probability of having an FDI relationship – Asia-Pacific  
Table 7.4 Probability of having an FDI relationship – America 
Table 7.5 Probability of having an FDI outflows relationship - by individual country  
Table 7.6 Marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable – FDI inflows 
Table 7.7 Probability of having an FDI inflows relationship - by individual country 
Table 7.8 Marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable – FDI outflows 
 11 
Acknowledgements 
 
The PhD process is filled with many challenges most of which are so particular and 
specific to the thesis at hand, that no one else can truly understand and offer greater insight 
than the PhD supervisors. I would like to thank my thesis supervisors, Professor Gulnur 
Muradoglu and Professor Mario Levis, for the given opportunity to be their PhD student as 
well as for all the help and time spent with me in my PhD pursuit, for their patience, advice 
and insight and incessant availability for meetings and discussions.  
I am very grateful to Cass Business School for giving me a bursary for the PhD 
program, without which I wouldn’t have been able to complete a PhD course in London. The 
school has also provided me with invaluable research support from the opportunity to attend 
several international conferences to the availability of vast research resources and research 
seminars. All of this has truly enriched my research experience and helped me to develop my 
research skills and myself as a researcher.    
I would like to thank my family and friends for their immeasurable support not only 
throughout the PhD course but throughout my education. They have listened patiently to 
many abstract research issues and have endured stoically while I discussed numerous and 
frequently esoteric academic challenges. They have supported me throughout my entire 
academic life and this PhD thesis is much to their credit as well.  
Writing a thesis can in many ways be a collaborative effort that is aided not only by 
the thesis supervisors but by various friends, colleagues and collaborators. I would like to 
thank all of them for contributing comments which have improved my research and thesis.
 12 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Thesis Motivation 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of corporate decision making 
regarding FDI by empirically testing two behavioural finance concepts, home bias and 
herding, in the context of FDI flows. Even though the overall FDI flows in the world have 
increased by around 150% over the past decade, there is still considerable obscurity behind 
corporate decisions on FDI. Increased mobility in the capital markets opens the doors for 
unobstructed direct investments and yet no one truly knows how large, international 
corporations decide on where to invest abroad in reality. There is a discrepancy from the 
normative FDI theory on the corporate location decisions for FDI and what can be observed 
as occurring. Newly emerging markets are first visited by their neighbours in geography or 
culture and a greater diversification in FDI investments occurs only from the richest few 
countries.  
The organisation of a society which is made up of its economic, political, legal social and 
moral enforcement institutions (Greif, 1994) has a profound effect on its economic 
performance and growth. The need for scientific application of human psychology in 
economics and finance has been suggested for a long time and can be noted as early as 1918 
in the work of the economist John Clark. Combining finance and psychology really 
accelerated since the mid-1980s and is behavioural finance is now part of the mainstream. 
Behavioural aspects in the theory of the firm and FDI have been suggested since the 1960s in 
the work of Hymer (1960), Cyert and March (1963), Aharoni (1966) and Agarwal (1980) 
albeit only as a theoretical notion with scarce empirical supporting evidence.  By considering 
methodological and conceptual behavioural finance issues which are already well established 
and developed in the equity markets we can have a clearer idea on how corporations make 
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decisions regarding FDI.  The behavioural finance approach to FDI would give more insight 
to the observed behaviour of companies when they decide to expand into a foreign market 
which frequently consists of investments to familiar places. Corporations are run by people 
who have to make decisions for the company’s foreign investments at various levels of 
familiarity with foreign locations. It is natural to expect that the motivation behind these 
corporate decisions would be affected by a complexity of factors which contribute to the 
situation can be observed – investing nearby and in familiar places.   
By the very nature of its motivation the foreign direct investment (FDI) promotes stable 
and long-lasting economic links between countries through direct access to the FDI receivers’ 
economy and production means (OECD Benchmark, 2008). It is widely recognised that 
efficient capital markets help to mobilise financing for growth and development (Evans, 
2002). With a proper policy setting, it also provides the host countries with an advanced 
technological and economic development and promotes further international trade through 
access to new markets. These activities not only assist the development of countries but in 
general help integrate the world capital markets and embetter their overall efficiency and the 
allocation of world resources. The FDI is a natural and widely available indicator of 
globalization precisely because they measure the extent of international (cross-border) 
investments which are made with the objective to form a long lasting interest in a country 
different than that of the investor.  Although the barriers to international investment have 
fallen sharply in the past decades (Stulz, 2005) this financial liberalisation hasn’t led to 
unobstructed cross-country investing. If this is the case for the equity markets it is a natural 
and intuitive assumption that this should be examined in the case of foreign direct investments 
in order to check if the same findings can also be observed.  
Finding out about the implications and nuances behind the corporate decision making 
regarding FDI would help guide various countries in their quest for FDI flows. Knowing more 
 14 
about the patterns of FDI will make the international capital markets more efficient and more 
liquid and the benefits of globalization more evenly spread around the world.   
 
1.2. Main Contribution  
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of corporate decision making 
regarding foreign direct investments by applying two behavioural finance concepts, home bias 
and herding, in the analysis of FDI flows. I contribute to literature by empirically testing for 
home bias and herding in an FDI context and I do so by using a very broad panel dataset. I 
also contribute by examining the country policy implications of home bias factors 
(institutional, cultural and physical) by estimating the effect that they have on the probability 
of having an FDI flows relationship between two countries. In addition, I contribute by 
providing a generality of the results at a global, regional and country levels, across time and 
across different country income groups. The analysis in this thesis is conducted on a large 
panel dataset of FDI outflows and inflows across 30 OECD member countries and their FDI 
partner countries, over 25 years and in a bilateral country pair format which is a unique 
application of this dataset for the purpose of studying home bias and herding in FDI. This 
thesis is the first to empirically test for home bias and herding in foreign direct investment 
between a large number of bilateral country pairs, at a global, regional and country levels and 
across time.   
 
1.3. Main Findings 
I find supporting empirical evidence that there is near-home bias in FDI flows. This is 
observed both in general and throughout geographically different regions, across time and in 
various country income groups. I find that there is herding in FDI outflows in several 
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contexts. Finally, I quantify probability impact of the near-home bias factors in a binary 
dependant variable model and consider them from a country policy perspective. The findings 
in this thesis which are done on FDI flows are consistent with the findings in the behavioural 
finance literature which is conducted for the equity markets and international equity flows.   
The development of behavioural finance in the past three decades introduced the use of 
certain psychological concepts into economics and finance in order to account for and 
measure the human factor. This thesis approaches the study of foreign direct investments and 
through them - corporate decision making from the perspective of behavioural finance.  
The analysis begins with the analysis of home bias in FDI flows at a global level. I argue 
that corporate financial decisions regarding FDIs are influenced by the institutional, cultural 
and location familiarity of the host market in addition to macroeconomic factors. This 
familiarity preference, similarly to investments in the equity markets is the observed home 
country bias.  It is insufficient to consider home bias in FDI flows just on a broad, global level 
but rather, this issue should be examined in various data segments. Therefore, home bias is 
analysed in a segmented analysis according to geographical, time and country income criteria. 
I further look into another behavioural finance concept – herding, that could be found in 
FDI flows. I look at herding from several aspects: contemporaneous herding around world 
and regional leaders and inter-temporal herding of direct investors around portfolio equity 
flows and regional FDI investments. Finally, when discussing FDIs, one shouldn’t avoid 
discussing the country policy implications.  
I estimate the probability that each of the previously established factors has on the 
probability that two countries will have FDI flows between them. Finding this probability has 
an impact on policies that countries can undertake in order to attract more FDIs. I find that the 
widely used cultural distance index has a very small, even negligible influence on the 
probability whether there will be FDI flows between two countries. I find that the institutional 
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proximity factors, represented through a shared membership in an economic and political 
organisation and a shared legal origin system have a much greater impact on this probability 
of having an FDI flows between two countries. For example, shared history is very important 
in the Asia-Pacific region; it increases the probability that there will be an FDI inflows 
relationship by 21%. The shared membership to an economic or political organisation for two 
countries will increase the FDI inflows probability by 13%. I find that the cultural distance 
index has a negligible effect probability that there will be an FDI relationship between two 
countries. This is a very important finding since cultural distances between nations as a 
sociological category, isn’t something that can be changed however, the institutional 
proximity factors are something that can be addressed and worked on in order to make the 
host country more familiar to investors.  
 
1.4. Near-home bias in Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investors are usually multinational corporations that have a long term 
investment horizon as they invest directly in real assets in a country different than their own. I 
investigate near-home bias in corporate decision making in an international context. There is 
extensive financial literature in the field of home bias in equity markets. Equity investors 
prefer local, domestic investment opportunities against foreign, further away ones (Lewis, 
1999). Since FDIs are by definition international, the concept of home bias in this case refers 
to the preference to invest in places that are more familiar in terms of geography, institutions 
and culture and is therefore entitled near-home bias. These familiarity factors in addition to 
the macroeconomics ones have a significant influence on the corporate decisions with respect 
to FDIs and that this is reflected in the FDI flows among the world countries. I account for the 
possibility that what is observed as near-home bias can also be explained by taking into 
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account asymmetric information and the costliness of conducting business abroad and do not 
find that near-home bias diminishes when those factors are taken into consideration.  
I contribute to the FDI literature by empirically testing a set of factors at a global, regional 
and country level and I also contribute to the home bias literature by extending its application 
on the international direct investment markets. I contribute to the existing FDI literature by 
using a large dataset in a bilateral country pair setting that offers a widespread look in the 
world’s FDI flows which enables a generalisation of the findings.  
 
1.5. Segmented Analysis of Near-home Bias in FDI Flows 
The observation of near-home bias in FDI inflows and outflows at a global level asserts 
the question of variability across regions and time periods. Is this near-home bias 
phenomenon that can be observed globally and is it something that can also be confirmed 
when the data are segmented according to various criteria?  The purpose of this analysis is to 
identify the differences among investors at a regional and country level, across time and when 
investments into various country income groups are considered. Near-home bias in FDI flows 
is not restricted to a particular region or country but can be observed throughout the world.  
Near-home bias prevails in regional investments with cultural and institutional factors being 
significant across the different continents. The individual countries exhibit some similarities 
and some differences which suggest that there is a need for further analysis.  
Globalization and the general capital markets liberalisation would lead to a conclusion 
that the observed near-home bias should diminish over time due to the reduced investment 
barriers. When I consider different time periods, I do not find support to the claim that near-
home bias has diminished over time but rather, it is still persistent.  
The direct investments that countries make may differ when it comes to countries with 
different levels of development. The World Bank provides very useful classifications of 
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countries according to various income levels per capita. One has to wonder if the observed 
near-home bias is something that is predominantly important when it comes to investments 
into developing countries where there is poorer country governance. I do not find that there is 
a difference in the direct investments of OECD countries across different country income 
groups and it can be observed that the near-home bias in persistent throughout these different 
groups. The segmented estimations offer greater insight in the nature of near-home bias across 
different regions, periods and country income groups and at any differences there might exist.   
 
1.6. Herding in Foreign Direct Investment 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether there is herding in the case of 
foreign direct investments. The decision process of making direct investments isn’t a 
transparent one. FDI theories suggest that firms that seek to expand in other markets are 
trying to assert their competitive advantage on the local market (Dunning, 1988). Specifically 
one FDI theory, the oligopoly theory, states that firms of certain industries that find 
themselves in an oligopolistic market are often forced and prone to follow and imitate their 
competitors in making investments abroad (Knickerboker, 1973). One reason for this can be 
competitiveness; firms may feel that the market would punish them if they’re perceived to be 
lagging in investment activity behind their main competitors.  Another may be utilizing the 
other company’s investigation and assessment of investment opportunities abroad. Similar 
conclusions are drawn in the finance literature that investigates herding in equity investors. 
Not unlike the oligopoly theory, the reason why investors may choose to follow a trend set by 
others is due to the perception that other investors have superior knowledge of the investment 
opportunities (Wermers, 1999). Though we may speculate on the true nature of the different 
reasons, there is serious empirical evidence suggesting that this phenomenon of herding is 
something that people are prone to in many different circumstances. This analysis offers 
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evidence on herding regarding FDI investments at a country level rather than firm level. I set 
out to investigate several hypotheses; whether direct investors from different countries follow 
the investments of a world leader, a regional leader, the sum of other regional investments to a 
host country or whether direct investors are motivated by an increased activity in the foreign 
portfolio flows in the host country. This is tested while controlling for the main 
macroeconomic drivers of FDI, the market size and the country openness as well as the 
physical, institutional and cultural common traits between the two countries in the bilateral 
pain. 
I find supporting evidence that there is herding in FDI outflows. I find that the herding 
mostly occurs on great distances i.e. when companies don’t have familiarity knowledge they 
resort to imitating the decisions of a world and regional leader. These findings shouldn’t be 
surprising. Companies from a highly developed country, like the US and the UK are usually 
among the first ones to go into a new and emerging market or in a market where new 
investment opportunities have arisen, something which other investors from other countries 
may view as a highly positive signal for the investment quality of a market. I find some 
evidence that portfolio investors and regional FDI investments herd other FDI investors 
however this evidence is taken with caution because of data constrains.  
 
1.7. Probability of Attracting FDI Flows 
The purpose of this analysis is to quantify the macroeconomic, proximity, institutional and 
cultural factors in terms of probability of an FDI flow occurring between two countries in 
order to see if countries can do something to enhance their attractiveness for FDI. In general, 
FDIs are considered to be very beneficial for the host countries as they promote growth 
(Daude and Fratzscher, 2008). Using a binary dependant variable method set to be zero if 
there isn’t an FDI relationship between country i and j and 1 if there is a positive relationship, 
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I show how the aforementioned factors increase or decrease the probability of an FDI 
relationship occurring between two countries. 
Certainly, very little can be done to influence the physical location but there is certainly 
something to be done about reducing the institutional and cultural distance among countries. I 
consider a set of macroeconomic, physical, institutional and cultural factors in order to 
determine if they are significant predictors of the probability of having an FDI relationship 
with another country. These factors tell us that managers don’t feel comfortable investing in 
places that they aren’t familiar with. Countries can use this knowledge to in order to attract 
more FDI. 
1.8. Conclusion 
 
I examine the foreign direct investments from a behavioural finance point of view. I do 
this by considering two concepts, home bias and herding that are well established in the 
equity markets literature. I find supporting evidence and show that there is near-home bias in 
FDI flows. These findings are confirmed on FDI inflows and outflows. The near-home bias 
that can be observed at a global level is also present when we take a look at different 
geographical regions, namely continents and countries. Results show that this phenomenon is 
present in all regions with some individual country variability. Home country bias is also 
present across time periods and in different country income groups. I further find evidence 
suggesting that direct investors herd in their investment choices and imitate the investors with 
perceived advance knowledge of the investments opportunities. Because these investors are 
world and regional leaders in direct investments other investors follow their investment 
location choices. Finally, the factors that are used in this thesis to denote physical, cultural 
and institutional proximity are significant predictors of the probability of two countries having 
an FDI relationship.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter surveys the past work in several fields that are related to the theoretical basis 
for the empirical analysis in this thesis. It looks into the theories and determinants of FDI 
flows between countries, home bias and herding in equity markets and the use of binary 
dependent variable models in FDI literature.  
Since the theoretical base for this thesis stems from several different areas of literature 
ranging from international business and macroeconomics to areas in finance and psychology, 
the review of literature is done with the specific research questions in this study in mind. I 
start by looking into a brief overview of the development of the FDI literature since the 
beginnings in the 1950s and I look into the modern developments in this literature as well as 
the different geographical or other focuses of the studies. While it is very important for the 
results to be confirmed at a global level, it is equally important for the data to be segmented 
according to various criteria in order to obtain generality of the findings as well as cross 
sectional differences in the findings. The home bias literature section provides an overview of 
the phenomenon, its determinants and the main studies of home bias in the equity markets. I 
then move to an overview of the herding literature in equity markets as well as a theoretical 
link between the FDI literature and the herding phenomenon. Finally, I look into a specific 
area of FDI namely, studies that use a binary dependant model. These probabilistic models 
have a very useful application in research questions that have a possibility of a qualitative 
dependent variable which can be converted in a binary dependent variable. Using these 
models one could quantify the probability of FDI flows among two countries and what 
determines this probability. This final analysis has a country policy aspect to it, which is 
especially important for countries that wish to increase or attract more FDI flows.  
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2.2. FDI Literature 
Definition of a foreign direct investment 
The OECD defines foreign direct investment as “a category of cross-border 
investment made by a resident entity in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective 
of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise ( the direct investment enterprise)  that is 
resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor” (OECD benchmark definition 
for FDI, 2008). Since this thesis uses FDI statistics data from the OECD it also follows their 
benchmark definitions regarding FDI. The lasting interest is recorded both at the time of the 
initial investment between those two entities as well as at the time of all other subsequent 
capital transactions. The direct investment enterprises can also be referred to as “foreign 
affiliates” (subsidiaries, associates, unincorporated business) that are either directly or 
indirectly owned by the direct investor or their non-resident branches. A direct investor can be 
classified to any sector of the economy and could be: an individual, group of related 
individuals, incorporated or unincorporated enterprises, public or private enterprises, group of 
related enterprises, government bodies, an estate, trust or other social organisations or any 
combination from the aforementioned entities. In the cases when two enterprises each own 
10% or more of each other’s voting power both of them are counted as direct investors in the 
other. The total FDI flows of one country may thus be a positive or a negative value 
depending on the levels of capital investment in each observed year. The OECD benchmark 
definition was first issued in 1983 and its aim is to set the world standard for direct 
investment statistics. It is also fully compatible with the standards and definitions of the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) manual regarding this issue. The OECD benchmark for 
the data collection provides its member countries with detailed guidance on how the 
comprehensive breakdowns by partner country and industry activity should be compiled. The 
statistics on FDI as requested from the OECD member countries should contain data on all 
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partner countries individually as well as for all major geographic regions and economic zones, 
currency or monetary organisations. However, since data on geographic regions and zones 
isn’t readily available for many other variables and from other data sources, only sovereign 
countries can be considered for this thesis. The bilateral data provide very valuable 
information to researchers to identify and examine at a more detailed level any differences 
that arise from bilateral comparisons as well as improve the quantitative analysis by providing 
a large and rich dataset (OECD benchmark, 2008).  
The statistics on FDI provided by the OECD relate to the transactions and positions 
between direct investors and their investment enterprises rather than to the financing and 
operations of those enterprises. This thesis subsequently also focuses on the FDI corporate 
decisions and the nature of the choices and not with the profitability of the investments or any 
measures of the used inputs and the produced outputs by the multinational enterprise. Due to 
the ever-increasing complexity of the multinational enterprise structure, the OECD rule on the 
geographic location of the direct investment positions follows a debtor/creditor principle. This 
means that the geographic allocation is made according to the country of residence of the 
direct investment enterprise (direct investor) even if the funds are paid or received from 
another economy. A source of major concern for the definition or analysis of FDI for any data 
provider is the approach to identifying the immediate and ultimate host/investor countries. At 
present the OECD requires that its members report on the immediate investing and host 
countries with additional, supplement data on the ultimate host or investor country where 
possible.  
The lasting interest implies the existence of a long term relationship between the two 
sides of the direct investment and a significant degree of influence on the management of the 
acquired enterprise. The current recommended methodology adopted by the OECD whose 
data are used in this study states that a lasting, direct investment is made when there is an 
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acquirement of 10% of the voting power of an enterprise by an investor resident in another 
economy even though there are many arguments in favour of the fact that when it comes to 
large enterprises, a controlling stake can be achieved by far a lesser percentage of the 
company stock than 10%. The ever increasing complexity of the multinational enterprises 
contributes to several issues regarding what can be counted as an FDI. For example, 
confusion may arise in several situations when: there is a continuation of control (firm A 
owns firm B in a second economy which in turn owns firm C in a third economy); fellow 
enterprises (firm A owns firms B and C which are in two different economies) or multiple 
direct investors (firms A and B from two different economies own controlling interests in firm 
C in a different economy). The OECD benchmark definition for FDI aims to follow the 
general criterion of 10% of the voting power in establishing whether each enterprise under 
consideration is a subsidiary, associate or not relevant in FDI and subsequently if an 
enterprise is considered to be a subsidiary or an associate it would be considered as FDI.  
According to the OECD benchmarks, a subsidiary is a direct investment enterprise in 
which an investor owns more than 50% of its voting power or where an investor and its 
subsidiaries combined own more than 50% of the voting power of another enterprise. The 
associate in a direct investment enterprise is an entity in which an investor owns at least 10% 
of the voting power and no more than 50% or where an investor and its subsidiaries combined 
own at least 10% and no more than 50% of the voting power in an enterprise. In a special 
situation, when an associate, either as an individual or in combination with its subsidiaries 
own more than 50% of an enterprise, this enterprise is regarded for FDI purposes as an 
associate of the higher level investor. What is not relevant in FDI is an enterprise in which an 
investor own less than 10% of its voting power.  
The OECD benchmark states that the main financial instrument components of FDI 
are equity and debt instruments. The equity may include common and preferred shares, 
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reserves, capital contributions and reinvestment of earnings. The dividends, distributed branch 
earnings, reinvested earnings and undistributed branch earnings are components of FDI 
income on equity. The debt instruments include bonds, debentures, commercial paper, 
promissory notes, non-participating preference shares and other non-equity securities: loans, 
deposits, trade credit and other accounts payable/receivable. Consequently all cross border 
positions and transactions related to these instruments between the enterprises that are 
involved in the FDI relationship are included in FDI flows however positions and transactions 
in financial derivatives between the two enterprises in the bilateral pair are excluded from 
FDI.  
 
Historical development of FDI literature 
FDI theories originated in the 1960s with the intention to understand the 
international capital and trade flows after the Second World War on a firm level (Buckey 
(2002)). There are many ways in which to approach a review on the literature on FDI. A 
topical review of FDI is done by Agarwal (1980) where theories are grouped together based 
on some common feature. Moosa (2002) following previous work done by Lizondo (1991) 
and Agarwal (1980) states that FDI theories can be classified in four main groups according 
to market structure: theories assuming perfect markets, imperfect market, other theories and 
theories assuming other variables and recognizes that this classification may have its 
weaknesses. Authors can be also grouped based on the geographical classification of the 
FDI flows. Papers often consider only one country’s FDI flows with others, or FDI flows to 
a specific region. It would be best to start with a basic historical development of FDI theory. 
There are three main theories that explain the motivation behind multinational corporations 
(MNCs); the monopolistic, oligopolistic and the Dunning’s (1980; 1995) eclectic or OLI 
 26 
(ownership, location, internalisation) paradigm. The theories during the 1960s and 1970s 
were based on the market structure the firms operate in.  
 
Monopolistic theory 
Hymer (1960) and Kindleberger (1969) have developed the monopolistic theory that 
proposes that firms operate in imperfect market conditions and therefore seek to take 
advantage of some superiority they have over the firms in the local markets. This is their 
monopolistic advantage and it can be in anything from the goods markets to an R&D 
advantage, from better marketing strategy to superior product quality as supported later on 
by Caves (1971; 1974) as well as a better ability to integrate vertically or horizontally. The 
monopolistic advantages may also arise through governmental action in the FDI receiving 
country. For example if the government in trying to protect the domestic production 
imposes strict trade barriers, it may indirectly stimulate FDI flows. Caves (1971; 1974) 
argues that firms that achieve horizontal integration are in possession of unique advantages 
from their competitors because they can really focus on brand development, recognition and 
protected trademarks. When large domestic firms decide to use their unique R&D and 
marketing advantage positions in the local markets and expand abroad, they are able to 
more easily establish their presence as multinationals since other smaller domestic firms in 
foreign markets do not have the same resources that they have. They use their monopolistic 
advantage in the local, foreign market as foreign direct investors. The monopolistic 
advantage also comes to mind when we consider the primary motive for an FDI which is the 
resource seeking investment. Many MNEs do not have a choice but to invest abroad. The 
privileged or restricted access to the raw materials and minerals or other resources that can 
only be found in certain geographic areas supports the monopolistic theory of FDI.  
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Oligopolistic theory 
The oligopolistic theory was introduced and developed by Knickerbocker (1973) and 
further developed by Kim and Lyn (1987), Caves (1974), Severn and Laurence (1974), and 
Mansfield, Romeo and Wagner (1979). The main idea behind this theory is that the 
international direct investment is simply a strategic reaction to an anticipated behaviour by 
oligopolistic competitors. The studies involving the oligopolistic theory report empirical 
evidence that firms that operate in an oligopolistic industry setting and strongly react to 
their competitors’ advances and follow their actions in order to replicate them. Thus if home 
market comprises of two or three firms and if one of these firms decides to start investing in 
a particular region or country, others will have to follow suit in order to maintain 
desirability in the eyes of the shareholders. Knickerbocker (1973) analyses the behaviour of 
US manufacturing firms between 1948 and 1967 and observes that companies, in an attempt 
to avoid risk (whether it may be from the stock market or the investment decisions) would 
follow one another into a foreign market. Firms in oligopolistic markets follow their 
competitors in their FDI decisions. He argues that the firms which engage is mass 
production and mass markets are the ones most likely to engage in this kind of behaviour. 
Caves (1971;1974) argues that investments occur from industries that have an oligopolistic 
structure. His position is understandable since at the time (the 1970s) the truly large 
companies that would be making foreign direct investments in rather constrained capital 
markets conditions would probably have been very few per industry. It is much later that 
this oligopolistic market structure can be overcome by a more competitive one. And it is 
probably still an oligopolistic structure for some industries like aviation or heavy 
manufacturing. Caves’ contributions are also important for the distinction between the 
different types of market integration of the firms. Namely, the motives for investment 
abroad can be simple, to achieve horizontal integration i.e. produce the same product 
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abroad, in a new market and take advantage of the economies of scale; vertical integration, 
where the MNE would also branch out in production and expand to new markets with the 
foreign acquisition and a further diversification of a conglomerate.   
  
Eclectic paradigm  
The following decade, 1980s brought a more complex explanation for FDI. The 
eclectic or ownership; location; internalisation (OLI) paradigm developed by Dunning 
(1980, 1988), connects the three factors - ownership, location and internalisation by having 
a simultaneous effect on the international corporate investments’ motives. The ownership 
advantages address the why question, i.e. the fact that the firm has some advantages over the 
firms on the local markets such as lower costs of production that give it the so called 
advantages based on ownership. Localisation factors account for the geographical aspects of 
the international investments and the motives behind particular decisions. The second set of 
advantages can also be found in the work of Buckley and Casson (1976) as a further 
clarification of the internalisation theory. Dunning in his paradigm separates them from the 
internalisation factor. This was a point of much criticism later on from several authors, 
notably Rugman (1986), Casson 1987, Itaki (1991) and Horaguchi, H. & Toyne, B, (1990).  
The third group of factors – the internalisation advantages draws on the previous work by 
Buckley and Casson (2003) and focuses on the firm’s choice out of the different ways of 
market entry to internalise, where the market does not exist or functions poorly so that 
transactions costs of the external route are high. The eclectic paradigm essentially analyses 
why and where multinational companies would invest abroad. The multinational company 
can transfer unique internal knowledge in other markets at low costs by establishing a 
subsidiary abroad and achieve economics of scale. It chooses locations where it can make 
use of its economic, political or cultural advantages. The world has undergone drastic 
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changes during the last two decades (Dunning (2002)). Financial liberalisation efforts 
started during late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Researchers have started to account for the 
liberalisations in capital flows and the changes in the world political maps as well as the 
impact of globalization. FDI studies during the last two decades try to identify the new 
factors that impact the FDI flows such as whether low labour costs will shift production 
towards the emerging and transition markets economies and how does their political 
instability influence the level of FDI they receive (Bevan and Estrin, (2004)).  
 
Determinants of FDI  
Why do firms go abroad and what influences their decisions? These questions have 
been the focus of most FDI studies that attempt to empirically or qualitatively test the 
determinants of FDI among countries. Recent work on FDI regardless of the geographical 
focus of the data feature the GDP and GDP per capita as proxies for the economic pull of an 
economy and are an important determinants of FDI flows. It is used for both emerging and 
developed countries [Kinoshita and Campos (2003), Bevan, Esterin (2004), Botrić and 
Škuflić (2006)]. GDP and GDP per capita are most commonly used as major determinant 
for FDI flows between two countries. This is due to the fact that FDI is strongly influenced 
by the size of the markets of the partner countries because FDI flows tend to gravitate 
towards larger economies.  
Recent FDI literature features some measurement for country openness as the 
second major determinant of FDI flows. Countries that are said to be more ‘open’ with 
increased trade flows or portfolio investments would be more likely to engage in FDI. 
Openness indicators include the country’s exports or market capitalisation and cost of 
borrowing [Botrić and Škuflić (2006), Kinoshita and Campos (2003)]. FDI flows are higher 
to more open countries because the capital flows towards these countries are easier than 
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towards less open countries. Hansen and Rand (2006) analyse the causal links between the 
FDI and growth in developing countries and find a positive association of FDI and GDP and 
a causal link from FDI to GDP in both the short and long run. Balasubramanyam,et al. 
(1996) study the role that FDI plays in the growth process of developing countries with 
respect to different trade policy regimens. In a cross section of 46 developing countries, they 
find that the beneficial economic effect of FDI is stronger when for the countries which are 
also more outwardly open to trade. This means that countries which are more open to trade 
attract more FDI. Chakrabarti (2001) provides an overview on the main groups of economic 
determinants which can be found in the literature on FDI determinants literature, conducts a 
sensitivity analysis and concludes that the influence of many of the used economic variables 
can be vary varied, aside from the very robust influence of market size expressed through 
the GDP, the other groups of economic factors such as labour cost, trade barriers, growth 
rate of GDP, trade deficit, exchange rates and taxes appear very sensitive to small 
alterations in the analysis. Wu and Li (2008) analyse the impact of trade liberalisation on the 
trade flows in developing countries. They find that trade liberalisation significantly and 
positively influences trade flows in the countries. This confirms the significance of 
openness to trade as a determinant of FDI flows.  
Cultural proximity is often assumed through geographical distance or shared border 
(Galego, Vieira and Vieira, 2004). Although it can be a significant determinant for FDI, the 
importance of distance may be diluted nowadays, with globalization and as the capital flows 
now move with fewer barriers. Culture can be approximated in different ways. A very popular 
proxy for cultural distance between nations is via the cultural dimensions as developed by 
Hofstede (1980; 1983). Kogut and Sigh (1988) developed an index for cultural distance based 
on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions which is very popular in FDI studies and some 
international trade flow studies. West and Graham (2004) develop a theory for a linguistic 
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based cultural measure in which they argue that in addition to the cultural dimensions a shared 
language should also be added to a cultural measure. It can be concluded that culture 
influences can be approximated in various ways, through organisational culture (like 
Hofstede) or through more broad categories such as language or history of a nation. 
Differences in culture cannot be ignored because they influence differences in investor 
protection in different countries (Stulz, Williamson, 2003). They also find that country 
openness reduces the cultural (especially religious) influence that it has on international trade 
and investments. Culture and egalitarianism are the primary focus in Licht et al. (2011). They 
focus on what they refer to as a key cultural dimension – egalitarianism, in order to identify 
what drives international investment. They find that the distance in the countries’ stances on 
egalitarianism has a negative role in investments in the world and suggest that it’s a possible 
explanation for home bias. Some studies focus on the influence that immigrants have on the 
choice of FDI destination country (Aharoni (1966); Gillespie et al. (1999); Amadi (2004). 
This influence can also be captured through the effects that the shared spoken language of 
minority population between two FDI partner countries.  
Kirkpatrick et al (2006) point to the need for good country governance and regulation 
especially when it comes to developing countries. Institutional distance is defined as the 
extent of similarity or dissimilarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
institutions of two countries (Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Kostova, Zaheer, 1999; Kostova, 1996). 
These studies stress the importance of institutional familiarity on the FDI flows. Institutional 
similarity may be difficult to capture for a large cross section of countries and like the culture 
it can also be approximated in various ways. Country-specific governance is also an important 
factor for doing business in a particular location. Kaufman, Karaay and Materazzi (2009) have 
developed an elaborate database with six world governance indicators that capture country 
specific factors of governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
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effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. These kinds of 
indicators have been used in FDI literature in various forms (Green and Cunningham (1975); 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002); Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007), Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002); Grande et al. (2009); Boyacigiller (1990)) and they are found to have a 
stimulating influence on FDI. Klostad and Villanger (2008) study the FDI determinants across 
different service industries on a wide cross section of countries. They find that institutional 
quality and democracy plays a big role for FDI and that the absence of this will deter 
investments below a certain threshold. Clark and Kassimatis (2009) investigate the effects of 
country default risk as a determinant in FDI inflows to eight Latin American countries from 
1986 to 2000. They find supporting evidence that the country default risk is a separate risk 
from political risk or exchange rate risk and that it adds more to the costliness of doing 
business abroad. Levis (1979) considers the political situation in a country to be an active 
determinant in addition to the economic factors of investment flows and focuses on an 
empirical examination of the relationship between the state of the political stability of a 
country and its FDI flows. 
Investors prefer locations where there is political stability and rule of law and 
governments work effectively, where the regulatory quality and accountability are high and 
corruption is under control because that will reduce the perceived costliness of doing business 
abroad. Institutional distance is linked to the establishment of legitimacy in the host country 
and the transfer of strategic operations and organisation practices from the parent firm to the 
subsidiary abroad. Being a member of the same economic organisation or having similar legal 
systems play a significant role in the investment decisions. Such similarities breed familiarity 
bias (Brainard, 1997) which makes it easier for corporate managers to make international 
investments if the destination markets have similar structure as the home market. Bilateral tax 
treaties may explain what drives investors to a particular location (Errunza and Senbet, 1981; 
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di Giovanni, 2003). Van de Laar and De Neubourg (2007) investigate the role of emotions 
among the managers of Dutch firms and their FDI decisions. They conduct a survey analysis 
and find that direct investment decisions are frequently affected by the managers’ personal 
preferences towards a particular investment destination. Guiso et al. (2009) find that bilateral 
trust between citizens of two countries will likely enhance cooperation among them because 
this trust creates a perception of a safe investment opportunity and an illusion of a reduced 
risk. Their survey results (a rank index of the level of trustworthiness of managers from 
different countries) show that there is a home bias effect in the trust in that managers are more 
likely to trust their fellow countrymen than those from abroad.  
In the general FDI literature, few categories of factors emerge as important when 
considering FDI, such as general macroeconomic influences in terms of GDP and country 
openness, and various political, socio-cultural or institutional determinants which help capture 
the finer points of the FDI flow patterns across countries.  
 
Geographical focus of FDI studies 
In this thesis, I consider a very wide country group that enables me to generalise the 
findings by considering both the broad and segmented picture, which might not be otherwise 
possible in a geographically narrow-focused study. Most FDI studies are conducted on a 
selective geographical scope, often from a single-country perspective and this single country 
is very frequently the US (Benito and Gripsurd (1992); Grosse and Travino (1996); Grosse 
and Goldberg (1991); Green and Cunningham (1975); Sethi et al., 2003; Grande et al., 2009; 
Boyacigiller (1990)). Other FDI studies are conducted for specific countries or regions such 
as Wezel (2003),  analysing the determinants of German FDI inflows in Latin America, Hara 
and Razafimahefa (2005) analysing Japanese FDI inflows. The attention to the interest that 
the immigrants’ homeland may play in the FDI outflows from one country was raised by 
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Aharoni (1966) who analysed the US FDIs made to Israel. Gillespie et al. (1999) further study 
the diaspora communities in the US and the US direct investment abroad for four large US 
immigrant communities.  
The EU and the EU accession countries are a geographic area of particular interest for 
FDI studies. Nitsch (2000) considers a comparison of the amount of trade between countries 
within the EU and countries of the EU with an outside EU partner country with similar size 
and proximity and finds that the trade within the EU countries is about ten times higher 
suggesting that the home bias based on national borders is still very influential and that 
countries rely on higher cultural and institutional familiarity.  Janicki and Wunnava (2004) 
analyse the FDI determinants in the EU accession countries and their particularities. The 
Central and East European Countries (CEEC) are the geographical focus of the study of FDI 
determinants in Bevan and Esterin (2004), while South-East European countries are the 
geographical focus in Bandelj (2002) and Botric and Skufic (2005).  
 
Psychic Distance  
 The collective influence that a certain social or cultural environment has on the 
perceptions and subsequent decisions of a manager (or any person) is the subject of a 
management and marketing literature strand that uses the term psychic distance. The 
theoretical background for psychic distance is set by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) 
and Johanson and Vahlne (1977). They introduce the concept of psychic distance in the 
context of the extension of firm activities to new markets. Psychic distance is defined as 
“…factors preventing or disturbing the flows of information between firm and market. 
Examples of such factors are differences in language, culture, political systems, level of 
education, level of industrial development etc…” (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975 p. 
308). They develop a model for the internationalisation process of the firm with focuses on its 
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gradual acquisition, integration and use of knowledge about foreign markets. They start with 
the assumption that internationalisation is the consequence of a series of incremental 
decisions and the most important obstacle to it is the lack of knowledge and resources. The 
perceived risks of investments decrease gradually through increased exposure to a foreign 
market and thus expect a stepwise extension of operations. They also argue that psychic 
distance is not constant and it changes over time as communication systems develop and trade 
and other social exchange build up. Psychic distance isn’t the only important factor but 
market size is crucial one to consider as well. This topic is revisited by Johanson and Vahlne 
(2009) where they also discuss the importance of trust and commitment building. Zhu and 
Yang (2009) analyse the role of psychic distance in the spreading of financial crises in four 
cases. They represent the psychic distance through dimensions that include language, 
geography, economic membership and development level. Psychic distance is used in 
marketing studies (Sousa and Bradley, 2008) to assess the differences between countries. 
Brewer (2007) systematically analyses the psychic distance aspects and proposes that national 
indicators of psychic distance should include: commercial ties (trade or foreign investment), 
political, historical, geographical, social (cultural) information and development 
(immigration, corruption etc.) ties. He then calculates a psychic distance index between 
around 30 countries from these aspects. Having a composite index of all of these factors may 
well capture the negative impact that human behaviour has on cross-country flows of any kind 
but it is also very necessary to be aware which of these factors contribute more or less and in 
which manner if we wish to draw conclusions on what determines the observed patterns in 
international flows. If it’s true that people prefer to invest in familiar places and that this 
creates a certain near-home bias, based on both geographical location and culture and 
organisation one would need to identify these factors separately not as a joint index.  
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Some studies use cultural distance (especially as defined by Hofstede (1980)) as the 
only representative of the manager’s psychic distance in the FDI location choice (Bertrand et 
al., 2004). The culture distance as defined by Hofstede and represented through the four 
dimensions is a sociological description of different attitudes between people. It does make a 
difference if the managers are used to an environment with different attitudes of masculinity 
vs. femininity for example but there are other aspects of cultural similarity between nations 
which aren’t depicted by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions such as speaking the same language 
or sharing history with another country. These aspects will make the environment of a country 
more familiar to a corporate manager but they will not necessarily decrease the cultural 
distance index between two nations. Let us consider the colonial links between countries for 
example. In terms of the cultural distance as a measure for the psychic distance that the 
manager will exhibit, a UK manager isn’t likely to be very culturally proximate to an African 
manager or employees in one of the Commonwealth nations according to Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions. However, a UK manager is far more likely to feel familiar to a former colonial 
African nation than let’s say a former French colonial African nation. Odds are that according 
to a cultural distance measure, the UK manager would be culturally equidistant from any 
African nation but a UK manager would prefer to invest in a former UK colony rather then a 
former French colony. This same notion can be extended to shared language. Even though 
these countries would be culturally different, they do share an official language which would 
increase the familiarity and with it the near-home bias that a UK manager would exhibit in the 
choice of the location to invest abroad.  
A range of psychic distance stimuli have been used in large datasets as significant 
predictors of trade flows (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006). I build the analysis of near-home bias 
in FDI on a similar understanding. Corporate managers prefer to invest in foreign destinations 
near home not only in terms of physical distance, but also in terms of institutional and 
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geographical distance.  Psychic distance explains the factors that influence and help shape the 
manager’s decision to invest in familiar places. Near-home bias is the empirical manifestation 
of these predisposition factors, it is what can be observed and empirically tested in FDI flows. 
It puts the familiarity preferences which are rooted in the psychic distance that corporate 
managers have in a geographical context based on the location of the investor and the 
investment destination. This geographical context and various institutional and cultural 
familiarity factors contribute to a home country bias in investments.  
2.3.  Home Bias Literature  
The term home bias (French & Poterba (1991); Lewis (1999)) is used in the context of 
portfolio investments to describe the tendency that investors overweight their domestic 
investments thus not taking the full advantage of international diversification.  French and 
Poterba (1991) form their argument through the fact that different nations have differences in 
fortunes and returns. This should drive investors from any part of the world to seek to 
diversify their portfolios internationally in order to use the benefits of financial diversification 
which have been known and recognised for a long time. In spite of this they observe that most 
investors hold nearly all of their wealth in domestic assets. They do consider that international 
barriers to trade could pose a limit to international diversification however in their sample 
they cannot observe that such barriers are in place or that they impede international 
investment. Another impediment to international investment may be the increased taxation in 
foreign markets however in this case as well they do not observe that there are significant 
differences in the cross border taxation burden. They also cannot explain the home bias 
through consideration of transaction costs. In another core home bias study, Lewis (1999) 
finds a puzzling prevalence of home bias in equity markets and international consumption. In 
an attempt to test whether equity portfolio home bias can explain the international 
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consumption home bias she finds that even if equity home bias can be eliminated and can no 
longer be measured, consumption home bias will continue to exist.  
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) study whether the capital flows among countries 
equalise the yield for investors or whether the saving remains within the same country and 
doesn’t flow abroad. If the capital is perfectly immobile then the domestic savings will be 
equal to the domestic investment. Conversely, if there is indeed capital mobility in the 
international markets then the investors would seek to take advantage of the best investment 
interest rates and therefore the domestic savings and the domestic investment would no longer 
be the same. This close link between the amount of domestic saving and domestic investment 
is known as the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and is one of the six puzzles in international 
economics and finance identified by Rogoff and Obstfeld (2001) alongside with the home 
bias in equity and international trade puzzle. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) used data from the 
OECD in the period from 1960-1974 and estimate a model where the dependent variable is 
the ratio of the gross domestic investment and the gross domestic product. The independent 
variable is the ratio of domestic savings and gross domestic product. They find that the 
coefficient (beta) of this ratio is always very high (near one).  They conclude that because 
barriers to capital flows impede the flow of capital among countries, the domestic saving is 
largely converted to domestic investment instead of the expected preference for the highest 
yield. The capital markets have significantly become liberalised in the past two-three decades 
and consequently the effects of the Felstein -Horika phenomenon have been found to have 
diminished (Jansen, 2000) but haven’t disappeared fully.  Caporale et al. (2005) find that 
empirical evidence in support of the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) conclusion. They state that 
even in the presence of perfectly mobile capital markets, a high savings-investment 
correlation can still arise because of things like productivity shocks in the domestic and 
foreign markets. The unexplained positive correlation between domestic savings and 
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investment even in a situation of relatively unobstructed capital markets offers some support 
to the home bias phenomenon claims that people prefer to invest locally or nearby. Feldstein 
and Horioka (1980) also conclude that much of the direct investments in the world are made 
to enhance the trade positions or to take advantage of special knowledge and as such these 
investments would not be sensitive to the differences in interest rates.  
The past two decades have seen much relaxation of the barriers in capital flows (Artis, 
Hofmann, 2006). They find that the home bias has declined with the increase of shared 
international consumption risk. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) analyse the evidence on capital 
immobility and the lack of portfolio diversification in international flows. They develop a 
model of asymmetric information between countries to help rationalise the observed high 
correlation between domestic saving and investment. A case has been made that globalization 
removes investment obstacles which leads to greater financial efficiency in the world in which 
case we should observe that investors are internationally diversified (Stulz, 2005). Investors 
can diversify their portfolios by holding assets in many foreign countries. They don’t often do 
this, however. Karoyi and Stulz (2002) observe that the home bias is still substantial in the 
international markets. They argue that the existing empirical evidence links the country risk 
premium with its covariance with the world market portfolio. The theoretical asset pricing 
literature and the models it uses fail to explain the portfolio holdings of investors, the equity 
flows and the cross country correlation properties. They find that the home bias effect has an 
increasing influence on local asset prices.  
The benefits of the liberalisation of the capital markets should also be expected in the 
world of FDI. If it’s easier to invest we should, similarly to the equity markets, observe less 
influence of the cultural, institutional and other familiarity factors which are still preset in 
investments of any kind. Stulz (2005) however, finds that the country irrelevance proposition 
of international portfolio diversification theory doesn’t hold and that a lot of the investments 
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take place at home or among rich countries. He also finds that home bias does diminish over 
time with the increased capital mobility in the international markets. Ke et al. (2009) 
investigate home bias in international investment decisions using US data on mutual fund 
holdings and find strong evidence that US investors decidedly prefer to invest heavily in 
domestic stocks. They also point out that the real degree of home bias in equity markets 
(especially in the US) is probably more serious that what is captured in the literature. 
Cumming and Dai (2010) investigate local bias in US venture capital investments and find 
that venture capitalists exhibit strong bias in their investment decisions; they tend to gravitate 
closer to their home state.  Wolf (2000) looks into the premise that if trade barriers were the 
sole culprit for home bias, it should disappear once borders are removed. He finds that home 
bias persists even within national states of the U.S. means that there are other forces behind 
home bias besides the intuitive barriers of trade explanation. Grinblatt (2001) documents the 
tendency of investors in Finnish firms to buy, hold and sell stocks of firms which are located 
near to the investors. He differentiates between the level of sophistication of the investors and 
concludes that the influence of culture, language and distance is more prominent among 
investors who are less savvy rather than the more knowledgeable investors. The home bias 
phenomenon can be observed in almost all types of markets and any level of analysis (within 
a country or at an international level). Tesar and Verner (1995) study the link between home 
bias and high turnover in international portfolio investment in 5 OECD countries. They find 
strong home bias in the national portfolios despite the benefits of international diversification. 
They also find that the structure of the portfolios doesn’t simply show a risk diversification 
but it reflects other factors as well which contribute to the observed home bias. They conclude 
that the high turnover that is present for some securities has little bearing on the net 
investment positions which means that high stock turnover doesn’t explain the home bias 
puzzle. Coval and Moskowitz (1999) show that there is a home bias at home, investigating 
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home bias in the US markets. They find that US investment managers exhibit “a strong 
preference for locally headquartered firms”. They also find that asymmetric information 
makes geographic proximity a very important factor in determining the investor portfolio 
choices. They use common language (to also approximate historical and colonial familiarity) 
and listing on the LSE, measurements for market depth (GDP) and transaction costs. In a 
related study, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) investigate the geography of investment and 
mutual fund performance. They find that there is a very strong link between the fund 
managers that earn abnormal returns and investments in firms that are nearby. These 
managers tend to overinvest in close-by firms. This trading superiority is consistent with 
managers having a superior knowledge for local firms. 
 
Determinants of home bias 
Home bias literature states that the international investors do not hold the world 
market portfolio. Kang and Stulz (1997) investigate the reasons for home bias. They perform 
their analysis on stock ownership of Japanese firms by non-Japanese investors over a long 
period from 1975 to 1991. The basic premise of international diversification is that both 
domestic and international investors will tilt their portfolio holdings towards stocks with the 
highest expected returns. The study that Kang and Stulz (1997) performed did not find 
supporting evidence for that claim. They observe that foreign investors hold more stocks in 
the ‘more visible’ Japanese firms, firms with higher size, higher turnovers etc., consistent 
with the view that international investors flock towards more internationally known firms. 
Cultural influences are the focus on many studies on what determines home bias as well as 
FDI. Portes and Rey (2005) investigate the determinants of international (cross-border) equity 
flows. They perform their analysis on bilateral cross border equity flows between 14 countries 
during an 8 year period panel data. They use a gravity type model which they find explains 
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both international transactions in financial assets as well as the trade flows of goods. As 
means of capturing the asymmetric information or transaction costs they include the physical 
distance, telephone calls traffic, bank branches, trading hours overlap between the countries or 
degree or insider trading. They find weak evidence of diversification motive in asset trading at 
yearly data frequency. They do find strong evidence that the information variables greatly 
improve the explanatory power of their gravity type model. They find that international 
markets aren’t frictionless but rather strongly prone to information asymmetries or familiarity 
effects. The findings of this study have a great implication for the home bias literature in that 
they expand it to international flows in both the financial assets investments and international 
trade side of the flows. These findings imply that home bias could be expected to be present 
in FDI flows as well. The different countries have different access and attitudes to information 
sets, something that greatly influences their investment decisions and patterns. All this has 
severe implications in the international capital markets.  
Anderson et al (2011) consider the widely cited cultural dimensions developed by 
Hofstede (1980) in their cross-sectionally wide study of home bias in institutionally managed 
portfolios highlighting the importance of the cultural determinants in any home bias study.  
Geographical proximity and cultural similarities are mentioned in a number of home bias 
studies in different areas (Rauch, 1999). Distance in both culture and geography yield in bank 
lending (Mian, 2006) because it makes the lending informationally difficult. The greater 
distance makes bilateral negotiations between braches and headquarters difficult to overcome. 
He finds that controls for bank size, legal institutions, risk preferences and unobserved 
borrower heterogeneity don’t explain their findings but that distance remains a detrimental 
factor in the unequal investment.  
The factor that the immigration presents to home bias is considered in several studies. 
Foad (2008) captures the effects of immigration population in investing. He finds that inward 
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migration is positively correlated with increased foreign equity positions and reduced home 
bias. Increased migration also increases the information flows which is consistent with the 
expectation that the asymmetric information findings in home bias literature. White (2007) 
uses a gravity model specification to investigate the effects of immigration in bilateral trade. 
The familiarity effect is measured by the number of immigrants/emigrants of country i living 
in country j relative to the total country’s population. He uses a shared border, language and 
distance to measure home bias. Similarly, Massa and Simonov (2004) analyse familiarity bias 
in the investors’ choices in portfolio investments. They measure the home bias by using 
variables for geographic proximity and holding period, education level and immigration status 
of the investors.  The immigrants’ effects on investments abroad can be captured through any 
shared language that a minority population group of one country shares with another country. 
Seasholes and Zhu (2010) find that individual investors tilt their portfolios towards 
locally headquartered firms i.e. more familiar investment opportunities. They conclude that 
individuals do not help incorporate information into stock prices. Licht et al (2011) suggest 
that the influence of egalitarianism in the international investments may help explain home 
bias. They use data on cross national investment flows of bond and equity instruments, 
syndicated loans and mergers and acquisitions and control for many of the known factors that 
influence international flows such as distance, language, legal system or culture. They find 
that egalitarianism maintains influence on the cross border flows even after controlling for 
these factors. The empirical analysis in Amadi (2004) using data on international assets 
holdings for over 30 countries shows that familiarity factors such as a common language, 
trade and immigrant links have significant influence which would support an information-
based explanation for equity home bias. These familiarity factors should also be applied to 
decision making on a corporate level and with regard to different kinds of investments, such 
as direct investments. Poor country governance (institutional, political etc.) is listed a great 
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obstacle to investments in a particular country (Stulz, 2005) and a contributor to the observed 
home country bias. Dahlquist et al (2003) also find a close relation between home bias and 
poor country governance in portfolios held by investors. Kho et al. (2009) investigate home 
bias using firm level data on US and Korean foreign portfolio investors and direct investors. 
They also maintain that the FDI investments depend largely on good country governance as 
well as that the average home country bias has fallen in the decade between 1994 and 2004.  
In this thesis the focus is to test whether FDI investors are prone to invest in the more familiar 
places in a cultural, institutional and geographical sense. Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) find 
familiarity bias variables (physical distance, common language) have a significant effect in 
domestic and foreign bias (domestic investors over-weigh local investments, foreign investors 
under-weigh overseas investments). Huberman (2001) using data on US Regional Bell 
Operating Companies finds compelling evidence that familiarity breeds investment and that 
people invest  in the familiar (the company that they work in) while often ignoring the 
principles of portfolio theory. Massa and Simonov (2006) analyse the familiarity effect in 
hedging and portfolio choice. Using a Swedish dataset, they observe that investors do not 
hedge but rather invest in stocks which are more familiar to them based on some demographic 
characteristics. They consider that this familiarity shouldn’t be considered as a behavioural 
bias but rather as utilisation of information. This is because they consider that this familiarity 
will yield the abnormal returns. Similarly, Li (2004) concludes that home bias may be a 
misleading term because it drives researchers to interpret cross border investments as biased 
even though this may well be an optimal asset pricing investment for the investors who 
consider all the relevant country specific risks and costs of investment. Wei (1996) finds that 
countries show home bias in international trade using OECD countries; they ‘stubbornly’ 
import more from themselves than from countries which are otherwise similar to them and 
after controlling for their size and distance as well as a possible linguistic connection. 
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Faruquee et al. (2004) study the determinants behind the home bias phenomenon in 
international portfolio diversification. They find that market size, transaction cost, and 
information asymmetry are major determinants of cross-border portfolio choice.   
Home bias is a well-spread phenomenon across many different types of markets. The 
main determinants used to capture this effect are factors that increase the investors’ familiarity 
of the investment destination. These factors have to do with aspects of social, political, 
cultural and geographical familiarity.  
 
Possible explanations for home bias 
The literature on home bias offers few explanations (Fidora et al. (2007)) with respect 
to the reasons and causes for this phenomenon. The most common reason is asymmetric 
information and/or transaction costs (Ahearne et al, 2004). Investors find it more difficult to 
gather information on more ‘distant’ investment possibilities. Because of different factors 
such as distance, language and political/cultural barriers; they tend to disregard distant 
investments [Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)]. Liljeblom and Löflund (2005) 
suggest other possible explanations for home bias besides asymmetric information to be 
transaction costs, differences in taxation or exchange rate and capital market regulation, and 
other restrictions for international investments. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) investigate home 
bias in equity portfolios and test to see whether the home bias is caused by investors who are 
trying to hedge from inflation risk. They find that the observed home bias cannot be explained 
through inflation hedging or through observable costs of international investment.  
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) approach asymmetric information by stating 
that even if information is tradable and available, home bias would not completely disappear 
as one would expect because if there’s a slight chance that investors will know a little bit 
more about their home assets they will continue to be less informed about foreign investments 
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and they invest more in home assets relative to their international holdings. Brennan and Cao 
(1997) develop a model of international portfolio flows that relies on informational 
differences between foreign and domestic investors. They find evidence of that the portfolio 
flows are associated with returns on the national market, consistent with the asymmetric 
information hypothesis but they also point out that their findings explain a small proportion of 
the variance of international equity portfolio flows and that further efforts are necessary in 
understanding their determinants. This finding supports the claim that though important, 
asymmetric information isn’t able to fully explain what drives capital flows.  Asymmetric 
information and the degree of financial market development have a strong explanatory power 
in Berkel (2004). Bertaut and Kole (2004) also show that the cross border investments tend to 
favour countries with close political and regional ties. Suh (2001) offers an insightful 
explanation for home bias due to asymmetric information by analysing the analysts’ 
recommendations of stocks from the Economist’s quarterly portfolio pole. Asymmetric 
information is at the root of the findings in Coval and Moskowitz (2001) who investigate the 
geography of investment of mutual funds. They find that investors hold local securities and 
also earn abnormal returns because they have the unique opportunity to enquire in person 
about these local securities.   
The second reason for home bias, transaction costs, means that investors would avoid 
investing abroad because it’s too costly. Other empirical studies on this have shown however, 
that transaction costs cannot fully explain the home bias. French and Poterba (1991) identify 
several possible reasons that could affect and impede international investments, such as 
taxation and other transaction costs and barriers to trade but find that they cannot explain 
home bias through these factors. Portes and Rey (2005) provide a gravity model for 
transactions in financial assets that works at least as well as it does for international trade. 
Their results show that transaction costs do not have a pivotal role in explaining home bias 
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but rather the information asymmetry and a ‘familiarity effect’  (distance, phone costs, banks 
headquartered in the country etc.) do. Ahearne, Griever & Warnock, (2004) analyse cross-
listed companies on the US market and find that that cross-listing reduces home bias due to 
lowered transaction costs. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) use direct and observable costs of 
international investments in order to explain the observed home bias but find that they are 
insufficient to explain the level of observed home bias in the international equity markets. 
Tesar and Verner (1995) find transaction costs cannot be the reason for the observed 
reluctance of investors to diversify internationally.  
A third reason for home bias is analysed by Wincoop and Warnock (2008) who state that 
the key link between the home bias in the two markets is the real-exchange rate risk. 
Schoenmaker and Bosch (2008) show that the arrival of the Euro has diminished the home 
bias in the bond markets in Europe and find that indeed the home bias has declined and that 
investors have shifted their investments from predominantly the home markets to the markets 
in the EMU.  This shows that economic organisations play a significant role in the investment 
decisions. Similarity of the markets brought on by this type of unions plays a big role in 
familiarity bias as found in Brainard (1997), where firms prefer to take up on international 
investing if the destination markets have similar structure as the home market.   
2.4.  Herding literature 
Herding strands of literature 
Herding is another very important phenomenon which is well documented in the equity 
markets literature but rarely associated with corporate decision making. Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) examine different contexts which can lead to heard behaviour in investment. They find 
that herding can arise from a rational attempt of managers to enhance their reputation as 
decision makers (reputational herding); they also find that one motivation that leads to herd 
behaviour is to share the blame for judgement errors in their decisions because essentially, it’s 
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safer not to stand alone. Managers may be less prone to herd if their compensations were 
dependent on the actual not relative assessment of their work. This paper by Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) finds that because decision making in firms is prone to judgement error by 
various-level managers it would better serve the firms if investment decisions were made in a 
group i.e. as committee decisions in order to avoid herding because managers wish to ‘share 
the blame’. 
Devenow and Welch (1996) review herding and the different contexts in which we can 
discuss it, and classify it in three broad groups: payoff and informational externalities and 
reputational models. Payoff externalities models show that the payoffs to one agent increase 
the number of other agents adopting the same action in a manner of adopting a market 
convention.  The information cascades are considered as the most general explanation of 
herding and it applies to the case when agents herd because others’ actions rather than 
publicly available information is available. Reputational herding can be caused by principal-
agent problems. They adopt the view of Sharfstein and Stein (1990) that managers are capable 
of completely ignoring private information to avoid being revealed as low-ability. Davenow 
and Welch (1996) also point out that a major issue in the literature with herding models is the 
lack of serious empirical evidence because it’s difficult to capture and because of data 
shortcomings.  
There are several reasons why herding in equity markets may occur according to Wermers, 
(1999); reputational risk – managers may disregard their own personal opinion in order to go 
with the crowd mentality; investors may act in the same way because they get their data from 
the same sources; investors may get their information from previous trades of what they 
consider to be more experienced investors; due to aversion to risk and low liquidity they may 
limit their investment choices; newsletter analysts tend to herd and that may be followed by 
the investors.  
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Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) also review evidence on herd behaviour from different 
perspectives: payoff and reputational interactions, social learning and informational cascades 
in capital markets. They review both rational and imperfectly rational theories of behavioural 
convergence and conclude that most of the herding in the capital markets is likely to involve a 
mixture of all of these effects. Levy (2004) finds that decision makers who are strongly 
motivated by reputation concerns tend not to herd but to contradict public information such as 
others’ recommendations. In general, finding empirical evidence of herd behaviour for any 
reason is difficult (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) largely due to its intangible nature. This 
classification of herding into broad groups that deal with payoffs, informational cascades and 
reputational herding is also supported in Prast (2000). It is interesting to note that most studies 
consider herding in a rational context. Shiller (1995) discusses what determines the volatility 
of mass behaviour. He argues that information cascades appear to be very important in 
explaining herding across different groups and time.   
Herding is likely to occur in various fields of financial markets and with all kinds of 
economic agents (Bernhart et is al. 2006). The likelihood to herd is also very present on 
different levels and economic agents may choose to follow a leader in their group of interest 
for different reasons such as uncertainty whether their information is correct or inability to 
draw a conclusion due to lack of information (Graham, 1999). Having in mind that herding 
occurs in all areas of the financial markets, whether they may be domestic or international, it 
isn’t unreasonable to expect that there might be herding when it comes to direct international 
investments, at a corporate decision-making level. In a seminal paper, Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992) propose a model for measuring herding that is subsequently adopted by 
numerous other studies. The proposed model consists of calculating the distance between the 
actual investments from a theoretical benchmark which is a very intuitive way to measure 
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herding. In the context of FDI an approach to herding could be in the form of a distance in 
investing from a leader as a benchmark.   
 
Herding in equity markets 
Imitation and mimicry are among the most basic of instincts (Devenow and Welch, 
1996). Oberlechner (2004) conducts survey research of investors in the foreign exchange 
markets and concludes that contrary to many theoretical finance postulates, much of the 
conducted   investing is heavily dependent on following news outlets and other investors’ 
reactions. He analysed the human psychology among various investors in the foreign 
exchange markets and found that all aspects of the trading process are heavily influenced by 
the personal psychology of the market participants. He observes that the ‘traditional notions 
that market participants are rational and the foreign exchange market is efficient have to be 
supplemented by a more complex understanding of psychological and social market 
processes’.  
Herding is defined as a group of investors trading in the same direction over a period 
of time (Nofsinger, Sias, 1999) or the tendency to buy and sell the same stocks in a quarter 
(Lakonishok et al. (1992); Grinblatt et al., (1995)). Dawenov and Welch (1996) state that 
herding can be considered from two perspectives: rational and non-rational. The non-rational 
view on investor psychology considers that economic agents follow each other blindly 
without rational analysis of their decisions.  On the other hand, not all herd behaviour can be 
classified as irrational in its motives. The rational view centres on externalities, optimal 
decisions are distorted based on information difficulties or incentive issues. Thus economic 
agents may find it easier to follow and rely on the decisions of the more knowledgeable 
members in the markets whose market information can be assumed to be both superior and 
reliable. The efficient market hypothesis states that investors adapt to the provided 
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information regarding a financial asset and proceed to take advantage of good investment 
opportunities. Therefore what may appear as herd behaviour could simply be a lot of investors 
after the same investment opportunity because it is simply the best investment decision and 
not because they are actually following other investors.  This is something that should be 
resolved through suitable empirical analysis. The theoretical background on whether certain 
herding actions can be viewed as rational or irrational and whether some rational herd 
behaviour is justified is debatable and subject of ongoing research.     
It has been pointed out that herding may occur contemporaneously and over a period 
of time. Herding has been most frequently considered as a phenomenon that occurs over a 
period of time, however it is possible for a group of investors to buy or sell a stock at the 
same time (Choi and Sias, 2009). I consider both cases because I have annual data; it is 
possible for direct investors to herd during the same year as well as over time. What we know 
about herding comes from the equity markets, and it is not uncommon in international 
investment flows, especially since the late 90s (Choe, Kho & Stulz, 1999). Herding is 
associated with many economic activities (Graham, 1999) such as investment 
recommendations, price behaviour of IPOs, mutual fund investing, fads and customs etc. This 
thesis contributes to the herding literature by examining herding in the context of foreign 
direct investments.  
In spite of herding, international investment is always influenced by home bias and the 
investors’ preference for the more familiar surroundings (Ackert et al. 2005). Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) find that investors are more likely to hold, buy, and sell the stocks of 
Finnish firms that are located close to the investor, that communicate in the investor's native 
tongue, and that have chief executives of the same cultural background. They find that the 
influence of distance, language, and culture is less prominent among the most investment-
savvy institutions than among both households and less savvy institutions. Feng and 
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Seasholes (2004) find that there is significant correlated trading behaviour of stock market 
investors especially when it comes to correlated buying and selling within a specific 
geographic region.  
Clement and Tse (2005) analyse herding behaviour among financial analysts and find 
that although it has many aspects, it is present among analysts on many levels i.e. in different 
forms. This implies that herding is likely present among all kinds of investors. Li, Rhee and 
Wang (2009) find that better-informed institutional investors exhibit a more intense herding 
behaviour than individual investors, which indicates that institutions tend to trade more 
selectively, whereas less-informed individuals tend to allocate their investments more evenly 
across stocks. This could be due to the sophistication level of investors but in any case 
herding among investors is a strong presence and should be expected to be present to some 
degree with all types of investors regardless of the nature of the investment (short or long). 
Agarwaal, Li and Rhee (2007) investigate the herding behaviour of domestic and foreign 
investors in the Indonesian stock market and they find that both kinds of investors tend to 
herd with the foreign ones conforming more to the domestic ones. Muradoglu and Salamouris 
(2010) investigate and measure the effect that herding behaviour has on the accuracy of the 
analysts forecasts in the UK in a period from 1990 to 2002. They find that the subsequent 
analysts are more prone to herding which is consistent with the equity investments herding 
observed for mutual fund investors. They also find that there is a strong positive correlation 
between forecasting accuracy and herding.   
 
Herding and foreign direct investments  
FDI hasn’t been a part of any herding studies thus far. Herding studies show that 
economic agents in all areas of the financial markets are susceptible to such tendencies even 
when it comes to more long-term decisions such as direct investments abroad. Modern FDI 
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theory suggests that the MNEs develop abroad in order to continue growing outside of the 
home market or as a response to market imperfections (Rugman, 1981) in the goods and 
factor markets (like natural resources dependent companies).  In FDI theory such expectation 
to invest abroad and that investors could possibly imitate each others’ decisions is suggested 
with the oligopolistic theory. The main idea behind this theory is that the international direct 
investment is simply a strategic reaction to an anticipated behaviour by oligopolistic 
competitors. The oligopolistic reaction is defined as: the decision of one firm to invest 
overseas raises competing firms’ incentives to invest in the same country (Head, Mayer, Ries, 
2002). This study is also the only FDI study that contains a reference to herding papers 
(Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al. (1998)) without explicitly connecting the oligopoly and 
herding theories. They confirm the intuitive expectation that the basic elements of the 
oligopoly theory (oligopoly, uncertainty and risk aversion) can be combined to generate 
‘follow the leader’ investment behaviour. 
As mentioned earlier, the oligopolistic theory was introduced by Knickerbocker 
(1973) and further developed by Kim and Lyn (1987), Caves (1974), Severn and Laurence 
(1974), and Mansfield, Romeo and Wagner (1979). Knickerbocker (1973) very intuitively 
observes that large firms from the manufacturing industries are very likely to engage in the 
imitation of investment decisions in order to reduce risk and maintain competitiveness. His 
analysis is very reminiscent of the herding studies except this theory hadn’t been developed 
at the time when he was writing his study. Caves (1971) considered MNEs to operate in an 
oligopolistic market which encourages them to differentiate their products. They report 
empirical evidence that firms that operate in an oligopolistic industry setting strongly react 
to their competitors’ advances and follow their actions in order to replicate them. Thus if 
home market comprises of two or three firms and if one of these firms decides to start 
investing in a particular region or country, others will have to follow suit in order to 
 54 
maintain desirability in the eyes of the shareholders. Firms in oligopolistic markets follow 
their competitors in their FDI decisions. The theoretical connection between two seemingly 
unrelated theories, an oligopolistic theory in FDI and herding theory in finance is obvious 
and straightforward. This is an unexplored gap in the literature which will bring together 
two seemingly different research areas. Following the notion of oligopolistic reaction, it 
may be the case that it’s not only that investors follow companies from the same country 
into another but it may be that the direct investors from one country are following the 
actions of their competitors from different countries and reacting to that. As the OECD 
benchmark definition of FDI (2008) states, there is an increased complexity of the structures 
of MNEs in the world which creates delicate situations for what constitutes an FDI. As 
previously discussed at the beginning of this chapter, it may be that an enterprise in one 
country is owned by two enterprises from two different countries with controlling interests 
high enough for both to constitute an FDI. With this in mind, it is reasonable to assume and 
test whether direct investments outflows from one country to another are stimulated by the 
total direct investments to the host country by the regional neighbourhood.   
 
FDI and Equity Portfolio Flows  
The link between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment is discussed 
by Razin and Sadka (2007) who state that it becomes more beneficial for a company to make 
a direct investment rather than a portfolio investment abroad at the moment when the net 
present value of a direct investment is greater than the net present value of a foreign portfolio 
investment. The reason for this type of distinction is to explain the difference between two 
kinds of international investments. The problem with this definition of FDI and FPI is that in 
reality these two types of investments aren’t likely to be closely related due to the fact that the 
motives and types of investors who make these investments are different. According to the 
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definition from the data providers (World Bank) the PEI include net inflows from equity 
securities other than those recorded as direct investment and including shares, stocks, 
depository receipts (American or global), and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets 
by foreign investors. The data like the data on direct investment are taken from the balance of 
payments. The direct investment occurs when there is an acquisition of a controlling interest 
(10% or more of the voting power).  
The portfolio investments have a speculative aspect and a temporary nature and would 
typically be conducted by equity investors who are solely motivated by profitability and 
diversification. The direct investments would be conducted by corporate managers who don’t 
normally also make portfolio equity investments home or abroad. But the fact that both of 
these kinds of investments have an international aspect to them makes them naturally 
connected. Levine (2001) examines the impact that the international financial liberalisation 
will have on economic growth. He finds that liberalising restrictions on international portfolio 
flows will enhance the stock market liquidity which in turn will accelerate economic growth 
through the increased productivity growth.    
The portfolio flows are theoretically linked to FDIs even though portfolio investments are 
seldom analysed together with FDI. Durham (2004) examines the effects of FDI and foreign 
portfolio equity investments on the economic growth and does not find strong evidence of 
these two economic categories on growth although the study doesn’t analyse the co-influence 
of these two variables among themselves. Razin and Sadka (2007) and Razin and Kirabaeva 
(2010) give a theoretical overview on the difference in decisions when it comes to FDI and 
portfolio investments and conclude that when the investment choices come to a point when 
the return rate of the direct investment is higher than the portfolio one the investors will in 
this case prefer to make direct investments. However in reality, the types of investors that will 
be interested in either of the two kinds of investments are very different because FDIs are 
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made to expand business and on a corporate level whereas PEIs are made in order for the 
investor to make a profit. When it comes to foreign portfolio investments, Poshkwale and 
Thapa (2009) find that the quality of institutions, the better law enforcement and better 
general investment profile appear to attract more foreign portfolio investments. This can also 
be the case with bilateral FDI flows - larger foreign portfolio investments could attract more 
direct investors. While it is generally widely believed that poor corporate governance and 
corruption does not have a positive influence on FDI flows, Li (2005) shows that this 
expectation doesn’t deter FDI flows to China which leaves room for investigation into other 
factors that might influence FDI flows counter to the expectation in some regions. Amiram 
(2009) studies the effect that information availability has on decision-making with respect to 
foreign portfolio flows. He finds that international accounting standards play a big role in the 
investors’ decisions to invest somewhere because he argues these investors can only rely on 
information that’s provided by the foreign companies and it is easiest to follow the 
international standards. These familiarity effects can also be captured through the institutional 
familiarity that a shared membership to an international organisation brings. He also finds that 
corruption has a negative effect on FPI. Evans (2002) discusses the policy aspects regarding 
both FDI and FPI. She finds that both kinds of investments have economic benefits for an 
economy and that the two can enhance these benefits.  A further investigation on the 
relationship between FPI and FDI is necessary.  
The limited scope of studies that consider international portfolio flows and direct 
investments shows a need for a closer examination of these two categories. There may be 
some question about the direction of the relationship between portfolio and direct investments 
with respect to which comes first in a market. This thesis focuses on the analysis of FDI flows 
and their determinants so it is natural to consider the portfolio flows as something that 
explains FDI flows. But there is also another reason namely, if it comes to a new, emerging 
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market where there are a lot of new investment possibilities and an undisclosed amount of 
riskiness and costs to investing in such a market, the more temporary and speculative nature 
of portfolio flows would drive that kind of investors to enter a market before direct investors 
would. This is why it would be interesting to see if an increased activity in the portfolio 
markets in a host country would increase the level of FDI flows to that country because these 
portfolio investors are herding direct investors.    
2.5.  Probability of an FDI relationship 
 
General use of probabilistic models  
Although the use of probabilistic models in the FDI literature is well spread and vast, 
studies using these models don’t often study the role that FDI factors and determinants play 
on the probability of an FDI relationship between two countries. This could be due to the fact 
that FDI related studies focus predominantly on the positive FDI flows between countries 
with little or no consideration of the zero FDI positions between countries. This is partly a 
theoretical consideration, determinants of FDI flows should be examined on existing flows 
and not where they do not occur and partly because this type of data (on zero FDI bilateral 
flows) is usually not supplied by data providers. The OECD dataset does require its members 
to provide data (whatever the amounts may be) for all of its countries and geographical, 
regions, territories and various economic and political organisations. Although it’s not 
uniformly and routinely supplied for all time periods by its members, the FDI statistics by the 
OECD do provide data on when there is zero FDI flows between two countries. While it may 
not be wise to include this type of data when one looks for determinants of an existing FDI 
relationship between two countries, it does pose an interesting question when one looks at 
FDI from a policy or regulatory perspective. It is interesting to examine how much known 
FDI factors increase the probability that one country will go from a non-existing FDI 
relationship with another country to a positive FDI flow. This is especially important to be 
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known for small, remote, developing or emerging markets, capital markets that have been 
previously constrained in their capital flows for various reasons or economies that simply 
wish to increase their FDI attractiveness. In this thesis I aim to identify and empirically test a 
set of variables that increase the familiarity between two countries and consequently 
contribute to the home country bias phenomenon. Knowing that these factors play a role and 
determine the corporate decisions regarding FDIs, it should be examined how much changes 
in some of those factors would increase or decrease the probability of having an FDI 
relationship with another country. Studies on the determinants of foreign direct investments 
are naturally complemented by looking at them from the context of policy and non-policy 
determinants. This has to do with the fact that as mentioned before, FDIs are generally 
considered to be very beneficial for country growth and advancement (Daude and Fratzscher, 
2008) and most countries (especially in the developing world) actively try to attract more of 
them. However, not all determinants of FDI have the possibility to be affected through a 
change in policy, hence the need for such a classification of determinants. Guisinger and Li 
(1992) look into the service industry companies in order to assess the determinants that would 
attract increased affiliates abroad from these companies. They perform a logistic analysis with 
a binary dependent variable that is set to express whether or not a service industry MNE has 
increased its number of foreign affiliates over a given period of time. Their data are compiled 
using data from the UN transnational companies centre and detail the number of affiliates of 
168 MNEs in several target regions such as US, Canada, Japan and Western Europe 
(developed countries). They find that FDI is increased with the market size and openness 
while the cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988) is found to have a negative 
impact on FDI. Guisinger and Loree (1995) examine the policy and non-policy variables on 
the location of US direct investment abroad. They find supporting evidence for the 
significance of some non-policy variables such as political stability, cultural distance, GDP 
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and infrastructure. While it is debatable what can be considered a policy or non-policy 
determinant, it is very important to consider the effects of these determinants on the FDI so 
that the countries can tailor their policies in the right direction in order to attract more FDI 
flows. The best way to determine the probability of FDI flows between two countries and how 
different FDI determinants influence that probability is to adopt a non-linear probabilistic 
model.  
Habib and Zurawicki (2002) use a probit analysis when testing the relationship of 
bilateral FDI inflows and corruption on a large number of countries over a short three-year 
period using data from the IMF statistics. They apply both an OLS and a probit model to test 
their hypotheses. They look at the negative impact of the host country’s corruption levels on 
FDI flows even when political stability is also considered as a determinant. They apply a 
probit analysis to test for the impact on the share of FDI to GDP as the differences in levels of 
corruption between the investor and host countries have a negative impact on FDI inflows.  
The use of probabilistic models isn’t limited to FDI or to just finance and economics 
in general. These types of models are very popular in the medical and biological studies 
where there is a greater presence of research questions that have qualitative properties. The 
predictive nature of binary dependent variable models also makes them incredibly useful in 
government research and analysis in many areas such as urban population patterns, 
determinants of academic performance or crime studies. In finance for example, binary 
dependent variable models have a very practical use in predicting country defaults or causes 
of bankruptcy and there is a large cluster of literature on this. In such a study, Lennox (1999) 
investigates the determinants of the bankruptcy probability in a large sample of UK listed 
companies and finds that the most important bankruptcy determinants are profitability, cash 
flows, leverage and economic cycle. This study also uses both probit and logit models in 
order to compare the results for the literature on bankruptcy.   In a related area, Kamstra and 
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Kennedy (2001) use an ordered-logit regression in order to forecast the bond ratings or a 
change in the ratings for firms by a rating agency. They find that the use of these models 
yields a highly meaningful and significant analysis at little cost to the firms. In the literature 
on FDI there is also a cluster of studies using binary dependent variable models however very 
few, if any use these models to predict whether there will be an FDI relationship between two 
countries and which factors have a great impact on that. Instead the most frequent focus of 
probabilistic studies in FDI in on the choice of mode of entry for FDI which is something that 
these models are ideally suited for.  
 
Probabilistic models and mode of entry of FDI  
The role of probabilistic models in the FDI literature is overwhelmingly related to the 
mode of entry investigation. The mode of entry for a foreign direct investment can be for 
example as a Greenfield investment (building a new factory abroad for example) or 
alternatively as a merger and acquisition or a venture capital investment.  
Rolfe and Woodward (1993) adopt a probabilistic, binary dependent variable model in order 
to test for the location determinants of in the context of export oriented manufacturing 
investments in the Caribbean basin and apply a logistic analysis. Most frequently, the binary 
response models are used in a specific context with the intention of testing for the impact of a 
specific factor such as the investment tax incentives (Buettner and Ruf, 2005) for example, or 
estimation of the probability of entering in a country from a particular region such as the 
transition countries (Javorcik, 2004) or even for determinants of exit of subsidiaries in Japan 
(Yamawaki, 2007). Altomonte and Guagliano (2001) use a probit model to determine the 
investment probability in certain industries for ten Mediterranean countries over an 8 year 
period. Molteni and Gattai (2005) use a probit analysis to determine the factors that decide the 
probability if Japanese firms will invest abroad as an FDI or as a joint-venture. In their study 
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on the entry mode choice, Kogut and Singh (1988) use a binary dependent variable analysis to 
determine the probability of firms choosing the mode of entry for FDI, (either greenfield, 
acquisition or as a joint venture) and find that national culture (I use their cultural distance 
index in this thesis) has a strong impact on the entry mode choice. The mode of entry of FDI 
(joint venture; trade or contracts) is the subject of a multinomial analysis in Meyer (2001). 
The determinants of the mode of entry is a very commonly used topic for a binary dependent 
model analysis (especially with probit). Hebous, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2010) analyse the 
mode of entry (M&A or Greenfield) probability determinants on German firm-level data and 
find that when there is less information available due to long distances for example, the firms 
tend to choose M&A rather than Greenfield investments.  
As I briefly discussed previously, the OECD benchmark definition classifies FDI 
investments in two broad categories as a subsidiary or an associate, but they do not provide 
the data separately according to that distinction. They do however provide an instruction for 
its member countries to attempt and provide the classification of the type of the direct 
investments as M&A’s, or Greenfield investments. However these data are currently 
unavailable and therefore such analysis using this dataset isn’t possible.   
While the studies using a probabilistic model tend to have a generally narrow 
geographical focus, there are some that do focus on greater cross country variability. 
McCalman (2004) uses the probit model on a wide country dataset to investigate the 
relationship between the FDI and intellectual property rights distribution across the world. 
The stance of this study is that greater standardisation in these rights across the world would 
lower the firms’ needs for FDI and take them more towards market based solutions such as 
licence agreements. This study is conducted on a sample of international film distribution by 
American companies in 40 foreign film markets. This makes the study focus on one industry 
and from one country and its partner countries. In a similar manner of merging a finance 
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literature models in the context of FDI, Brandao de Brito and de Mello Sampayo (2005) apply 
an option-pricing model in order to perform several binary dependent variable models to test 
for optimal timing and probability for FDI entry. Similarly to what’s argued in this thesis, 
they also argue that the surge in globalization has given a lot of new direct investing 
opportunities to firms and also it has presented them with a lot of challenges in the investment 
destination choices. They also use the empirical models and findings from the finance 
literature and apply it to an FDI setting.  
The location choices of FDI in emerging markets are investigated by Paladino (2007) 
for a sample consisting of Italian banks. Bertrand et al. (2004) use a conditional logit analysis 
in order to examine the location determinants of some OECD member countries in 1990s FDI 
outflows in the special case of mergers and acquisitions.  Altomonte and Guagliano (2001) is 
a study with a similar aim to mine, to examine the determinants and implications of FDI 
investments from European MNEs to two distinct regions: Eastern Europe and South 
Mediterranean countries by using a probit analysis. Their binary dependent variable takes the 
value of one if an FDI operation is registered in industry i of country j in year t and zero 
otherwise. They measure the number of MNE investments from one industry to a particular 
country from the target areas they’ve considered using a dataset from UNCTAD. They 
consider variables for economic size, level of education and institutional familiarity and find 
that MNEs evaluate the local demand but also consider locations which are in neighboring 
regions. Most FDI studies using a probabilistic model focus on the entry mode choice or a 
particular industry or region or the general determinants to investments in a particular location 
considering only existing (positive) direct investments. I aim to investigate the probability 
that there will be an FDI flow between two countries on a global, regional and country level 
in order to confirm the results in a broad way. I am able to do this by using data that also 
contain country pairs that have reported zero FDI flows.  
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2.6.  Conclusion  
The literature review points out to several issues. First, the FDI studies are not frequently 
associated with the financial literature even though there is a reasonable theoretical basis to 
assume that the direct investors are plagued by the same issues, such as home bias or herding 
that have been investigated and found to play an important role for investors in the equity 
markets.  
Second, there are a lot of different FDI studies with a narrow geographical scope and focus 
that use various determinants across very different regions or countries. A need emerges for 
uniform analysis which is performed on a geographically segmented data at different levels: 
global, regional and country so that any differences in the determinants in different areas can 
be isolated and analysed. The equity markets literature on home bias suggests that it should 
diminish over time due to the increased capital mobility in the markets and this should be 
tested in the context of FDI flows.  
The FDI flows, to the best of my knowledge, haven’t been analysed in the context of the 
probability of having an FDI flow between two countries. The dataset on FDI by the OECD 
provides a unique opportunity for this to be investigated. The literature point of that one of the 
greatest limitations of any study in behavioural finance is the lack of empirical tools to 
accurately measure and represent the intangible aspects of human behaviour. This is further 
complicated by frequent data unavailability. Further research is best served by new data 
resources that directly address some of these specific research areas. The best way to capture 
what drives investment flows between two geographical locations would be by analysing the 
flows between two partner entities rather than one-sided investment flows to and from a 
single location. In the next chapter I discuss the data which are used for the empirical analysis 
in the thesis.  
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3. Data  
3.1. Introduction  
The data for the dependant variables (FDI flows) are obtained from the OECD statistics 
database that reports on 30 OECD member countries which are listed in figure 1 below,  and 
their possible 337 partner countries, country territories and regions. Thus, the initial data 
sample for FDI inflows and outflows individually, consisted of 261,175 observations [30 
countries x 25 years x 337].  An observation is defined as the value of a bilateral country pair 
at a given year for one variable. The data were further reduced according to 2 criteria:  
1. Country territories, regions or unions weren’t considered but rather only sovereign 
countries. A full list of all possible remaining partner countries that can be found in at 
least one country pair is in appendix 1.  
2. Missing values. 
Therefore, the dataset is an unbalanced panel. The data period is from 1981 to 2005.  
 
After the reduction of the data based on the aforementioned conditions, there are 28,879 
observations left for FDI inflows and 26,457 for FDI outflows. The provided data on FDI 
consist of positive, negative FDI flows as well as non - investment relationship (zero FDI 
flows). I use data on positive FDI flows in chapters 4, 5 and 6 while for the analysis in chapter 
7 I add the observations for zero FDI flows. Therefore the data are further reduced to 14,669 
Table 3.1: List of all OECD members (as of 2008) 
Australia Finland Ireland Netherlands Spain 
Austria France Italy New Zealand Sweden 
Belgium Germany Japan Norway Switzerland 
Canada Greece Korea Poland Turkey 
Czech Republic Hungary Luxembourg Portugal United Kingdom 
Denmark Iceland Mexico Slovak Republic United States 
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observations and 1,867 unique country pairs for FDI outflows and 11,903 observations and 
1,789 unique country pairs for FDI inflows when only the positive FDI flows are considered. 
The dataset becomes 22,989 observations with 2,872 unique bilateral pairs for FDI outflows 
and 25,390 and 3,066 unique country pairs for FDI inflows when the zero FDI flows data are 
added for the analysis in chapter 7.  The advantages of using panel data compared with cross 
section or time series data are numerous (Kennedy, 2003, p.302): it deals with heterogeneity 
in the micro units, it reduces the omitted variable bias, alleviates multicollinearity problems 
because it’s more informative, it allows for analysis of issues that cannot be done solely 
across section or time and finally it allows a dynamic analysis of the data that a single cross 
section or time series doesn’t.  Data on all of the variables come from four different sources 
(full list of variables and data sources can be found in table 3.11, at the end of this chapter). 
Data on FDI flows are taken from the OECD, data on GDP, GDP per capita and exports and 
imports are from the World Bank, data on distances come from the French Centre for 
International Economic Studies (CEPII), and the data on the legal system origins of the 
countries come from professor Rafael La Porta’s datasets (1998;2008), the cultural distance 
index is taken from Geert Hofstede’s website and studies (1980; 1983; 2001) and Kogut and 
Singh (1988) while some of the variables I constructed myself.  
I consider FDI outflows and inflows among all available country pairs. The FDI inflows are 
flows to the FDI receiving country (OECD member) from a partner country (that can be 
anywhere in the world). The FDI outflows are flows from the FDI sending country (OECD 
member) to a partner country (any world country). Data on FDI flows are in constant millions 
of US dollars.  The descriptive statistics for the data in the different empirical analyses can be 
found in tables 3.2 through to 3.7; the correlation tables for the data can be found in tables 3.8 
to 3.10. In the following section I define and briefly discuss all of the variables used in the 
thesis. First I define the dependent variables and discuss their descriptive statistics for both 
 66 
inflows and outflows followed by all of the independent variables for both inflows and 
outflows. This is followed by a brief analysis of the correlation matrix.  
3.2. Variable definitions 
The following section will give a brief description of the definition of the variables 
used in this thesis. It starts with the dependent variables, FDI inflows and outflows followed 
by the description of all of the independent variables.  
 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
This section describes the various forms of the dependent variables as they appear in 
the empirical analysis in chapters 4 through 7. They may take the form of FDI outflows or 
inflows; FDI over GDP and a binary dependent variable form.  The basic, underlying form of 
the dependent variable is FDI flows. The foreign direct investment flows represent the inflows 
or outflows of direct investment to and from an OECD member country and its FDI partner 
country. The FDI flows data are on an annual basis and in $US million or in a binary variable 
form. The following sub-sections present the different forms that the dependent variables can 
take throughout the empirical chapters first for FDI outflows then inflows.  
 
A) FDI outflows 
Foreign direct investment outflows are the investment flows from country i (sending 
country) to country j (receiving country) at time t (year), in the case of this thesis the FDI 
flows from the OECD member countries towards their partner countries anywhere in the 
world. This levels form of FDI outflows is used as the dependent variable in chapters 4 and 5.  
In chapter 6, in addition to the level form of FDI outflows I use the following form: FDI 
outflows divided by the GDP of the sending country. In chapter 7 the dependent variable is 
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transformed from FDI outflows to a binary variable form. In that case, the dependent variable 
takes the value of one if there are positive FDI outflows between country i and j at time t and 
zero if there is a zero-FDI relationship in the country pair.  
 
B) FDI inflows 
Foreign direct investment inflows represent flows to country i (receiving country) 
from country j (sending country) at time t.  They are the inflows to the OECD member 
countries from their FDI partner countries anywhere in the world. The FDI inflows appear as 
a dependent variable in this level form in chapters 4 and 5. FDI inflows aren’t used in the 
empirical analysis in chapter 6. In chapter 7 same as for the FDI outflows, the dependent 
variable is transformed into a binary dependent variable that takes the value of one if there is 
a positive FDI inflow in the country pair and zero if there is a zero-FDI relationship.  
 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
The dataset includes thirteen independent variables taken into consideration when 
building the econometric models in the empirical chapters 4-7. The independent variables are 
presented and organised in five groups: institutional, cultural and geographical proximity 
variable groups, macroeconomic variables and other variables.  
 
A)  Institutional Proximity Variable Group 
This group includes five variables: same economic or political organisation, same 
origin of the legal system, shared history, common official or minority language and a cultural 
distance index. The variables in this group are all dummy variables except for the cultural 
distance which is an index value.   
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Membership in the same economic or political organisation  
This variable takes the value of one if both countries in the bilateral country pair are 
members of the same international economic or political organisation. I constructed this 
variable by considering countries’ membership to four economic or political unions: 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union 
(EU), the Commonwealth of Nations and the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA). The data on this are taken from the corresponding organisations’ websites. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) cannot be added to this variable because 
none of its members are an OECD member country which would mean that the variable 
would never take a value of one for sharing membership to ASEAN.     
 
Same origin of the country’s legal system  
The shared legal origin variable [LEGORSAME] takes the value of one if the FDI 
sending and receiving country’s legal system origin is the same and zero otherwise. These 
data divides the legal systems in the world into 5 categories: British, French, German, 
Socialistic and Scandinavian. Data on countries’ origin of the legal system are taken from La 
Porta et al (1998; 2008) and professor Rafael La Porta’s datasets and can be found on his 
website. This division of the legal systems is a good approximation for institutional similarity 
between countries. These legal system aspects are incorporated into specific legal rules as 
well as the organisations, human capital and beliefs of its participants (La Porta et al., 2008).   
 
B)  Cultural Proximity Variable Group 
Shared History  
I compiled the shared history variable from five other variables taken from the 
CEPII’s dataset. The dummies from which this dummy is made up of are: if the countries 
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have had a common colonizer after 1945, have ever had a colonial link, have had a colonial 
relationship after 1945, are currently in a colonial relationship or were or are presently the 
same country. The shared history part of the variable, as explained in CEPII’s dataset notes, 
complements the common colonizer information setting to one if the countries were the same 
state or the same administrative entity for a long period (25-50 years in the twentieth century, 
75 years in the ninetieth and 100 years before). This definition covers countries that have 
belonged to the same empire (Austro-Hungarian, Persian, Turkish), countries that have been 
divided (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) and countries that have belonged to the same 
administrative colonial area. For instance, Spanish colonies are distinguished following their 
administrative divisions in the colonial period (viceroyalties). According to this definition, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay were thus a single country. Similarly, the 
Philippines were subordinated to the New Spain viceroyalty and thus the ‘same country’ 
equals to one with Mexico. Sources for this variable came from 
(http://www.worldstatesmen.org/). This newly constructed shared history dummy takes the 
value of one if the two countries in the bilateral pair had any of the aforementioned 
relationships and zero otherwise.  
 
Common Official or Minority Language  
I made the common language [LANGCOM] variable out of two other variables: a 
common official language and a common language of a minority group between the two 
countries in the bilateral pair.  For the purpose of this variable a significant minority group is 
considered if there’s a minority population of at least 9% (this level is set by the data 
provider, CEPII) that speaks the same language of another country. This variable takes the 
value of one if the two countries share a common official or a minority language and zero 
otherwise.  
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Cultural Distance Index  
The cultural distance index is calculated following Kogut and Singh (1988) and is 
based on the four cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede (1980; 1983). The data on these 
dimensions are taken from Hofstede’s website (www.geert-hofstede.com). The four 
dimensions are:  
i) Power distance index: the extent to which the less powerful members of 
organisations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed equally; 
ii) Individualism: the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups; 
iii)  Masculinity: the distribution of roles between genders;  
iv) Uncertainty avoidance index: society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. 
These are sociological circumstances in which individuals live and work in different societies. 
The idea behind Kogut and Singh’s index is to measure the difference in these cultural 
dimensions between the two countries involved in an FDI relationship. The index is 
calculated using the following formula:   
CDi,j =  
∑ (Id ,i−Id ,j )2
V d
4
d =1  
4
                         (3.1) 
 
Where the Id,i and Id,j is the individual cultural dimension (d) for country i and j respectively 
and Vd is the variance of each of the cultural dimensions.  
 
 
C)  Physical Proximity Variable Group 
The physical proximity variables group includes three variables: physical distance 
between the country pairs and two variables if the countries in the bilateral country pair are on 
the same continent or if they share a border. Data on these variables are taken from CEPII. 
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Physical distance  
The data on geographical distances [DIST] are measured following Head and Meyer 
(2002) and the formula for the distances is not a simple air distance between two cities but it 
is calculated using the countries’ area and the capitals’ longitude and latitude: 
i, dii = 0.67 * √(area/π) 
This variable is measured in kilometres and represents the physical distance between the two 
countries in the country pair.  
 
Location on the Same Continent  
This variable [SAMECONT] takes the value of one if the two countries in the bilateral 
country pair are on the same continent and zero otherwise. I constructed this variable using 
continent country location data taken from the CEPII.  
 
Shared Border  
The shared border variable [BORDER] takes the value of one if the country pair shares a 
border and zero otherwise. It is taken from the CEPII dataset.  
 
D) Macroeconomic Variable Group  
Data on the macroeconomic variables are from the World Bank database. They’re in 
millions of $US. I use five macroeconomic variables including: Gross Domestic Product 
[GDP] for both the sending and receiving countries, Exports plus Imports as a percentage of 
GDP [EXIM/GDP] for both the sending and receiving countries and Portfolio Equity 
Investments in the FDI receiving country [PEIrec] in chapter 6 only.  
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 Gross domestic product [GDP] 
This variable [GDP_rec] [GDP_send] represents the gross domestic product of a 
country at time t. It is measured in constant prices (base year, 2000) for each country so that  
the effects of inflation on the reported levels of GDP can be offset, both for the FDI receiving 
and the sending country. It is in $US millions. 
 
Country openness to trade  
The country openness [EXIM/GDP_rec] [EXIM/GDP_send] is a measurement of the 
country’s openness to trade flows. It is calculated by adding the exports and imports of a 
country and dividing it by its GDP. The original data on exports and imports are measured in 
constant prices (base year, 2000) both for the FDI inflows receiving and the sending country 
and in $US million and the same is the case for the GDP. I calculated this variable from data 
on the percentage of exports and imports in GDP as obtained from the World Bank’s world 
development indicators. 
 
Portfolio Equity Flows for the FDI outflows receiving country 
Portfolio equity flows [PEIrec] data are taken from the World Bank database and are 
net and include non-debt-creating portfolio equity flows (the sum of country funds, depository 
receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors).  
 
E) Other Variables  
Bilateral trust  
The index measures bilateral trust between citizens of two countries in a sample of 15 
European countries (Austria, Belgium, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, France, 
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Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden). It’s obtained from 
Guiso et al. (2009). The trustworthiness is rated on a scale from 1-4 (1 being not at all and 4 
being a lot of trust).  
 
International telephone calls per capita 
The international telephone calls measures the international minutes of telephone 
conversations that occurred in the FDI receiving country. They are measured in minutes and 
divided by the country’s population (per capita).  
  
 Financial Times Circulation per capita 
I’ve obtained all available data from the Financial Times newspaper on their 
newspaper circulation. They are used as per capita for the FDI outflows receiving country. 
Data are obtained directly from the Financial Times company.  
 
Bilateral tax treaty for double taxation avoidance 
This is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the two countries in the 
bilateral country pair have a signed bilateral treaty for double taxation avoidance, zero 
otherwise. I constructed this variable from ob available in the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) country profile database (available on UNCTAD’s 
website: www.unctad.org).  
 
Country governance 
I include six country governance indicators in order to capture some country specific 
factors that have to do with doing business in one country and the costliness that might entail. 
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They are obtained from the World Bank as explained in Kaufman et al., (2009).  The six 
aggregate indicators are as follows: 
i) Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence captures perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.  
iii) Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies.  
iv) Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.  
v) Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence.  
vi) Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
  The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis can be found in the 
tables 3.2 through to 3.7. The descriptive statistics tables show the basic descriptive properties 
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Table 3.2. OECD member countries - continent statistics   
 
Continent Number of countries Percentage (of No. count.) No. FDI outflows obs. 
    
Europe 23 76% 11,876 
Americas 3 10% 973 
Asia  2 6.67% 1,407 
Pacific (Australia, Oceania) 2 6.67% 413 
Total 30 100% 14,669 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Partner countries - continent statistics  
 
Continent No. of cross sections No. FDI outflows obs. Percentage (of obs.) 
    
Europe 767 6,908 47.1 % 
Americas 503 3,819 26 % 
Asia – Pacific 335 2,644 18.16 % 
Africa 262 1,298 8.85 % 
Total 1,867 14,669 100% 
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Table 3.4a. Descriptive statistics for FDI outflows panel data (used in chapters 4 and 5) 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the FDI outflows analysis. These variables are in their original units 
 
 
  
FDI 
Outflows 
(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country(mil$) 
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI 
Rec. country  
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI 
Send. 
Country 
Physical 
Distance 
(km) 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal 
Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common  
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
 Mean 593 606,157 1,329,119 0.74 0.66 5,467 0.45 0.07 0.50 0.26 0.14 0.09 2.06 
 Median 34 134808 505,144 0.62 0.56 4,691 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.88 
 Maximum 172,210 10,995,800 10,995,800 3.67 2.97 19,447 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.69 
 Minimum 0.001 132 6,500 0.10 0.16 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
 St. Dev. 3,078 1,507,324 2,044,870 0.48 0.42 4,536 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.44 0.35 0.28 1.46 
  
             
 
 
Observations 14,670 14,669 14,670 13,878 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 
 
11,627 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4b. Descriptive statistics for additional variables for FDI outflows panel data (used in chapter 4) 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the additional variables used in the FDI outflows analysis. These variables in their original units. 
 
 
  
Bilateral 
Trust 
International 
Phone 
Minutes for 
rec. Country 
per capita 
FT 
circulation 
per capita for 
rec. country 
Bilateral 
treaties 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
 Mean 2.82 65.26 0.0004 0.76 0.50 0.29 0.70 0.62 0.56 0.60 
 Median 2.74 25.94 0.0001 1 0.75 0.44 0.69 0.73 0.65 0.45 
 Maximum 3.65 867.28 0.0037 1 1.83 1.68 2.64 3.41 2.12 2.53 
 Minimum 2.18 0.07 0.0000 0 -1.86 -2.46 -2.51 -2.67 -2.07 -1.74 
 St. Dev. 0.32 102.32 0.0007 0.43 0.92 0.89 1.02 0.88 0.99 1.09 
  
          
 
Observations 2,773 11,632 3,425 
 
13,968 6,290 6,288 6,288 6,289 6,285 6,274 
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Table 3.5b. Descriptive statistics for additional variables for FDI inflows panel data (used in chapter 4) 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the additional variables used in the FDI outflows analysis. These variables in their original units. 
 
 
  
Bilateral 
Trust 
International 
Phone 
Minutes for 
rec. Country 
per capita 
FT 
circulation 
per capita 
for rec. 
country 
Bilateral 
treaties 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Political 
Stability 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
 Mean 2.82 70.18 0.0006 0.84 1.16 0.82 1.41 1.21 1.22 1.27 
 Median 2.78 53.26 0.0003 1.00 1.29 0.89 1.61 1.18 1.39 1.42 
 Maximum 3.65 397.01 0.0037 1.00 1.83 1.68 2.64 2.01 2.12 2.53 
 Minimum 2.18 3.95 0.0000 0.00 -0.68 -1.49 -0.17 0.04 -0.51 -0.51 
 St. Dev. 0.32 58.90 0.0009 0.36 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.49 0.67 0.82 
  
          
 
Observations 2,635 9,230 3,390 
 
6,895 5,376 5,376 5,376 5,376 5,376 5,376 
 
Table 3.5a. Descriptive statistics for FDI inflows panel data (used in chapters 4 and 5) 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the FDI outflows analysis. These variables are in their original units 
 
 
  
FDI Inflows 
(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country(mil$) 
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI 
Rec. country  
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI 
Send. 
Country  
Physical 
Distance 
(km) 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal 
Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common  
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
 Mean 590 1,053,480 798,958 0.71 0.76 5,361 0.48 0.07 0.60 0.30 0.09 0.16 7.77 
 Median 19 407,951 187,692 0.57 0.66 3,595 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.70 
 Maximum 108,566 10,995,800 10,995,800 2.97 3.67 19,630 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 42.76 
 Minimum 0.001 6,500 52 0.16 0.10 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
 St. Dev. 3,029 1,819,463 1,727,969 0.49 0.50 4,653 0.50 0.26 0.49 0.46 0.28 0.37 5.91 
 
Observations 11,903 11,903 11,903 11,837 11,325 11,903 11,903 11,903 11,903 11,903 11,903 11,903 
 
10,057 
 78 
 
 
  
 
Table 3.6b. Descriptive statistics for other variables used in chapter 6 
 
Table 3.6a. Descriptive statistics for FDI outflows panel data used in chapter 6 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the FDI outflows analysis. These variables are in their original units. 
 
 
  
FDI 
Outflows 
(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country(mil$) 
Trade 
Openness 
of the  FDI 
Rec. 
country  
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI 
Send. 
Country 
Physical 
Distance 
(km) 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal 
Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common  
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
 Mean 593 606,157 1,329,119 0.74 0.66 5,467 0.45 0.07 0.50 0.26 0.14 0.09 2.06 
 Median 34 134808 505,144 0.62 0.56 4,691 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.88 
 Maximum 172,210 10,995,800 10,995,800 3.67 2.97 19,447 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.69 
 Minimum 0.001 132 6,500 0.10 0.16 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 
 St. Dev. 3,078 1,507,324 2,044,870 0.48 0.42 4,536 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.44 0.35 0.28 1.46 
  
              
 
Observations 14,670 14,669 14,670 13,878 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 14,670 
 
11,627 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the FDI outflows analysis in chapter 6. These variables are in their original units. 
 
 PEI in the receiving 
country (mil$) 
FDIoutfl. i,j,t / GDPi –
FDIoutfl.usa,j,t / 
GDPusa (mil$) 
FDIoutfl. i,j,t / GDPi –
FDIoutfl.uk,j,t / GDPuk 
(mil$) 
FDIoutfl. i,j,t / GDPi –
FDIoutfl.jpn,j,t / 
GDPjpn (mil$) 
Total European 
FDI outflows to 
country j at time t 
(- i) 
Mean 5,730 0.0000060 0.000005 0.0000072 7,668 
Median 102 0.0000022 0.000002 0.0000033 2,008 
Maximum 275,575 0.0003090 0.000310 0.0000850 198,466 
Minimum -43,550 -   0.0003070 -           0.000333 -   0.0000196 0 
St. Dev. 20,541 0.0000237 0.000026 0.0000136 17,682 
Observations 14,670 8,197 10,905 757 5,803 
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 Table 3.7a.  Descriptive statistics for FDI outflows panel data used in Chapter 7 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the FDI outflows probit analysis. The variables are in their original units.  
 
 
  
Binary 
dependent 
(FDI 
relationsh.) 
GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country(mil$) 
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country  
Trade 
Openness 
of the FDI 
Send. 
Country  
Physical 
Distance 
(km) 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal 
Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common  
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index  
 Mean  0.47 415,987 1,070,412 0.76 0.69 6,171 0.34 0.05 0.36 0.24 0.07 0.11 8.52  
 Median  0 66,974 392,790 0.65 0.56 5,716 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.68  
 Maximum  1 10,995,800 10,995,800 3.67 3.07 19,630 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 42.76  
 Minimum  0 28 6,500 0.10 0.15 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 St. Dev.  0.50 1,249,750 1,744,955 0.47 0.45 4,625 0.48 0.21 0.48 0.42 0.26 0.32 6.17  
Observ. 22,983 22,983 22,989 20,460 22,977 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989 22,989 14,525  
 Table 3.7b. Descriptive statistics for FDI inflows panel data used in Chapter 7 
The table reports the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the FDI inflows probit analysis. The variables are in their original units.  
 
 
  
Binary 
dependent 
(FDI 
relationsh.) 
GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country(mil$) 
GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country(mil$) 
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country  
Trade 
Openness 
of the FDI 
Send. 
Country  
Physical 
Distance 
(km) 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal 
Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common  
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index  
 Mean  0.64 871,527 403,831 0.70 0.79 6,706 0.32 0.04 0.33 0.25 0.06 0.13 8.30  
 Median  0 407,951 47,097 0.58 0.69 6,510 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.31  
 Maximum  1 10,995,800 10,995,800 2.97 3.67 19,630 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 42.76  
 Minimum  0 5,362 26 0.16 0.10 60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 St. Dev.  0.49 1,407,620 1,246,346 0.42 0.46 4,720 0.47 0.20 0.47 0.43 0.24 0.34 6.28  
Observ. 25,390 25,390 25,375 25,274 22,085 25,390 25,390 25,390 25,390 25,390 25,390 25,390 14,636  
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of the variables in their original values. Therefore, the data are presented in the original units 
and they show: the mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, sum and number of 
observations.  
 
3.3.1. Dependent Variables 
A) FDI outflows 
The FDI outflows panel dataset contains a total of 14,670 FDI outflows observations.  It 
contains a total of 1,867 different country pairs. The total monetary value of the FDI outflows 
in the sample is 7,905,061 million of $US across the 25 years in the sample period with an 
average outflow investment in the sample of $US 298 million per annum and per country pair. 
The minimum FDI outflows is $US 0.001 million and a maximum outflow investment of $US 
172,210 million per year and per country pair [inflows from Germany in the UK in 2000]. 
The fact that the FDI outflows have a higher average and volume than the FDI inflows is 
understandable as the OECD member countries (from which the FDI outflows originate) 
include the majority of the richest countries in the world.   
 
FDI outflows – binary dependent variable  
  This variable has been constructed in order to be used in the probit econometric 
estimation of chapter 7. The descriptive statistics can be found in table 3.7a. This binary 
dependent variable takes the value of one if there is a positive FDI relationship (FDI outflow) 
between the two countries in the bilateral country pair. This variable has 22,989 observations 
and 2,872 unique country pairs. Since it can only take the values of 0 and 1 these are its 
maximum and minimum. The average is 0.47 which means that 47% of the observations have 
an FDI relationship in the FDI outflows.  
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B) FDI inflows 
The FDI inflows panel dataset contains a total of 11,903 observations.  It contains a 
total of 1,789 unique bilateral country pairs. The total monetary value of the FDI inflows in 
the sample is $US 6,367,971 million of across the 25 years in the sample period with an 
average inflow in this sample is $US 590 million per annum, per country pair. The minimum 
FDI inflows is $0.001 million and a maximum inflow investment of $US 108,566 million per 
year and per country pair [Inflow from USA to the UK in 1999].  
 
FDI inflows – binary dependent variable  
This variable is constructed to be used in the probit econometric estimation of chapter 
7. The descriptive statistics can be found in table 3.7b. There are two binary dependent 
variables in this case as well, both of which can have the value of either 0 or 1. The first 
binary dependent variable takes the value of one if there is a positive FDI relationship (FDI 
inflow) between the two countries in the bilateral country pair. This variable has 25,390 
observations and 3,066 unique country pairs. Since it can only take the values of 0 and 1 these 
are its maximum and minimum. The average is 0.64; 64% of the observations have an FDI 
relationship in the FDI inflows data.  
 
 
3.3.2. Independent Variables  
In this section I discuss the basic descriptive statistics of all of the independent 
variables that are used in the empirical analyses in chapters 4 through 7. The descriptive 
statistics can be found in tables 3.2 to 3.7. 
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Membership in the same economic or political organisation dummy 
In the data sample, 50% of the countries in the country pairs share membership to an 
economic or a political organisation for FDI outflows and 60% in the inflows. This variable is 
a dummy and can only take the values of zero and one.  It matches the dependent variable in 
the number of observations and has 14,670 and 11,903 for outflows and inflows respectively.  
 
Same origin of the country’s legal system  
In this case, 26% and 30% of the bilateral country pairs in the FDI outflows and 
inflows respectively have the same origin of their legal systems. It only takes the values of 
zero and one. It has 14,670 and 11,903 observations for outflows and inflows respectively. 
 
Shared History  
For this variable, 14% of the bilateral country pairs in the FDI outflows share a 
common history as defined in the previous section while the mean is 9% in the FDI inflows 
sample. The minimum and maximum values are 0 and 1 and there are 14,670 and 11,903 
observations for outflows and inflows respectively. 
 
Common Official or Minority Language Dummy  
The dummy has the value of one the bilateral country pair countries have either a 
common official language or a common language that a minority speaks and zero otherwise.  
In this sample, 9% of bilateral country pairs that have a language in common in the FDI 
outflows while this number is 16% for the inflows. The values for this dummy variable as 
well are either one or zero and the number of observations is 14,670 and 11,903 for outflows 
and inflows respectively. 
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Cultural Distance Index  
The data on this index are time-invariant and reduce the sample to 11,304 and 10,057 
observations for outflows and inflows respectively. The individual cultural dimensions may 
range from 0-100. In this sample the mean cultural distance index is 2.06 for the FDI outflows 
and 7.77 for the FDI inflows. In the outflows, the minimum is 1.88 while the maximum is 
10.69 which points to the fact that most of the country pairs in the sample are culturally 
closer. In the FDI inflows, the minimum is 6.70 and maximum 42.76 which indicates a 
greater cultural distance in the inflows country pairs.  
 
Physical distance  
The average distance between the country pairs in the sample is 6,610 km. The 
smallest distance is around 60km [distance between Austria and the Slovak Republic] and the 
furthest away country pairs are around 20,000 km. As an illustration, the distance between 
Australia and Malaysia is around 6,600 km (the mean) and New Zealand and France are 
approximately 20,000 km apart (the maximum in the sample).  
 
Same Continent Dummy  
In the dataset, 45% and 48% of the bilateral country pairs are on the same continent 
for FDI outflows and inflows respectively. The min-max values are zero and one as in all 
dummy variables and the number of observations are 14,670 and 11,903 for outflows and 
inflows respectively.  
 
Shared Border Dummy 
In the dataset, 7% of the bilateral country pairs share a border for both FDI outflows 
and inflows. The min-max values are zero and one as in all dummy variables and the number 
of observations are 14,670 and 11,903 for outflows and inflows respectively.  
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 Gross domestic product [GDP] 
In the FDI outflows sample, the mean GDP value for the receiving country is $US 
606,157 million. The highest GDP value per year and country is $US 10,995,800 million 
(10.1 trillion) (USA, 2005) while the smallest GDP per year and country in the dataset is $US 
132 million (Kiribati, 1987). The mean GDP value for the sending country (an OECD 
member country) is $US 1,329,119 million per year (roughly 1 trillion). The highest GDP 
value per year and country is $US 10,995,800 million (10.1 trillion) (USA, 2005) and the 
smallest GDP per year in the data is $US 6,500 million and it’s in Iceland in 1992.  
In the case of FDI inflows, the mean GDP value for the receiving country (an OECD member 
country) is $US 903,820 million per year and per country pair. The highest GDP value per 
year and per country is $US 10,995,800 million (10 trillion) (USA, 2005) and the smallest 
GDP per year in the sample is $US 6,500 million and it’s in Iceland in 1992. The mean GDP 
value for the sending country is $US 418,852 million (4.1 trillion). The highest GDP value 
per year and per country is $US 10,995,800 million (10.1 trillion) per year (USA, 2005) and 
the smallest GDP per year and per country in the sample is $US 52 million per year.  
 
Country openness to trade  
The country openness to trade is a ratio between the sum of exports and imports and 
the GDP of a country. In the case of FDI outflows, the mean of this variable for the receiving 
country is 74%. The highest participation of exports plus imports over GDP per year and 
country is 367% (Bulgaria in 1989) and the minimum is 10% (Argentina in 1984). The mean 
of this variable for the sending country is 66%. The highest participation of exports plus 
imports over GDP per year and country is 297% (Luxembourg in 2005) and the minimum is 
16% (Japan in 1993).  
In the case of FDI inflows, the mean of this variable for the FDI receiving country is 71%. 
The highest participation of exports plus imports over GDP per year and country is 297% 
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(Luxembourg in 2005) and the minimum is 16% (Japan in 1993). The mean of this variable 
for the FDI receiving country is 76%. The highest participation of exports plus imports over 
GDP per year and country is 367% (Hong Kong in 2005) and the minimum is 10% (Argentina 
in 1984).  
 
Portfolio Equity Flows for the FDI outflows receiving country 
The data are in current U.S. dollars. For the purpose of the empirical analysis in 
chapter 6, where this variable is used, I transformed this series into constant 2000 U.S dollars 
in order to make this variable comparable to the others used in the regressions. This variable 
is only used with FDI outflows. The mean portfolio equity flows per country and year is US$ 
5,730 million.  
 
 
Bilateral trust  
This variable reduces the sample to just 2,773 and 2,635 observations for FDI 
outflows and inflows respectively. The data are a set of surveys conducted by Eurobarometer 
and sponsored by the European Commission (Guiso et al, 2009). They were conducted on a 
representative sample of the total population over the age of sixteen and on about 1,000 
individuals per country. The survey question asked them to rate how much they trust people 
from their own country and from other countries. They rate the trustworthiness on a scale 
from 1-4 (1 being not at all and 4 being a lot of trust) and the index is an average of all 
answers. Because all countries are European this also makes the same continent and economic 
organisation dummies have the value 1 for each observation and therefore unusable in this 
regression. Due to the limited number and range of countries that are covered with this index, 
this variable clashes with the some of the other  variables like shared economic or political 
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organisation and same continent when it may cause all of the country pairs to have those 
variables with the value of one.  
 
International telephone calls per capita 
The data on international telephone calls are obtained from the International 
Telecommunications Union (www.itu.int).  Data are from 1995-2005 and they have 11,632 
and 9,230 observations for outflows and inflows respectively. The average international 
telephone call minutes are 65.26 minutes per country and year.  
 
 Financial Times Circulation per capita 
I obtained this data from the Financial Times company and they are on their 6 month 
world circulation available for the following years only: 2004, 2002, 2001, 1999 and 1998. 
The number of observations is only 3,425 and 3,390 for outflows and inflows respectively.  
 
Bilateral tax treaty for double taxation avoidance 
Data were unavailable for Korea, Mexico and Turkey and therefore when this variable 
is used, these three countries are not included in the panel. The data are available for all the 
years of the sample and the number of observations is 6,895 and 13,968 for FDI inflows and 
outflows respectively. 
 
Country governance 
For corporate governance I include six variables from the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI can be found on www.govindicators.org) available for all countries between 
the 1996-2008 period. Their data are compiled from a number of 441 variables, 35 different 
sources and 33 organisations that inform on aspects of governance. Then the authors assign 
each of the following six aggregate indicators with that information and use an unobserved 
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components model to construct them. These indices range from a minimum of -2.67 to a 
maximum of +3.41. They’re also highly correlated amongst themselves and I cannot therefore 
use them together in the same regression but rather adding them one by one in order to see 
their effect. The data are available for the following years only: 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002-
2005. The number of observations for each of the six indicators ranges from 5,300 and 6,300 
observations for FDI inflows and outflows.  
 
 
3.3.3. Other data particularities  
There are several countries in the dataset that are missing a whole dummy variable 
which therefore cannot be used in some of the individual country estimations. The shared 
border dummy variable doesn’t take the value of one in the cases of island countries. There 
are five island countries among the OECD member countries: Australia, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand and Korea [the data are on South Korea, which only borders North Korea (for which 
there aren’t any data) and it is effectively an island country in this sample]. For these 
countries the shared border dummy variable never takes the value of one and cannot be used 
in the estimation for these countries. The common language dummy in the sample also never 
has a value of one for these countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Japan, 
Norway and Poland. In the case of the same history dummy variable, it doesn’t have a value 
of one for: Switzerland, Norway and Italy with an addition of Belgium in the outflows 
dataset.   
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Table 3.8a. Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5 
 
The table reports the correlation coefficients of the variables used in the FDI Outflows regression analysis.  
 
 
  
L FDI 
Outflows 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Receiving 
country 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Sending 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the  
FDI Rec. 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the FDI 
Send. 
country 
L Distance 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common 
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
L FDI 
Outflows 1.00             
L GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country 
0.41 1.00            
L GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country 
0.37 -0.12 1.00           
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country 
-0.02 -0.39 -0.04 1.00          
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI Send. 
country 
-0.15 -0.07 -0.62 0.12 1.00         
L Distance -0.15 0.01 0.23 -0.18 -0.17 1.00        
Location on 
Same 
continent 
0.11 0.02 -0.21 0.16 0.08 -0.81 1.00       
Shared 
Border 0.19 0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.47 0.29 1.00      
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
0.31 0.48 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.30 0.35 0.17 1.00     
Legal Syst. 
Origin 0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 0.01 1.00    
Shared 
History 0.17 -0.04 0.12 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.09 0.20 -0.01 0.36 1.00   
Common 
Language 0.10 -0.10 0.05 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.11 0.14 -0.02 0.33 0.46 1.00  
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
-0.18 -0.10 -0.03 0.10 0.03 0.13 -0.07 -0.21 -0.21 -0.30 -0.20 -0.13 1.00 
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Table 3.8b. Correlations table for FDI inflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5 
 
The table reports the correlation coefficients of the variables used in the FDI Inflows regression analysis.  
 
  
L FDI 
inflows 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Receiving 
country 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Sending 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the  
FDI Rec. 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the FDI 
Send. 
country 
L Distance 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal Syst. 
Origin 
Shared 
History 
Common 
Language 
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
L FDI inflows 
1.00             
L GDP of FDI 
Receiving 
country 0.23 1.00            
L GDP of FDI 
Sending 
country 0.53 -0.05 1.00           
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country -0.15 -0.64 -0.15 1.00          
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI Send. 
country -0.02 0.02 -0.42 0.08 1.00         
L Distance 
-0.25 0.17 0.02 -0.13 -0.13 1.00        
Location on 
Same 
continent 0.17 -0.17 -0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.82 1.00       
Shared 
Border 0.20 -0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.42 0.27 1.00      
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 0.49 -0.05 0.48 -0.07 -0.11 -0.33 0.36 0.15 1.00     
Legal Syst. 
Origin 0.00 0.00 -0.13 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.18 -0.10 1.00    
Shared 
History 0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.15 -0.06 0.32 1.00   
Common 
Language 0.08 0.11 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 -0.11 0.19 -0.12 0.37 0.45 1.00  
Cultural 
Distance 
Index -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.10 -0.07 -0.18 -0.07 -0.32 -0.13 -0.20 1.00 
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Table 3.8c. Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5 (continues from table 3.9a) 
The table reports the correlation coefficients with the robustness variables used in the FDI Outflows regression analysis.  
 
 
  
  Bilateral 
trust 
Internati
onal 
Phone 
Calls/cap 
FT 
circulation 
per capita 
Bilater
al tax 
treaties 
Voice and 
Accountab
ility 
Politica
l 
Stabilit
y 
Government 
Effectives 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control 
of 
Corrupt 
L FDI Outflows 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.34 0.27 0.21 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.30 
L GDP of FDI 
Receiving country -0.16 0.14 0.14 0.39 0.35 0.22 0.50 0.42 0.45 0.43 
L GDP of FDI 
Sending country -0.32 -0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 
Trade Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country 
0.21 0.50 0.33 -0.13 0.08 0.28 0.16 0.24 0.15 0.13 
Trade Openness of 
the FDI Send. 
country 
0.21 0.06 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
L Distance -0.31 -0.08 -0.27 -0.17 -0.28 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.22 
Location on Same 
continent NA 0.08 0.26 0.19 0.43 0.39 0.33 0.36 0.33 0.31 
Shared Border 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Econ. or Political 
Organisation NA 0.24 0.35 0.36 0.73 0.63 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.69 
Legal Syst. Origin 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 
Shared History 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 
Common 
Language 0.15 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 
Cultural Distance 
Index -0.10 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.19 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 
Bilateral trust 1.00 0.19 0.11 -0.27 0.42 0.41 0.52 0.33 0.52 0.51 
International 
Phone Calls/cap  1.00 0.50 -0.01 0.28 0.43 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.55 
FT circulation per 
capita   1.00 0.12 0.37 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.55 
Bilateral tax 
treaties    1.00 0.31 0.24 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.28 
Voice and 
Accountability     1.00 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 
Political Stability      1.00 0.82 0.80 0.85 0.82 
Government 
Effectives       1.00 0.93 0.97 0.97 
Regulatory Quality        1.00 0.92 0.91 
Rule of Law         1.00 0.97 
Control of 
Corruption          1.00 
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Table 3.8d. Correlation table for FDI inflows panel data used in chapters 4 and 5 (continues from table 3.9b) 
 
The table reports the correlation coefficients with the robustness variables used in the FDI Inflows regression analysis
  Bilateral 
trust 
Internati
onal 
Phone 
Calls/cap 
FT 
circulation 
per capita 
Bilater
al tax 
treaties 
Voice and 
Accountab
ility 
Politica
l 
Stabilit
y 
Government 
Effectives 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control 
of 
Corrupt 
L FDI inflows 0.10 0.23 -0.02 0.30 0.18 0.07 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.24 
L GDP of FDI 
Receiving country -0.23 -0.05 -0.32 0.14 -0.16 -0.34 -0.03 -0.22 -0.07 -0.04 
L GDP of FDI 
Sending country -0.15 0.08 -0.15 0.31 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.01 
Trade Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country 
0.20 0.34 0.69 -0.13 0.30 0.45 0.28 0.48 0.28 0.23 
Trade Openness of 
the FDI Send. 
country 
0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.14 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
L Distance -0.34 -0.14 -0.07 -0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 
Location on Same 
continent NA 0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
Shared Border 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Econ. or Political 
Organisation -0.04 0.12 -0.09 0.30 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
Legal Syst. Origin 0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 
Shared History 0.13 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.06 
Common 
Language 0.15 0.07 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Cultural Distance 
Index -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Bilateral trust 1.00 0.28 0.12 -0.33 0.43 0.41 0.49 0.34 0.51 0.50 
International 
Phone Calls/cap  1.00 0.54 0.07 0.60 0.49 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.66 
FT circulation per 
capita   1.00 -0.13 0.40 0.49 0.54 0.64 0.53 0.51 
Bilateral tax 
treaties    1.00 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 
Voice and 
Accountability     1.00 0.83 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.87 
Political Stability      1.00 0.79 0.77 0.83 0.80 
Government 
Effectives       1.00 0.87 0.96 0.96 
Regulatory Quality        1.00 0.85 0.88 
Rule of Law         1.00 0.96 
Control of 
Corruption          1.00 
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Table 3.9. Correlation table for FDI outflows panel data used in the econometric analysis in chapter 6  
The table reports the correlation coefficients of the various variables used in the analysis in chapter 6. The rest of the coefficients are 
were shown previously in table 3.9a.  
 
  |FDIoutf
l. i,j,t / 
GDPi –
FDIoutfl
.jpn,j,t / 
GDPjpn| 
|FDIoutf
l. i,j,t / 
GDPi –
FDIoutfl
.uk,j,t / 
GDPuk| 
|FDIoutfl. 
i,j,t / 
GDPi –
FDIoutfl.
usa,j,t / 
GDPusa| 
LTota
l Eur. 
FDI 
outfl. 
to j( - 
i) at  t  
L Total 
Eur. FDI 
outfl. to 
j( - i) at  t 
-1 
L PEI 
in the 
rec. 
countr
y t-1 
L PEI in 
the rec. 
country t 
L PEI in 
the rec. 
country 
t-2 
L PEI in 
the rec. 
country 
t-3 
|FDIoutfl. i,j,t / 
GDPi –
FDIoutfl.jpn,j,t / 
GDPjpn| 
1.00         
|FDIoutfl. i,j,t / 
GDPi –
FDIoutfl.uk,j,t / 
GDPuk| 
1.00 1.00        
|FDIoutfl. i,j,t / 
GDPi –
FDIoutfl.usa,j,t / 
GDPusa| 
1.00 1.00 1.00       
Total Eur. FDI 
outfl. to j( - i) at  t NA 0.01 0.03 1.00      
Total Eur. FDI 
outfl. to j( - i) at  t 
-1 
NA -0.04 -0.06 0.46 1.00     
L PEI in the rec. 
country t 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.05 1.00    
L PEI in the rec. 
country t-1 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.21 1.00   
L PEI in the rec. 
country t-2 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.07 0.21 0.23 1.00  
L PEI in the rec. 
country t-3 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.08 -0.10 0.10 0.22 0.22 1.00 
L FDI inflows 0.37 -0.07 -0.02 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 
L GDP of FDI 
Receiving country 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.64 0.03 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.24 
L GDP of FDI 
Sending country -0.70 -0.50 -0.56 -0.06 0.15 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Trade Openness 
of the  FDI Rec. 
country 
-0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.21 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 
Trade Openness 
of the FDI Send. 
country 
-0.43 -0.31 -0.32 -0.07 0.15 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
L Distance 0.01 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Location on Same 
continent 0.05 0.10 0.14 NA 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Shared Border NA 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Econ. or Political 
Union 0.26 0.05 0.09 0.30 -0.02 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 
Legal Syst. Origin 0.38 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
Shared History 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Common 
Language 0.17 0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Cultural Distance 
Index -0.22 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
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Table 3.10a. Correlations table for FDI outflows panel data used in chapter 7 
The table reports the correlation coefficients of the variables as used in the FDI outflows regression analysis in chapter 7.  
  
Binary (FDI 
relationship) 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Receiving 
country 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Sending 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the  
FDI Rec. 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the FDI 
Send. 
country 
L 
Distance 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal Syst. 
Origin 
Common 
Language 
Shared 
History  
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
Binary (FDI 
relationship) 1.00             
L GDP of 
FDI 
Receiving 
country 
0.26 1.00            
L GDP of 
FDI Sending 
country 
-0.06 -0.02 1.00           
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country 
-0.05 -0.28 -0.02 1.00          
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI Send. 
country 
0.12 -0.02 -0.39 0.12 1.00         
L Distance -0.26 0.03 0.15 -0.13 -0.10 1.00        
Location on 
Same 
continent 
0.25 -0.05 -0.10 0.12 0.02 -0.81 1.00       
Shared 
Border 0.15 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.45 0.28 1.00      
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
0.37 0.32 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.35 0.45 0.21 1.00     
Legal Syst. 
Origin 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00    
Common 
Language  0.13 0.06 0.16 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.18 0.00 0.36 1.00   
Shared 
History 0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 0.30 0.43 1.00  
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
-0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.04 -0.18 -0.15 -0.30 -0.18 -0.12 1.00 
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Table 3.10b. Correlations table for FDI inflows panel data used in chapter 7 
The table reports the correlation coefficients of the variables as used in the FDI inflows regression analysis in chapter 7.  
  
Binary (FDI 
relationship) 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Receiving 
country 
L GDP of 
FDI 
Sending 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the  
FDI Rec. 
country 
Trade 
Openness 
of the FDI 
Send. 
country 
L 
Distance 
Location 
on Same 
continent 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
Legal Syst. 
Origin 
Common 
Language 
Shared 
History  
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
Binary (FDI 
relationship) 1.00             
L GDP of 
FDI 
Receiving 
country 
0.26 1.00            
L GDP of 
FDI Sending 
country 
-0.06 -0.02 1.00           
Trade 
Openness of 
the  FDI Rec. 
country 
-0.05 -0.28 -0.02 1.00          
Trade 
Openness of 
the FDI Send. 
country 
0.12 -0.02 -0.39 0.12 1.00         
L Distance -0.26 0.03 0.15 -0.13 -0.10 1.00        
Location on 
Same 
continent 
0.25 -0.05 -0.10 0.12 0.02 -0.81 1.00       
Shared 
Border 0.15 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.45 0.28 1.00      
Econ. or 
Political 
Organisation 
0.37 0.32 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.35 0.45 0.21 1.00     
Legal Syst. 
Origin 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00    
Common 
Language  0.13 0.06 0.16 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.18 0.00 0.36 1.00   
Shared 
History 0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 0.30 0.43 1.00  
Cultural 
Distance 
Index 
-0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.04 -0.18 -0.15 -0.30 -0.18 -0.12 1.00 
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3.4. Correlation among the variables 
The correlation matrix for inflows and outflows as used in the empirical analysis in 
chapters 4-7, are shown in tables 3.8 through to 3.10. Very high correlation among the 
variables may cause multicolinearity which in turn will yield biased results. The correlation 
matrix shows the correlation among the variables in the form in which they are used in the 
regressions i.e. as logarithms, etc.  
 
Dependent variables  
FDI outflows 
The correlation relationship of the FDI outflows with the other variables shows a 
positive correlation to the GDP of the FDI outflows receiving and sending country while 
there’s a negative correlation relationship with the openness of both outflows sending and 
receiving countries. Identically with FDI inflows, there is a negative relationship to the 
distance variable and a positive one to the border and same continent variables within the 
physical proximity variables group. There is also a positive correlation relationship with four 
variables in the near-home bias variables group while a negative one with the cultural distance 
index.  
 
FDI inflows 
The correlation matrix of the FDI inflows with the other variables shows a positive 
relationship with the GDP of both the FDI sending and receiving country. It also shows a 
negative relationship with the trade openness of both the FDI sending and receiving country. 
FDI inflows have a negative correlation with the distance variable from the proximity 
variables and a positive one with the same continent and border variables. There is a positive 
correlation relationship with four of the near-home bias variables (same economic and 
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political organisation, same legal system origin, common language and shared history) and a 
negative one with the cultural distance index. 
 
Independent variables  
 
Data on institutional and cultural variables 
The membership in the same economic or political organisation dummy is negatively 
correlated to the same origin of the legal system dummy and common language dummy and 
positively to the shared history dummy. It is also strongly positively correlated to the GDP of 
the FDI inflows sending and FDI outflows receiving country.  The same origin of the 
country’s legal system dummy is strongly positively correlated to the shared history and 
common language dummies while the Shared History Dummy variable is positively 
correlated to the other variables in the near-home bias group. The Common Official or 
Minority Language Dummy is positively correlated to the other dummies in this near-home 
bias variable group, except the economic organisation dummy and CD index. None of the 
correlations coefficients show levels of correlation that might cause multicollinearity.  
 
Data on physical proximity variables 
The distance is predominantly negatively correlated to the other variables such as the 
dependent variables, FDI inflows and outflows, the exports and the other two variables from 
the proximity group, same continent and border and with three out of four near-home bias 
variables: same economic and political organisation, same legal system origin, and shared 
history. It is only positively correlated with the common language dummy variable and the 
two GDP variables of the FDI flows receiving and sending country. The same continent 
dummy is positively correlated with the exports of both FDI flows receiving and sending 
countries. This dummy is positively correlated with the shared border dummy but strongly 
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negatively with the distance variable (-0.81). It is strongly positively correlated with the 
economic and political organisation dummy while it is negatively correlated with the other 
three variables from the near-home bias group. The Shared Border Dummy is positively 
correlated to the other variables in the near-home bias group.   
 
Data on macroeconomic variables for FDI outflows 
The GDP of the receiving country has a negative correlation relationship with the 
GDP of the FDI outflows sending country and the openness of the receiving country while a 
positive one to the openness of the FDI inflows sending country. The GDP of the sending 
country has a negative correlation relationship with the GDP of the FDI outflows receiving 
country and the openness of the sending country while a positive one to the openness of the 
FDI outflows receiving country. The openness of the receiving country has a negative 
correlation relationship with the openness of the sending country and with the distance. 
The openness of the sending country has a negative correlation relationship with the openness 
of the receiving country and with the distance. None of these variables report a worrying level 
of correlation.  
 
Data on macroeconomic variables for FDI inflows 
The GDP of the receiving country has a negative correlation relationship with the 
GDP of the FDI inflows sending country and the openness of the receiving country while a 
positive one to the openness of the FDI inflows sending country. The GDP of the sending 
country has a negative correlation relationship with the GDP of the FDI inflows receiving 
country and the openness of the sending country while a positive one to the openness of the 
FDI inflows receiving country. The openness of the receiving country has a negative 
correlation relationship with the openness of the sending country and with the distance. 
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The openness of the sending country has a negative correlation relationship with the openness 
of the receiving country and with the distance. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
The dataset in this thesis is unbalanced panel data built around the 2008 edition of the 
OECD FDI flows dataset. Aside from the OECD, FDI data are also provided by the United 
Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as well as the World Bank. The 
World Bank’s datasets provide one-sided data on FDI as opposed to the bilateral country 
databases also available from other sources. The choice of the OECD database was made for a 
couple of reasons: it contains  a country-wide and time-lengthy source of bilateral FDI 
country data; unlike the UNCTAD datasets, it provides the data in both the national currency 
and in a common world currency (US dollars) which helps avoid potential bias when 
researchers individually convert data to a common currency and finally, the  OECD also 
provides the data when the countries have reported a zero-FDI relationship which is very 
beneficial for the analysis in chapter 7.   
As with other databases, it has a few limitations as well: it is compiled from the point of view 
of the OECD member countries and therefore the outflows originate from the OECD 
members and go to the rest of the world partner countries and the inflows originate from the 
rest of the world partner countries and are directed towards the OECD member countries. The 
dataset therefore doesn’t cover the FDI flows between country pairs in the world that aren’t 
members of the OECD. The second limitation of the dataset comes from the fact that it is an 
unbalanced panel. Some of the OECD countries have provided less data than other member 
countries especially when it comes to the first half of the data (1981-1993).  
I consider both FDI inflows and outflows for two main reasons; the first reason is to compare 
the general results and try to eliminate some of the aforementioned unevenness due to the 
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nature of the data as well as strengthen and generalise the findings; the second reason is to 
capture any effects that might not have been captured by analysing either the FDI outflows or 
FDI inflows due to the unbalanced nature of this panel data. In some analyses it is imprudent 
or impossible to consider the FDI inflows, such as in chapters 5 and 6 because of the limited 
country variability that they create.  
Table 3.11 contains a full list of all variables that are used in the estimations in the next 
chapters. This table shows the full variable name, its short form used in the tables that report 
the results as well as its brief definition and the source where it was obtained from.  
 
 
Table 3.11. Alphabetical list of all variables in this thesis 
VARIABLE VARIABLE CODE DEFINITION/DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLE SOURCE 
Binary dummy 
variable for FDI 
inflows and 
outflows 
Binary_relationship 
A binary dependent variable taking 
values 0 if the bilateral country pair 
doesn’t have an FDI relationship (zero 
FDI flows) or 1 if there is a positive 
FDI flow between the two countries in 
the country pair. 
Author calculated 
from data on FDI 
flows from the 
OECD database. 
Common 
Language langcom 
Dummy with value one if the two 
countries share a common official 
language or if a language is spoken by 
at least 9% of the population in both 
partnering countries, zero otherwise; 
Author developed 
dummy with data 
from www.cepii.fr 
 
Cultural Distance 
Index CDindex 
Index comprised of Hofstede’s (1980) 
4 cultural distance indicators. Index 
calculated following (Kogut and Singh, 
1988) 
www.geert-
hofstede.com/ 
Difference in FDI 
outflow of 
country i to 
country j from 
the world 
leader’s FDI 
outflows to 
country j (USA) 
AbsDiffUSA 
FDI outflows from country i to j at 
time t over the GDP of country i at 
time t, minus the FDI outflows of the 
world leader in FDI investments 
(United States of America) to country j 
at time t over the GDP of USA at time 
t. 
Author calculated 
from data on FDI 
flows from the 
OECD database and 
data on GDP from the 
World Development 
Indicators (2008). 
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Difference in FDI 
outflows of 
country i to 
country j from 
the regional 
leader’s FDI 
outflows to 
country j (UK) 
AbsDiffUK 
FDI outflows from country i to j at 
time t over the GDP of country i at 
time t, minus the FDI outflows of the 
world leader in FDI investments 
(United States of America) to country j 
at time t over the GDP of USA at time 
t. 
Author calculated 
from data on FDI 
flows from the 
OECD database and 
data on GDP from the 
World Development 
Indicators (2008). 
Difference in FDI 
outflow of 
country i to 
country j from 
the regional 
leader’s FDI 
outflows to 
country j (Japan) 
AbsDiffJPN 
FDI outflows from country i to j at 
time t over the GDP of country i at 
time t, minus the FDI outflows of the 
world leader in FDI investments 
(United States of America) to country j 
at time t over the GDP of USA at time 
t. 
Author calculated 
from data on FDI 
flows from the 
OECD database and 
data on GDP from the 
World Development 
Indicators (2008). 
Distance between 
partner countries Dist 
Geodesic distances between the two 
countries in the bilateral country pair; 
in kilometers; 
www.cepii.fr 
FDI inflows 
(inflows towards 
the OECD 
member) 
FDIinfl 
FDI Inflows to the OECD member 
country from the FDI sending (partner) 
country. 
OECD 
FDI outflows 
(outflows from 
the OECD 
member) 
FDIoutfl 
FDI Outflows from the OECD member 
country to the receiving (partner) 
country. 
OECD 
GDP for the FDI 
inflows receiving 
country 
GDPrec 
Gross Domestic Product for the FDI 
inflows receiving country at constant 
2000 prices, in US$ million; series 
code (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
GDP for the FDI 
inflows sending 
country 
GDPsend 
Gross Domestic Product for the FDI 
inflows sending country at constant 
2000 prices, in US$ million; series 
code (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
GDP for the FDI 
outflows 
receiving country 
GDPrec 
Gross Domestic Product for the FDI 
outflows receiving country at constant 
2000 prices, in US$ million; series 
code (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
GDP for the FDI 
outflows sending 
country 
GDPsend 
Gross Domestic Product for the FDI 
outflows sending country at constant 
2000 prices, in US$ million; series 
code (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD) 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
Portfolio Equity 
Investment for 
the FDI outflows 
receiving country 
PFOinv 
Portfolio investment flows are net and 
include non-debt-creating portfolio 
equity flows (the sum of country funds, 
depository receipts, and direct 
World Bank, Global 
Development Finance 
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at time t purchases of shares by foreign 
investors) for the year t. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars 
Same Continent samecont 
Dummy with value one if the two 
countries in the pair are on the same 
continent, zero otherwise. 
www.cepii.fr 
Same origin of 
the legal system 
for the two 
countries in the 
bilateral country 
pair 
Legorsame 
A dummy set to gain value of one if the 
legal system is of same origin in the 
FDI sending and receiving country in 
the bilateral pair. 
data are from prof. La 
Porta: 
[http://mba.tuck. 
dartmouth.edu/ 
pages/faculty/ 
rafael.laporta/ 
publications.html]  
Shared Border Border 
A dummy variable that has the value of 
1 and 0 otherwise if a border is shared 
between the FDI receiving and sending 
countries. 
www.cepii.fr 
Shared History samehist 
Dummy with value one if the two 
countries in the pair share the same 
history, zero otherwise. 
Author developed 
variable using data 
from www.cepii.fr 
Shared 
membership in 
an economic or 
political 
organisation 
ecorgsame 
Dummy set to gain value of one if the 
two countries in the pair are members 
of the same economic or political 
organisation [OECD, EU, 
Commonwealth, NAFTA], zero 
otherwise. 
Author developed 
variable using data 
from organisations’ 
websites 
Total European 
FDI outflows to  
country j (minus 
country i) at time 
t 
FDI EUR,j(-i),t 
Sum of FDI outflows from all regional 
(European) countries to country j (FDI 
receiving country) at time t, excluding 
the country i (that’s on the dependent 
variables side). In US$ million. 
Author calculated 
from data on FDI 
flows from the 
OECD database. 
Trade openness 
for the receiving 
country 
EXIMrec/ GDPrec 
Exports of goods and services plus 
Imports of goods and services for FDI 
flows receiving country divided by its 
GDP; 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
Trade openness 
for the sending 
country 
EXIMsend/ GDPsend 
Exports of goods and services plus 
Imports of goods and services for FDI 
flows sending country divided by its 
GDP; 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
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4. Near-Home Bias in FDI flows 
 
The following chapter establishes the model which will be used to investigate the impact 
of the near-home bias variables on FDI flows. It starts by elaborating on the theoretical 
background of the model and how it can be applied in this case and is followed by an 
overview of the econometric representation of the regressions that will be estimated.  
 
4.1. Theoretical background of the model 
The basis for the model that will be developed to test near-home bias in FDI is the 
gravity model. It is called the gravity model because it predicts that certain economic 
categories that occur between two places, such as trade flows will behave according to natural 
laws, the attraction between any two objects will be determined by their mass and distance. Its 
origins are in physics, in Newton’s second law of gravity and it was first introduced in 
economics by Ian Tinbergen (1962). He developed the gravity model to explain international 
trade flows between bilateral country pairs. Although it has many variations (Bergstrand, 
1985) the basic analogy of its two main parts, the mass of two objects and their distance are 
maintained in the basis for this model. In economics the mass is proxied with the country’s 
size and economic power and the distance is measured between two geographic places that 
have an economic relationship. The model varies in the added variables which serve to 
explain the research question. The widespread use of the model in international economics 
and economics of trade flows is due to the model’s borrowed intuition from the natural 
sciences.  
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4.1.1. Gravity Model in Physics 
The gravity model in physics is Newton’s second law of gravity [Motta, 1729] devised 
in 1678 which states that the attraction between two objects is a result of the objects’ mass 
and the distance between them. Newton’s second law of gravity is written as follows:  
 
,
i j
i j
ij
M M
F G
D
α β
θ=
                                                                                                     (4.1) 
Where Fij is the force of attraction between the two objects i and j; Mi and Mj are the masses 
or sizes of the two objects, Dij is the distance between them while G is a constant that 
represents Earth’s gravity force. From the equation it can be said that the bigger their mass the 
higher the force of attraction between them and the bigger the distance between them the 
lesser is the force of attraction. This basic relation between an object’s mass and its distance 
from other objects was further developed by Tinbergen (1962) as the basis for a natural 
relationship between two objects in economics. In economics these two objects can be any 
number of things that have an interaction - countries, cities, companies and people as well as 
in any number of relationships between them: general trade, imports, exports or direct 
investment. The ingenuity of this model is that it follows a natural law that can be found 
everywhere between physical objects and applies it to economic flows. Economics however, 
isn’t predominantly a natural science, but rather a social science and as such the relationships 
between economic categories are much more complex than that of two physical objects and 
that’s why other contributing factors must be added to the existing natural relationship 
between economic categories.  
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4.1.2. Gravity Model in International Trade 
The gravity model in international trade is often claimed to be the single most 
successful empirical device (Anderson, 1979). This gravity model was introduced by 
Tinbergen (1962) for the purpose of an economic analysis of international trade flows. 
Tinbergen was a physicist working on his doctoral thesis in economics in the Netherlands. He 
developed the model by assigning an economic counterpart for each of the variables used in 
the Newton’s second law of gravity that would be used in physics to explain the attraction 
between two objects and created the model that can explain the driving force behind the trade 
attraction for two countries. The mass of the two objects can be represented in economics 
with the GDP of two countries that are engaged in some relationship as the GDP of a country 
is an excellent indicator of the economic might or pull of that country. The distance between 
two objects is the distance between two countries or any two geographically different places 
(cities or agglomerations, countries, states, factories, regions) that have an economic 
relationship. When equation (1) is transformed into a logarithmic form I get the following 
functional form of the gravity model that can be used to explain the magnitude of trade flows 
between two countries:  
 
log Fij = log Mi + log Mj – log Dij + ui,j                                                                            (4.2) 
 
Where Fij is the trade flow (imports, exports, net exports and similar variations) from origin i 
to destination j; Mi and Mj are the relevant economies’ sizes (M is usually measured as the 
gross domestic product (GDP) or GDP per capita and similar variations); Dij is the distance 
between the geographical locations of the two partner countries (usually measured centre to 
centre or with a tailored formula that includes the whole country area) (Head and Mayer, 
2002) and ui,j is the error term. When two countries are closer to each other there is a natural 
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attraction between them to exchange goods as opposed to an exchange with countries that are 
far away. This is because there is greater familiarity and ease in the exchange that is 
proximate and it occurs at a lesser cost. Exacerbated trade among proximate countries also 
occurs because of higher probability that these countries are similar and trade is facilitated 
because of such greater familiarity.  
The model is generally very widely used in international trade literature and its success is due 
to its high explanatory power and a very general applicability in all sorts of economic 
relationships such as the one that occurs in cross – border direct investment (Anderson, 
Wincoop, 2003). The same model can be applied in FDI because like in international trade 
there exists a similar economic relationship between two geographic locations and economic 
entities. In the case of FDI the flow between the countries takes the form of a direct 
investment which has its particularities (ownership change) as opposed to a simple exchange 
of goods. Thus the factors that determine the FDI relationship will be slightly different than 
the ones in international trade. In the case of FDI the nature of the exchange has a more 
permanent character than that in international trade which can be quite temporary and so we 
would naturally expect this decision to be more influenced by familiarity factors. Entering 
into a direct investment abroad requires commitment of resources for a longer period of time 
and it is to be expected that decision makers in corporations will feel more comfortable 
investing in locations where they feel more familiar with the investment process and 
environment. The FDI decision is a more serious and complex one compared to trade because 
the countries can’t discontinue it as easily. This will reflect itself in the choice of locations for 
direct investment. Decision makers will be more comfortable investing in locations where 
they feel more acquainted with the market.  
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4.1.3. Gravity Model for Foreign Direct Investment 
Following this general premise of two main factors, mass and distance I can say that 
the FDI flows are a function of the size of the respective economies in bilateral country pairs 
and the distance between them as well as other contributing factors. Following this, the 
general gravity model (Tinbergen, 1962) from equation (4.2) for FDI flows is written as 
follows:  
 
log Fi,j,t = log Mi,t + log Mj,t – log Dij  + ui,j,t                                                                      (4.3) 
 
Where Fi,j,t are FDI flows from country i towards country j at time t [the FDI flows can be 
represented with a variation in measure such as FDI as a percentage of GDP  or the total trade 
(exports + imports]; Mi,t and Mj,t are country’s i and j’s GDP at time t, respectively [this is the 
measure for the size of the country and it can be also represented by GDP per capita or other 
measures for the country’s economic size such as the stock markets’ capitalisation]; Dij is the 
distance between the two countries that have an FDI relationship [the measure of distance 
between two countries is usually done by calculation of the physical distance between the two 
countries or is approximated by their location within a region or continent or proximity can 
also be represented by a shared border variable]. ui,j,t stands for the error term.  
The model also contains the time element (the variables vary across time and country) 
because most commonly FDI studies are done using panel data and both the cross section and 
time series are reflected in the models. All gravity models based FDI studies include variables 
to represent the countries’ mass and economic power such as the country’s GDP, GDP per 
capita, exports, imports or net exports as well as distance proxies. There is a great variety in 
terms of additional variables among FDI studies that use the gravity model. From the 
additional variables to the gravity model, studies differ according to the research question 
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(Blonigen, 2005). If the data are region-determined (Bevan and Estrin, 2004) then the 
additional variables will include determinants particular to that case such as average industry 
wages, labour skills, technological progress and development, natural resource abundance, 
political risks or if the focus of the study is on the financial incentives and the finance 
structure of the investment (Bertrand et al. 2004), than it will include variables on tax rates or 
wages or interest rates.  
Having FDI literature determinants in mind, in addition to the two main gravity model-
comprising variables, the GDP and distance, when forming this model for near-home bias in 
FDI, I add some other variables. In addition to the main macroeconomic influence of the 
countries’ economic power represented by the GDP I add a variable for the country openness 
comprised of the country’s exports and imports to be used as a proxy for the countries’ 
“openness” or propensity to trade at time t. The openness to trade of a country is usually 
measured with a variable containing exports and imports however, in some cases it can be 
represented by the country’s interest rate spread, bond yield spread or trading volume 
depending on the focus of the research question.  
I use two additional variables to measure the distance between two countries: a dummy 
variable for a shared border between the country pairs and a dummy variable that captures if 
the two countries in the bilateral pair are on the same continent. The additional variables are 
included in order to capture certain particularities (such as the regional location of the 
countries) of the geographic proximity not already captured by the physical distance in 
kilometres.   
In the case of this study, the aim is to test whether greater familiarity between two countries 
intensifies their FDI relationship. This familiarity creates a near-home bias for a country in 
that it will affect the chosen location for FDI. This near-home bias can be represented through 
a group of variables that will capture any similarities that may exist between countries in 
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several areas such as: their institutions or legal system similarity; their economic and 
institutional development through membership in political and economic organisations and 
organisations, their cultural and linguistic similarity or social similarity that may occur 
because of some past historical occurrence.  
 
 
4.2. A modified gravity model for near-home bias in FDI 
This section establishes the econometric specification of the model in the analysis of 
near-home bias in FDI flows. The purpose is to examine the influence of near-home bias on 
FDI flows over a given period of time. I argue that the FDI flows are determined by a set of 
macroeconomic factors, physical distance between two countries and also they are a function 
of a set of near-home bias variables that capture the preference of the direct investors for 
investing in familiar places.  
Therefore, it can be said that the near-home bias in FDI flows is a function of: 
FDI flows = ƒ (macroeconomic factors; physical proximity factors, institutional factors and 
cultural factors) 
The econometric model in this thesis, considering these three sets of factors, economic size 
and might, proximity and near-home bias, can be written as follows:  
  
FDI
 i,j,t (inflows)  = β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4) + ui,j,t                                                    (4.4a) 
FDI
 i,j,t (outflows)  = β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4) + ui,j,t                 (4.4b) 
 
Where: FDI
 i,j,t is the FDI inflows or FDI outflows from country i to j at time t; γ1 is for the 
macroeconomic variables that denote the economic pull or strength of the country. I use two 
macroeconomic variables: the GDP, the country trade openness; γ2 is for the three 
geographical proximity variables, distance between the country pairs, a shared border dummy 
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and a same continent dummy. The next set of variables, denoted by γ3 is for the institutional 
proximity variables. It includes two variables: same origin of the country’s legal system and 
common membership to a political or economic organisation between the country pairs. The 
fourth group (γ4) is called the cultural proximity group of variables and it includes: shared 
language, common history between the country pairs and a cultural distance index. Finally, 
ui,j,t stands for the error term component that has a time and cross sectional component due to 
the fact that the analysis is based on panel data. The variables used in the model were 
previously discussed and described in greater detail in chapter 3.  
I use the general gravity model framework in order to test for the influence of near-
home bias factors in FDI flows. Home bias can be measured from different perspectives, as 
under or overweighting of investments (French & Poterba, 1991) or as the preference to invest 
in nearby, familiar and close to home places (Anderson et al., 2011). If we consider the fact 
that FDI by definition occurs abroad then the home bias phenomenon in its original form as 
preference to invest locally within the same country cannot be applied to FDI. Therefore in 
this sense in the case of FDI, the term near-home bias in this thesis has a geographical 
attribute; it is a neighbourhood bias and denotes the preference to invest in familiar places 
hence the use of the term near-home bias.  
The physical, institutional and cultural proximity groups of variables contain variables 
that depict certain influences on FDI flows which create greater familiarity between two 
countries. This will enhance or promote an FDI relationship. I use the term near-home bias to 
denote the effect of those variables because it reflects how a country’s geo-position, socio-
political and cultural circumstances may influence or create a bias in its relationship with 
other countries in terms of FDI. By including these variables I intend to show whether some 
additional and non-economic factors affect corporate decision makers in such a way that they 
would prefer making foreign direct investments in countries that are more similar to their 
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own. The significance of adding these variables is that it has direct impact on specific policies 
for countries that wish to attract more FDI, something that is further tested in chapter 7.  
4.3. Econometric Specifications  
 
To examine the impact of near-home bias on FDI flows I estimate the following regression 
specification using OLS panel estimators with fixed effects as suggested by the Hausman test 
(Hausman, 1978). I use cross-sectionally clustered White standard errors (White, 1980) in 
order to control for the heteroskedasticity that comes from the country variability 
(Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
Log (FDI outflows
 i,j,t) = β0  +  β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                               (4.5a) 
 
 
Log (FDI inflows
 i,j,t) = β0  +  β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                               (4.5b) 
 
Where log (FDI outflows
 i,j,t) is the logarithm of the levels of FDI outflows in millions of US 
dollars from country i to j at time t; log (FDI inflows
 i,j,t) is the logarithm of the levels of FDI 
inflows in millions of US dollars to country i from j at time t. Log (GDPrec) is the logarithm 
of the GDP levels in millions of constant US dollars for the FDI receiving country. Log 
(GDPsend) is the logarithm of the GDP levels in millions of constant US dollars for the FDI 
sending country. Log (Openness rec) is the ratio of the exports plus imports over GDP for the 
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FDI receiving country. Log (Openness send) is the ratio of the exports plus imports over GDP 
for the FDI sending country. Log (DIST) represents the logarithm of the distances between the 
two counties i and j in the bilateral country pairs. SAMECONT is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one if the two countries in the bilateral country pair are on the same continent. 
BORDER is a dummy variable if the two countries in the bilateral country pair share a border. 
ECONORGD is a dummy variable that has a value of one if the two countries in the bilateral 
country pair are members of an economic or political organisation (EU, OECD, the 
Commonwealth or NAFTA). LEGALOR is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
two countries in the bilateral country pair have the same legal system origin. COMLANG is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the two countries in the pair share the same 
language and SAMEHIST is a dummy that has the value of one if the two countries in the 
bilateral country pair share history. CDINDEX represents the cultural distance index as 
developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) based on data by Hofstede (1980) between country i 
and j.  
4.4. Additional Variables  
 
 In order to test for the effects of asymmetric information and the costliness of doing 
business in a particular location I conduct the analysis from 4.5.a/b with a number of 
additional variables and estimate the following model: 
 
FDIi,j,t (outflows) = β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4) + β5(γ5) + ui,j,t                             (4.6a) 
FDIi,j,t (inflows) = β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4) + β5(γ5) + ui,j,t                             (4.6b) 
 
Where all the variable groups are as denoted previously and γ5 can denote any of the 
following variables: bilateral trust index, international phone minutes per capita for the FDI 
receiving country, Financial Times circulation per capita for the FDI receiving country, 
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bilateral tax treaties and any of the six country governance indicators including: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law 
and control for corruption. Due to data unavailability, these variables significantly lower the 
total number of observations compared to the previous regression model in 4.5.a/b. Also, 
unlike the other variables these additional ones aren’t bilateral (except for the bilateral tax 
treaties), they are one-sided i.e. for the FDI receiving country only.  
 
4.5. Econometric Estimation 
This section gives an overview of the econometric framework for analysing the 
research questions within the proposed panel dataset in this chapter. This discussion is also 
relevant and refers to the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 as well. Using panel data over a cross 
sectional analysis will allow a greater flexibility in modelling the behaviour across countires 
(Greene, 2008, p.182). All of the econometric estimations in this thesis are performed using 
Eviews (versions 6 and 7). 
 
4.6.1 Fixed vs. Random effects  
Given the nature of the research question and the panel dataset, when it comes to a 
large cross section it is reasonable to expect that there will be individual effects (Greene, 
2008). There are a lot of country data across many years. This points to the fact that there 
might be certain periods with stronger explanatory power. Panel regressions with fixed effects 
models have the advantage of taking into account the country-specific heterogeneity (Baltagi, 
2001). The basic framework (Greene, 2008, p.182) for analysing panel data models takes the 
following form: 
FDI flows i,j,t = Γ’i,j,tβ + ci + εi,j,t                                                    (4.7) 
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where:
 
Γ’i,j,t is a vector of the regressors not including the constant term. When expanded to 
the model the equation takes the following form: 
FDI flows i,j,t = β0 +γi,j,tβ1 + γi,j,tβ2 + γi,j,tβ3 + γi,j,tβ4 + ci,j + εi,,j,t                                                  
(4.8)
                                                       
 
Where:
 
i,j = 1….N is the cross sectional unit and t= 1….T identifies the time series and εi,j,t is 
the error. yi,j,t is the dependent variable and γi,j,t is a vector of explanatory variables. ci,j is a set 
of individual effects which may be unobserved in the model (such as country specific factors) 
which has a time invariant individual effect. FDI flows i,j,t stands for FDI outflows or inflows 
from country i to j at year t. The fixed effects model treats the unobserved heterogeneity (ci,j) 
as a set of unknown parameters. The Hausman test is applied to determine which type of 
individual effects, fixed or random are most suitable for the model.   
 
4.6.2 Hausman test 
The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is based on the differences of the random and 
fixed effects model estimates. The test is performed on a random effects estimate of the model 
without any error correction. Since the fixed effects model is consistent when the unobserved 
term (ci,j)  and γi,j,t are correlated, but the RE is inconsistent, a statistically significant 
difference is interpreted as evidence against the random effects assumption. (Wooldridge, 
2002). 
The Hausman test statistic can be written as: 
HT = T (
^ ~
T Tu u− ) ( ~ ^T TV V− ) ( ~ ^T Tu u− ),                                                                      (4.9) 
Where 
~
TV  and 
^
TV are consistent estimators of the asymptotic covariance of 
^
Tu and
~
Tu , 
respectively. It tests the null that the estimation is based on the correct model. The alternative 
is that the model is not correctly identified and a fixed effects model should therefore be used. 
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The result of the Hausman test for the empirical analysis in this chapter can be seen in table 
4.1. It rejects the null hypothesis and the alternative is accepted: fixed effects should be used. 
This test is repeated again in the empirical analysis in chapter 6 and the econometric 
specification from this section is relevant for that analysis as well.  
Table 4.1. Hausman Test for the econometric panel analysis in chapter 4; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Reject H0 
 
4.6.3 Panel estimation technique 
The econometric estimation is carried out using the ordinary least squares method 
(OLS). The classical linear regression model is based on some assumptions that must be 
fulfilled so that the estimator is a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). These assumptions 
(Greene, 2008, p.44) are:  
A1. Linearity: yi,j,t = β0 +γi,j,tβ1 + γi,j,tβ2 + + ...+ γi,j,KβK + εi,,j,t  
A2: Full rank: in the n x K sample data matrix, the γ
 
has a full column rank. 
A3: Exogeniety of the independent variables i.e. no correlation between the disturbances and 
the independent variables. This can be checked by calculating the correlation of the residuals 
of the OLS regression with the independent variables.  
A4: Homoskedasticity and non-autocorrelation: each disturbance has the same variance and is 
uncorrelated with every other disturbance term. When dealing with panel data that is very 
Ho: there is no misspecification in the RE model 
 
H1: there is misspecification in the RE model, use FE 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: OLSHAUSMANTEST   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 492.222243 5 0.0000 
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large and across many countries it can be assumed that I must account for cross sectional 
heteroskedasticity (Baltagi, 2008). 
A5: Stochastic relationship;   
A6: Normality distribution: the disturbances (errors) are normally distributed. The Jarque 
Bara test statistic is 6.37, which is a very mild violation of the normality of errors assumption. 
 
The ordinary least squares estimator works in such a way that it minimizes the sum of squared 
residuals i.e. it fits a regression line in the place where the sums of squares of the errors are 
minimal. Having the aforementioned conditions in mind, a simple (OLS) estimation equation 
can be represented with: 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
0 1 2 31 2 3 , ,( ) ( ) ( ) i j ty uβ β γ β γ β γ=+ + + +
                                                                                                    
(4.10) 
Where y is the dependent variable (FDI flows) and γi stands for the independent variable 
groups ( 1γ -macroeconomic variables; 2γ -geographical proximity variables; 3γ  -institutional 
proximity and 4γ
 
cultural proximity group) while the β denotes the coefficient estimates. 
From that linear regression model any one of estimators (Wooldridge, 2002) for the three 
groups of variables will be estimated as follows (in the case of 1β ):  
^
1 1 2
1
1( )
n
i i
i
d uγβ β σ == + ∑                                                                                (4.11)   
Where di = γi –
_γ , 2γσ  is the total variation in γi. The estimator ^ 1β equals the population slope 
β1 plus a term that is a linear function of the errors ui = {u1, u2...... un}. A full derivation of the 
OLS method can be found in Wooldridge (2002, chapter 2).
 
 
I estimate an OLS regression on the models 4.5a/b and 4.6a/b in order to examine the 
explanatory power of the regressors on the dependant variable which is FDI outflows or 
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inflows in 4.5a and 4.6a and 4.5b and 4.6b respectively. The standard errors are clustered in 
the cross- section of the panel using the (White, 1980) method in order to control for the 
heteroskedasticity that comes from the country variability (Wooldridge, 2002). 
 
4.6.4 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)  
For robustness of the estimation results [results are reported in table 4.9], I conduct the 
same set of estimations using a static GMM IV estimation method. For instruments I use the 
lagged (one period) values.  
The GMM model works in such a way that it minimises the quadratic form of the sample 
means (Qt) and so the coefficient estimates (
^
Tγ ) are estimated: 
^
Tγ  = argminγ QT (u)         
The GMM makes use of the orthogonality conditions (the presence of enough instruments to 
make the estimation) to allow for efficient estimation of the coefficients. I address the 
research questions with the regression models specified earlier in the equations 4.5a/b by 
estimating GMM static panel regressions fixed effects. It is done so by using a lagged value 
of the independent variables as instruments (except for the dummy variables and the physical 
distance variable).  
The use of GMM addresses some endogeniety issues  
 
4.7. Results 
In this section I discuss the presence of near-home bias in FDI flows. I analyse the 
effects of four groups of variables on FDI flows: cultural, institutional and physical proximity 
and macroeconomic factors. The results are presented in tables 4.1 through 4.8. 
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Table 4.2. Near-home bias in FDI outflows  
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment flow from country i to country j at time t; The FDI outflows are from the 
FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI 
sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i 
and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value 
of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin 
of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j 
share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have 
been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 (Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
C -4.95*** -8.04*** -8.10*** -8.56*** -8.31*** -8.60*** -9.07*** -8.78*** -9.15*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.69*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 
(Log) GDP send 0.92*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.17*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.31*** 
Openness rec  0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 
Openness send  0.66*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 0.89*** 
(Log) Distance -0.65*** -0.60*** -0.58*** -0.44*** -0.42 -0.41*** -0.33*** -0.37*** -0.46*** 
Same Continent   0.02 0.07** 0.00*** 0.05 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 
Border    0.34*** 0.34*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.04 
Shared Econ. Org.     0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 
Same Legal 
System      0.28*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 
Shared History       0.51*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 
Shared Language        0.29*** 0.30*** 
Cul. Dist. Ind.         -0.05*** 
N 14,669 13,878 13,878 13,878 13,878 13,878 13,878 13,878 11,304 
Adj. R2 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.50 
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The accent of the results analysis is primarily put on the outflows of foreign direct 
investment of OECD countries towards the rest of the world. This perspective best enables us 
to see the influence of the near-home bias variables on FDI because they show us where 
countries choose to make their investments out of the whole world. The data also consist of 
FDI inflows of approximately the same size in terms of a number of observations. By 
performing the same estimations on FDI inflows we can immediately see a comparison of all 
of the results and identify any potential differences there might exist.  Furthermore, I consider 
a set of additional variables in order to control for the possibility of asymmetric information 
and the costliness of doing business abroad. Finally, in order to see if the results are robust 
according to the econometric method, I instrument the independent variables (using their lags) 
and use a static GMM (instrumental variable) regression. Each of the regressions are 
estimated for the FDI outflows panel and then for the inflows panel data as well. 
 
4.7.1. Near-home bias in FDI outflows 
Table 4.2 reports the results for the panel data regressions. In the case of FDI outflows 
the FDI sending country is an OECD member and the FDI receiving country is a partner 
country anywhere in the world. 
 
The regressions are run starting with the basic gravity model and followed by adding the 
variables one by subsequently.  
Column (1) reports the results for the basic economic relation between FDI outflows 
and economic mass and distance, as established by the gravity model. The coefficient estimate 
for the GDP of the FDI sending country is positive indicating that as income increases in the 
FDI sending country FDI outflow increases. The coefficient estimate for the GDP of the FDI 
receiving country is also positive. As income in the FDI receiving country increases, FDI 
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flows to that country increases. The coefficient estimate for distance is negative. FDI outflows 
are lower to countries that are geographically further away. As the gravity model predicts 
(Andersen and Wincoop, 2003) the economic activity in both the FDI sending and the FDI 
receiving country is important in determining the FDI outflows. The size of the economies of 
the FDI partner countries gravitates FDI investments among larger economies that are 
geographically closer.  
 In column (2) the country openness to trade is added as an additional explanatory 
variable.  The coefficient estimates for the trade openness of both the FDI sending and the 
receiving countries are positive. As expected countries that are more open to trade have higher 
FDI flows. FDI flows constitute a mechanism for international integration (Edison et al., 
2002). Corporations have to weigh the costs and risks of investing at home against 
opportunities at home and against opportunities competitor countries offer. If a country is 
more open to trade, penetration to a foreign market is easier and FDI partnership is 
uncomplicated to maintain. Both host and source country characteristics in terms of openness 
to trade are important for corporate managers to penetrate into a foreign market. 
Columns (3) and (4) include the two proxies for the physical proximity between the 
FDI host and source countries. In column (3) I add the dummy variable measuring if the 
partner countries are in the same continent. The coefficient estimate for the same continent 
dummy is not significant, although it becomes significant in the final regression in column 
(9). In column (4) I use the dummy variable that measures if the FDI sending and receiving 
countries share a border. The coefficient estimate for the shared border dummy is positive. 
FDI outflows are higher to countries that share a border. Corporate managers prefer to invest 
into countries that are bordering their own country as they usually are more familiar with the 
investment climate of such neighbouring countries. Firms expand abroad to exploit the 
knowledge created within the firm, including not only technical knowhow but also marketing 
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and managerial know how (Casson, 1987). This know how advantage, is most powerful in an 
environment that is most equal to the environment that they are already familiar with 
(Buckley and Casson, 1991). Neighbouring countries usually constitute a climate similar to 
one’s home country. 
Next, I measure the effect of shared economic and legal systems and cultural 
similarities on FDI flows. Columns (5) through to (9) incorporate one by one the five near-
home bias variables that are the main focus of this study. Column (5) reports results with the 
dummy variable that measures if the FDI partner countries are in the same economic 
organisation. The coefficient estimate for shared economic organisation dummy is positive. 
When a firm decides to invest abroad, it does not only depend on its internal competitive 
advantages but also its advantages over domestic firms and other foreign firms. The economic 
structure and institutional quality in FDI sending and receiving countries is a major 
competitive advantage when investments are channelled towards countries in the same 
economic organisation. Similarity of the economic structures of the host and source countries 
creates a familiar environment where firms prefer to invest.  
Column (6) introduces a dummy variable that measures if the FDI sending and 
receiving countries have the same origin of legal system. The coefficient estimate for the 
same legal system dummy is positive indicating that FDI flows are higher towards countries 
that have a similar legal system. Similarity of institutional environments is important in FDI 
decisions. If a company is used to work in a certain legal framework, whether British, German 
or French, it might be better able to exploit its knowledge advantage in a country that operates 
under the same legal system. Other things being equal it would be more advantageous to 
penetrate into a foreign market whose legal system is familiar. The empirical work of Galindo 
et al. (2003) shows that in the banking sector, foreign bank penetration is greater between 
countries that have legal and institutional similarities.   
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Column (7) introduces a dummy variable that measures if the host and source 
countries have a shared official language or a shared language spoken by a minority in either 
country. The coefficient estimate for the shared language dummy is positive. Corporate 
investors prefer to invest in countries that have a shared language. Language is a major 
ingredient of cultural climate. Speaking the same language gives a competitive advantage to 
firms expanding abroad against their foreign competitors that do not speak the same language. 
It puts them into a level field with domestic firms that speak the same language.  
A dummy for common history is added in column (8); it takes the value of 1, if the 
FDI sending and receiving countries share a common history. The coefficient estimate for the 
shared history dummy is positive. Firms invest more in countries with which they share a past 
such as having been part of the same country in the past or having had colonial ties. “Shared 
history” is used in daily language to indicate having a lot in common. A shared history 
implicitly provides familiarity with business climates, a common understanding of issues and 
ways of resolving them. Historical similarities encourage the firms’ expansion across borders.  
Ultimatly, in column (9) I control for the cultural similarities between the two 
countries in the country pair as defined by Hofstede (1980) and converted in an index by 
Kogut and Singh (1988). Hofstede claims that culture is more often than not a source of 
conflict rather than synergy. We can see that the index has the expected negative sign 
indicating that the greater the cultural distance between the country pairs, the less FDI 
outflows between them.   
FDI decisions are difficult to reverse compared to portfolio investments in foreign 
destinations. The location decisions of foreign direct investors provide a good test of how 
familiarity breeds investments. The findings suggest that foreign direct investors prefer to 
invest near home; in countries that share a border with their home country, in countries that 
are in the same economic organisation with their home country, and that use the same legal 
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frameworks. Historical ties such as sharing the same home country some time in near history 
and linguistic ties such as being able to speak home language in a foreign country are also 
driving forces in foreign direct investors’ location decisions. The cultural distance is 
important in that it shows that the greater the cultural distance between two countries the 
lesser the FDI relationship and interaction between them, acting similarly to physical distance. 
In general, I can conclude that near-home bias is a significant contributing factor in FDI 
outflows. I find that investments flow more towards places that are more similar to the FDI 
sending country with respect to certain ‘non-economic’ factors that show social, cultural, 
historical and political preference.  
 
4.7.2. Near-home bias in FDI inflows  
Table 4.3. shows the results for the near-home bias analysis in the case of FDI inflows. 
Estimating the general model from equation 4.5 in the case of FDI inflows will give an 
overall comparison of the results from the outflows analysis and identify any discrepacies and 
deviations. I expect similar if not the same findings as is FDI outflows. The dataset in this 
thesis shows two perspectives, FDI outflows which occur from OECD member countries 
towards the rest of the world and FDI inflows which are directed from all of the countries in 
the world towards the 30 OECD member countries. The a priori expectation is that the 
variables in the model will have the same effect in both cases, however it is highly important 
to see if there are some differences, what they are.  
 
Similar to the previous table (4.2), the same 9 columns of regressions are estimated, by adding 
the independent variables one by one, starting from the basic gravity model.  
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Table 4.3. Near-home bias in FDI inflows  
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to country i from country j at time t; The FDI inflows are from the FDI sending 
country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the 
log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared 
border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the 
same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i 
and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial 
relationship or having been part of the same country). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) 
method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 (Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
C -4.22*** -7.11*** -6.67*** -6.95*** -6.30*** -6.68*** -7.08*** -6.63*** -6.78*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.69*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 
(Log) GDP send 0.91*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 0.91*** 0.94*** 0.95*** 0.95*** 1.04*** 
Openness rec  0.42*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 
Openness send  0.51*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 
(Log) Distance -0.91*** -0.87*** -0.95*** -0.88*** -0.82*** -0.80*** -0.73*** -0.81*** -0.84*** 
Same Continent   -0.10** -0.07* -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.13*** -0.18*** -0.17*** 
Border    0.21*** 0.22*** 0.11*** 0.08*** -0.02 -0.05* 
Shared Econ. Org.     0.63*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.61*** 
Same Legal System      0.28*** 0.21*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
Shared History       0.41*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 
Shared Language         0.41*** 0.42*** 
Cul. Dist. Ind.         0.004** 
N 11,900 11,263 11,263 11,263 11,263 11,263 11,263 11,263 9,758 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.52 
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In the first column (1) we can see that all of the coefficients are significant indicating that 
greater GDP for both the receiving and sending countries are generating more FDI inflows to 
the economy. In the second column (2) I add the proxy for trade openness – the sum of 
exports and imports divided by the country’s GDP and it can be concluded that in this case as 
for FDI outflows, the greater the openness to trade, the higher the FDI inflows. In the columns 
(3) and (4) I add the two other physical proximity variables: the shared continent and shared 
border. The shared continent dummy variable shows a negative sign to the contrary of the 
expected but this could be due to the high correlation between the shared continent and the 
physical distance as discussed previously in the data section. Given that the shared continent 
variable generally has a positive sign in the FDI outflows analysis, another reason for this sign 
could be the sample: FDI inflows recipients in this case are OECD member countries most of 
which are located in Europe.  In the columns (5) through (9) I add one by one the variables 
that denote institutional and cultural proximity between nations. They are all statistically 
significant and have the expected signs which are positive except in the case of the cultural 
distance index which is expected to be negative.  
The shared economic or political organisation dummy is positive and significant 
demonstrating that FDI outflows tend towards institutionally similar countries. The shared 
legal origin dummy is also positive and significant; countries prefer to make FDI investments 
to countries that have similar institutional organisation. The countries with a shared language 
are a preferred location for investors due to an easier way to do business. This has a 
stimulating influence for FDI inflows. The same history between the countries in the bilateral 
country pair has a positive influence on FDI in general. The smaller the cultural distance 
between the country pair countries the greater the FDI inflows between them.   
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4.7.3. Additional Variables results 
This section presents the results for near-home bias in FDI flows. The results present 
the analysis of six additional variables: bilateral trust, international phone calls per capita, 
Financial Times circulation per capita, bilateral tax treaties for double taxation avoidance and 
six different country governance indicators. These variables are relevant in showing how 
asymmetric information and the costliness of doing business impact the FDI flows. These 
additional variables aren’t bilateral (except the bilateral tax treaty), they refer to the FDI 
receiving country. They also greatly reduce the amount of observations compared to the 
previous regressions.  
 
Bilateral trust  
This section looks into the influence of bilateral trust in near-home bias in FDI flows. 
This variable is taken from Guiso et al. (2009) and because its limited scope, consisting of 15 
European countries two of the other variables are lost: shared continent and economic and 
political organisation dummies. The bilateral trust is measured through a survey in which the 
respondents answer to which degree they trust managers from their own and other countries. 
We can see that the bilateral trust index is both positive and significant in both cases of 
outflows and inflows. This confirms the findings in Guiso et al. (2009) in that bilateral trust 
plays a big role in the cultural biases between countries and their subsequent economic 
relationship. This reduction in the sample also influences the shared history and border 
variables. The shared border becomes insignificant suggesting that these European countries 
have a large FDI relationship despite not being immediate neighbours but this is to be 
expected in a sample containing the 15 most developed EU countries. The other variables 
follow the expectations and findings of the main regression in tables 4.2 and 4.3. The bilateral  
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Table 4.4a. Bilateral Trust and Near-home bias in FDI outflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment 
flow from country i to country j at time t; The FDI outflows are from the FDI sending 
country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the 
GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log 
of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent 
dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared 
border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or 
political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the 
same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and 
j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j 
share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if 
country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or 
having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and 
Singh (1988)); bilateral trust between the citizens of two countries (from Guiso et al., 
2009)The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note 
that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) 
 (Log )FDI Outflows (Log )FDI Outflows 
C -9.15*** -11.67*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.75*** 1.01*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.31*** 1.27*** 
Openness rec 0.36*** 0.69*** 
Openness send 0.89*** 0.87*** 
(Log) Distance -0.46*** -0.59*** 
Same Continent 0.10*** NA 
Border 0.04 0.02 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.16*** NA 
Same Legal System 0.12*** 0.23*** 
Shared History 0.36*** 0.82*** 
Shared Language  0.30*** -0.48*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.05*** -0.07*** 
Bilateral Trust  0.66*** 
N 11,304 2,773 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.64 
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Table 4.4b. Bilateral Trust and Near-home bias in FDI inflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment 
inflow to country i from country j at time t; The FDI inflows are from the FDI sending 
country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the 
GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the 
log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent 
dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared 
border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or 
political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the 
same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i 
and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i 
and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history 
(one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial 
relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on 
Kogut and Singh (1988)); bilateral trust between the citizens of two countries (from 
Guiso et al., 2009)The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted 
for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects 
used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) 
 (Log )FDI Inflows (Log )FDI Inflows 
C -6.78*** -6.12*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.80*** 0.74*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.04*** 1.00*** 
Openness rec 0.38*** -0.04 
Openness send 0.54*** 0.53*** 
(Log) Distance -0.84*** -1.07*** 
Same Continent -0.17*** NA 
Border -0.05* -0.08* 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.61*** NA 
Same Legal System 0.16*** 0.13*** 
Shared History 0.19*** 0.36*** 
Shared Language  0.42*** -0.14 
Cul. Dist. Index 0.004** 0.00 
Bilateral Trust  0.45*** 
N 9,758 2,635 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.60 
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Table 4.5a. Asymmetric Information and Near-home bias in FDI outflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment flow 
from country i to country j at time t; The FDI outflows are from the FDI sending country 
towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI 
receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports 
plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the 
country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j 
are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a 
border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share 
membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if 
country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i 
and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if 
country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having 
been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); 
international telephone calls in minutes per capita for the FDI receiving country; financial 
times circulation per capita for the FDI outflows receiving country. The t-statistics are based 
on standard errors that have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) 
method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (Log )FDI Outflows (Log )FDI Outflows (Log )FDI Outflows 
C -9.15*** -9.10*** -9.87*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.81*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.31*** 1.34*** 1.47*** 
Openness rec 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.36*** 
Openness send 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.88*** 
(Log) Distance -0.46*** -0.51*** -0.58*** 
Same Continent 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.09* 
Border 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.16*** 0.09* 0.05 
Same Legal System 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 
Shared History 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 
Shared Language  0.30*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 
L(Int. Phone Calls/capita)  0.02**  
L(FT/capita)   0.00 
    
N 11,304 8,748 2,792 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.49 0.52 
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Table 4.5b. Asymmetric Information and Near-home bias in FDI inflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to country 
i from country j at time t; The FDI inflows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI 
receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of 
the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the 
FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending 
country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent 
dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); 
same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared 
language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared 
history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or 
having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); 
international telephone calls in minutes per capita for the FDI receiving country; financial times 
circulation per capita for the FDI outflows receiving country. The t-statistics are based on standard 
errors that have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects 
used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (Log )FDI inflows (Log )FDI inflows (Log )FDI inflows 
C -6.78*** -5.85*** -6.11*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.80*** 0.67*** 0.78*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.04*** 1.01*** 1.06*** 
Openness rec 0.38*** 0.07 0.38*** 
Openness send 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.54*** 
(Log) Distance -0.84*** -0.88*** -0.86*** 
Same Continent -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.16** 
Border -0.05* -0.06 -0.07 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.61*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 
Same Legal System 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 
Shared History 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.08** 
Shared Language  0.42*** 0.35*** 0.41*** 
Cul. Dist. Index 0.004** 0.003* -0.01** 
Int. Phone Calls/capita 
 0.003***  
L(FT/capita)   0.08*** 
N 9,758 7,481 2,698 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.55 0.56 
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trust between managers of different nations does have a very strong effect on FDI flows but 
doesn’t replace the influence of home country bias.  
 
Asymmetric information  
This section discusses the influence of asymmetric information in near-home bias in 
FDI flows. The results can be found in tables 4.5a and 4.5b. In order to consider information 
availability as a possible explanation for near-home bias I add two proxy variables: 
international phone minutes per capita and Financial Times circulation per capita for the FDI 
outflows receiving country.  
In the case of FDI outflows, only the international phone calls variable is significant 
and positive while the FT per capita circulation isn’t. In the case of FDI inflows both of these 
variables that represent asymmetric information are positive and significant. This means that 
the greater the information availability in one country, the higher the investment attractiveness 
of that country. This is consistent with previous findings in both home bias in equity markets 
and FDI literature. This however isn’t the only explanation for home bias, also consistent with 
previous findings. Though a factor, asymmetric information isn’t the only thing that can 
explain near-home bias as shown by the significant near-home bias variables in n tables 4.2 
and 4.3.  
 
Bilateral tax treaties 
Bilateral tax treaties are a possible factor in near-home bias in FDI flows. The 
regressions in 4.6a and 4.5b consider the influence of bilateral tax treaties for double taxation 
avoidance. In the case of FDI inflows this variable isn’t significant. In the case of FDI 
outflows this variable is a strong determinant of FDI flows but similarly to the case of the two 
asymmetric information variables in table 4.6a, the near-home bias variables remain  
 131 
 
  
Table 4.6a. Bilateral Tax Treaties and Near-home bias in FDI outflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment flow from 
country i to country j at time t; The FDI outflows are from the FDI sending country towards the 
FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving 
country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports 
over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i 
and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the 
same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared 
economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in 
the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j 
share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the 
same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share 
history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same 
country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); bilateral tax treaties for 
double taxation avoidance. The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted 
for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note 
that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(Log )FDI Outflows (Log )FDI Outflows 
C -9.15*** -9.40*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.75*** 0.77*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.31*** 1.27*** 
Openness rec 0.36*** 0.39*** 
Openness send 0.89*** 0.86*** 
(Log) Distance -0.46*** -0.38*** 
Same Continent 0.10*** 0.15*** 
Border 0.04 0.03 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.16*** 0.12*** 
Same Legal System 0.12*** 0.15*** 
Shared History 0.36*** 0.37*** 
Shared Language  0.30*** 0.32*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.05*** -0.05*** 
Bilat. tax treaties  0.17*** 
N 11,304 10,727 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.51 
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Table 4.6b. Bilateral Tax Treaties and Near-home bias in FDI inflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to 
country i from country j at time t; The FDI inflows are from the FDI sending country towards the 
FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving 
country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports 
over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in 
kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same 
continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic 
or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same 
economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the 
same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official 
language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with 
respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural 
distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); bilateral tax treaties for double taxation 
avoidance. The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand 
for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) 
 (Log )FDI inflows (Log )FDI inflows 
C -6.78*** -6.87*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.80*** 0.81*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.04*** 0.99*** 
Openness rec 0.38*** 0.54*** 
Openness send 0.54*** 0.55*** 
(Log) Distance -0.84*** -0.78*** 
Same Continent -0.17*** -0.17*** 
Border -0.05* -0.13*** 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.61*** 0.76*** 
Same Legal System 0.16*** 0.11*** 
Shared History 0.19*** 0.11*** 
Shared Language  0.42*** 0.53*** 
Cul. Dist. Index 0.004** -0.02*** 
Bilat. tax treaties  -0.03 
   
   
N 9,758 5,874 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.55 
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significant, suggesting that even though tax treaties play a role in the choice of FDI 
destination countries, it is not the sole explanatory factor along with the other macroeconomic 
variables in predicting the choice country for FDI. The results of the influence of this variable 
should be taken with caution considering the fact that more than 75% of the countries have a 
signed bilateral tax treaty.    
 
Country Governance  
This section discusses the influence of country governance indicators and near-home 
bias in FDI flows. Results show that all of the six governance indicators are significant and 
positive in both the cases of FDI outflows (table 4.7a) and inflows (table 4.7b). This suggests 
that the individual country governance in the FDI outflows and inflows receiving country 
plays a significant role in the choice country. FDI investors prefer to invest in countries where 
there is better governance. The voice and accountability indicator is positive and significant 
indicating that the greater the freedom of speech and expression of the citizens of one country, 
the greater the FDI flows to that country. The political stability indicator shows a positive and 
significant influence on FDI flows. The greater the political stability and absence of violence 
the more the FDI flows. Same is true for greater government effectiveness, the better the 
quality of public services the more FDI flows. Regulatory quality shows the ability of the 
government to implement sound policies that promote the private sector, therefore the greater 
this quality the more FDI flows will be attracted. This variable is also positive and significant. 
The rule of law variable is positive and significant, the greater the rule of law i.e. the extent to 
which the rules of the society are abided, the greater the FDI flows to that country. Finally, 
the control of corruption is also both positive and significant indicating that the investors 
prefer countries with greater control over corruption.  
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Table 4.7a. Country Governance Factors and Near-home bias in FDI outflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment flow from country i to country j at 
time t; The FDI outflows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables 
are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of 
exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent 
dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if 
country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share 
membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the 
same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language 
of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial 
relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); voice 
and accountability index; political stability and absence of violence index; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; 
rule of law; control of corruption. The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
(Log )FDI 
Outflows 
C -9.52*** -9.26*** -9.29*** -9.21*** -9.34*** -9.33*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.75*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.49*** 1.48*** 1.48*** 1.49*** 1.48*** 1.48*** 
Openness rec 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 
Openness send 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 
(Log) Distance -0.69*** -0.70*** -0.67*** -0.70*** -0.68*** -0.67*** 
Same Continent 0.04 0.04 0.06* 0.04 0.06* 0.06* 
Border -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
Shared Econ. Org. -0.13*** -0.06 -0.05 -0.13** 0.00 -0.04 
Same Legal System 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
Shared History 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 
Shared Language  0.26*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
Voice and Acc. 0.16***      
Polit. Stab.  0.12***     
Gov. Effect.   0.10***    
Regulat. Quality    0.20***   
Rule of Law     0.06***  
Control of Corr.      0.08*** 
N 4,496 4,496 4,496 4,496 4,496 4,496 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
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Table 4.7b. Country Governance Factors and  Near-home bias in FDI inflows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to country i from country j at 
time t; The FDI inflows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables 
are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of 
exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent 
dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if 
country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share 
membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the 
same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language 
of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial 
relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); voice 
and accountability index; political stability and absence of violence index; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; 
rule of law; control of corruption. The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
(Log )FDI 
Inflows 
C -8.09*** -7.62*** -7.16*** -7.60*** -7.28*** -7.30*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.87*** 0.91*** 0.76*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 1.03*** 1.04*** 
Openness rec 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 
Openness send 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
(Log) Distance -0.81*** -0.89*** -0.83*** -0.83*** -0.84*** -0.83*** 
Same Continent -0.08 -0.13** -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 
Border -0.05 -0.09* -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
Same Legal System 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 
Shared History 0.09** 0.11** 0.09** 0.06 0.09** 0.08* 
Shared Language  0.43*** 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** 
Voice and Acc. 0.50***      
Polit. Stab.  0.30***     
Gov. Effect.   0.37***    
Regulat. Quality    0.56***   
Rule of Law     0.34***  
Control of Corr.      0.29*** 
N 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099 4,099 
Adj. R2 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58 
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The country governance quality in the FDI outflows and inflows receiving country 
plays a role in the potential costliness of investing in a particular country. Understandably,   
investors prefer to invest in countries that have better social governance. However this doesn’t 
eliminate the other factors of near-home bias. All of them remain overwhelmingly significant 
for both FDI outflows and inflows and with their expected signs which shows that familiarity 
in the institutional and cultural sense still plays an important factor in the investment 
destination choices for FDI in addition to the macroeconomic and governance factors.  
 
4.7.4. Robustness test - GMM (IV) estimation 
In order to test the robustness of the econometric method as well as account for the 
possibility of endogeniety issues between the dependent variable and the residuals I estimate a 
GMM (Instrumental Variables (IV)) regression. There are quite a number of studies that use a 
different econometric method to OLS to estimate the determinants of FDI flows [Guiso et al 
(2009), Sembenelli, Siotis (2005), Ledyaeva, Linden 2006, Mitze et al. 2009), Foad (2007), 
Cazzavillan and Olszewski, 2009]. Using the general method of moments is beneficial in 
some cases when there is a panel dataset however it is most useful when there is a need for a 
dynamic panel analysis that uses a lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable. 
This is not the case here since adding such a lagged variable will impact the economic 
interpretation of the model as well as the research question. Of the other static panel data 
analysis using GMM, I perform regression estimations using the dependent variables in a 
lagged form as instruments. This is done in order to check the robustness of the econometric 
method.  
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Table 4.8. GMM (IV) estimation of Near-home bias in FDI flows; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI in/outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment flow 
to/from country i from country j at time t; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country 
towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI 
receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports 
plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the 
country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are 
one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); 
shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share 
membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if 
country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i 
and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if 
country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having 
been part of the same country); cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988. 
Estimation method used is a static Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Instrumental 
Variables (IV). Lags of independent variables used as instruments. The t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White 
(1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
GMM (IV)                       (1)                           (2) 
 
                    (Log )FDI inflows                   (Log )FDI outflows 
C -6.70*** -5.38*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.79*** 0.74*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.04*** 0.70*** 
Openness rec 0.37*** 0.36*** 
Openness send 0.55*** 2.29*** 
(Log) Distance -0.85*** -0.47*** 
Same Continent -0.17*** 0.08*** 
Border -0.05* 0.00 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.63*** 0.16*** 
Same Legal System 0.17*** 0.12*** 
Shared History 0.18*** 0.33*** 
Shared Language  0.40*** 0.33*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.01*** -0.04*** 
   
N                    8,585                10,161 
Adj. R2                     0.51                 0.48 
 138 
 
Table 4.8 shows the results of this regression for FDI outflows and inflows. The results show 
similar findings to the ones in the previous panel regressions. The R2 coefficients are also 
very akin to the ones in the OLS.  
Both of the regressions for FDI inflows and outflows in table 4.8 show identical statistical 
results except in the case of the shared continent dummy variable which also resemble the 
OLS regressions in tables 4.2(9) and 4.3(9). The shared continent coefficient is negative and 
significant for FDI inflows and positive and significant for FDI outflows. The rest of the 
variables have the predicted signs: the institutional and cultural proximity variables are 
positive and significant and have a stimulating effect on FDI flows while the cultural distance 
index has the expected negative sign. The macroeconomic variables are all positive and 
significant confirming the predicted stimulating effect on FDI flows.  The physical proximity 
variable is as expected negative and significant indicating a decrease in FDI flows as the 
distance grows. By using the GMM (IV) method the findings from tables 4.2 and 4.3 are both 
confirmed and strengthened. Since the GMM (IV) results do not significantly differ from the 
OLS findings it is sufficient to use OLS as an estimation technique.  
 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter studies the location choices for foreign direct investments using data on 
the FDI outflows and inflows of the 30 OECD countries and their FDI partners for the period 
1981-2005. I show that similarities between host and source countries are decisive factors in 
corporate decisions in entering a foreign market.  
The results show that corporate investors prefer destinations that they are familiar 
with. Physical proximity is an indicator of familiarity because countries that are closer to each 
other tend to have similar features their cultures and business environments.  Direct investors 
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also prefer to invest in countries with similar economic and legal systems to their own. 
Institutional similarities are important indicators for business climate familiarity. A 
commonly spoken language between the host and source countries and a shared history 
determine FDI decisions as they give a competitive advantage to the foreign investor relative 
to its international competitors. Corporations prefer destinations that they are familiar with in 
their international investments.  
The results are important from a policy perspective. I show that economic activity and 
country openness are not necessarily the only prerequisites to attract foreign investors. FDIs 
tend to have a beneficial impact on economic growth and many countries want to attract them. 
I show that FDI investors prefer destinations that are familiar to them. There is need for 
caution here. Being neighbours or having a shared language may not be the only prerequisites 
to attract foreign direct investments. Developing the legal frameworks and enforcing them 
well may also make the business environment more familiar to foreign direct investors. As 
such these results suggest a further research agenda on country policy regarding FDI which 
will be addressed further on, in chapter 7.  
Considering near-home bias at a global level immediately puts forward a question 
whether the same findings hold across different segments of the data: geographical 
destinations, different periods or different country income groups. A global perspective isn’t 
enough to generalise findings across different segments. This issue is further examined in the 
next chapter (5), by dividing the dataset according to such criteria. 
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5. Segmented Analysis of Near-Home Bias in FDI Flows 
5.1. Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to uncover the differences of near-home bias in FDI flows 
in various sub-groups of data, stratified according to geography, time and country income 
levels. As previously discussed in the literature section, many studies in both equity markets 
and FDI are geographically or otherwise focused. They target many different country samples 
in order to discover any regional variation or other particularities in their sample. This chapter 
stratifies the full panel sample that was used in the previous chapter in several data segments 
according to three criteria: geography, time and country income. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) 
investigate local investment bias and point out to several potential pitfalls that go with 
studying individuals’ investments and geography. One of these pitfalls has to do with the 
geographic and time-series selection bias of any data sample. To address such concerns it is 
prudent not only to have a cross-sectionally diverse dataset that covers a long time period but 
also to divide the sample and perform this analysis in various segments. 
When it comes to the geographical aspects a natural stratification of the data are across 
regions and countries. Since these data are country level data, country level analysis is the 
lowest level that a geographical analysis on this dataset can go. The time dimension of the 
OECD dataset involves 25 years so the next natural stratification would be across time. 
Finally, a very informative and popular way to divide countries is according to their level of 
development. By taking this property of the countries we can take away the pre-imposed 
geographical consideration of any panel data that is made up of country data.  
Overall, in both cases of FDI outflows and inflows there is supporting evidence for home 
country bias in FDI flows. Regardless whether it comes to a highly developed group of 
countries or a general consideration of the whole world, the influence of the near-home bias 
i.e. certain aspects of countries are present overall. Such a general and unrestrained sample 
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offers a broad picture in the general tendencies in FDI flows in the world. This however 
brings a need to the fore to narrow and restrict the dataset according to broad regions and at a 
country level to reaffirm these findings from a broad to a more specific level. The results have 
some differences with the main regressions but generally do not vary greatly.   
 
Geographic stratification 
As the title suggests, this division of the sample is done based on geographical criteria. 
The advantage of working with a cross-sectionally large dataset is that it can be easily 
stratified in sub-samples in order to discover the differences in near-home bias across regions 
and countries.  
In a study on correlated investor trading, Feng and Seasholes (2004) find that the correlated 
trading occurs especially with respect to a particular region. It is important to discover the 
various idiosyncrasies of particular, geographically distinct locations, regions and countries. 
This will show any particular cross sectional properties of near-home bias that can’t be 
observed with the full panel dataset in the previous chapter 4.  
 
Time Stratification 
In a study on the limits of financial globalization, Stulz (2005) argues that home bias 
in the international equity markets has diminished over time but is still very strong and 
present. This chapter looks into the near-home bias in the case of FDI flows when the data are 
segmented in several ways, one of them being time-wise. Milonidis and Sideris (2008) find 
supporting evidence that near-home bias effect does diminish over time in a G7 economies 
analysis because the goods markets become more integrated over time. This hypothesis that 
the home bias diminishes over time should be tested in the context of FDI. According to 
Bekaert, 1995; Bekaert and Harvery (1997); Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, (2005) and 
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Levine, (2001) the financial markets liberalisation started in the early 80s and again in the 
early 1990s. Coincidentally, this division of the sample to before and after the early 90s also 
divides the sample in half, time wise. Therefore I test the hypothesis that the globally 
observed near-home bias effects diminishes over time by estimating the model specified 
previously in section 4.2.  
  
Income Stratification 
The classification of the country groups according to the income per capita is taken from 
the World Bank. They classify the countries in two broad categories: developing and 
developed. They also provide a more detailed classification of the countries in four categories 
according to the gross national income (GNI) per capita. These four categories are:  
a) Low income economies with GNI per capita of US $995 or less  
b) Lower-middle income economies with GNI per capita from US $996 to $3,945 
c) Upper-middle income economies with GNI per capita from US $3,946 to $12,195 and  
d) High income economies with GNI per capita of US $12,196 or more 
The aforementioned broad classification of countries as developed and developing generally 
considers the low and middle income countries as developing. It is useful to perform the 
analysis on both of these classifications in order to enrich this empirical analysis using data 
according to different country income groups.  
5.2.  Econometric specification of the model 
 
This chapter uses the same data as the previous chapter and the estimation objective 
doesn’t change i.e. the goal is to estimate near-home bias in FDI flows. Therefore, the model 
in this chapter is the same as the one set up in chapter 4.  
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To examine the impact of near-home bias on FDI across different geographical and income 
segments, the following regression specification for FDI outflows and inflows is estimated:  
 
Log (FDI outflows
 i*,j,t) = β0  +  β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                               (5.1a) 
 
Log (FDI inflows
 i,j*,t) = β0  +  β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                               (5.1b) 
 
Where:  
a) When the dependent variable is log (FDI outflows
 i*,j,t) it is the logarithm of the levels 
of FDI outflows in millions of US dollars from country i* to j at time t; country i* 
represents countries located in either: Europe; Asia-Pacific; America; individual 
OECD member country; low-income; lower middle; upper middle or high income 
country group. In the case of FDI outflows the whole sample can be divided according 
to time in which case FDI outflows
 i,j,t* is the logarithm of the levels of FDI outflows 
in millions of US dollars from country i to country j at two possible time periods: the 
first from 1981-1992 and the second from 1993-2005; 
b) When the dependent variable is log (FDI inflowsi,j*,t) it is the logarithm of the level of 
FDI inflows to country i from country j* at time t; country j* represents countries 
located on either: Europe; Asia-Pacific America or Africa.   
The rest of the variables are the same as previously used in chapter 4 and as defined in chapter 
3: log (GDPrec) is the logarithm of the GDP levels in millions of constant US dollars for the 
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FDI receiving country. Log (GDPsend) is the logarithm of the GDP levels in millions of 
constant US dollars for the FDI sending country. Log (Openness rec) is the ratio of the 
exports plus imports over GDP for the FDI receiving country. Log (Openness send) is the 
ratio of the exports plus imports over GDP for the FDI sending country. Log(DIST) is the 
logarithm of the distances between the two counties i and j in the bilateral country pairs. 
SAMECONT is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the two countries in the 
bilateral country pair are on the same continent. BORDER is a dummy variable if the two 
countries in the bilateral country pair share a border. ECONORGD is a dummy variable that 
has a value of one if the two counties in the bilateral country pair are members of an 
economic or political organisation (EU, OECD, Commonwealth or NAFTA). LEGALOR is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the two countries in the bilateral country pair 
have the same legal system origin. COMLANG is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the two countries in the pair share the same language and SAMEHIST is a dummy that 
has the value of one if the two countries in the bilateral country pair share history. CDINDEX 
is the cultural distance index by Kogut and Singh (1988) between country i and j.  
 
5.3. Segmented analysis of near-home bias in FDI flows results 
This section presents the results for near-home bias in FDI flows when the data are 
stratified according to three criteria: geography, time and national income per capita. The 
results are presented in different sections for each of these segments as well as for FDI 
outflows and inflows separately. These results can be found in tables 5.1-5.7 while the basic 
statistical overview of the number of countries across continents was previously presented in 
tables 3.3 and 3.4.    
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Table 5.1.  Near-home bias in FDI outflows  by continent of  sending country 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment outflow from country i to 
country j at time t,  for the FDI outflows sending country located on a particular continent (Europe, Asia-Pacific 
and the Americas); The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory 
variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports 
plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j 
in kilometres; shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political 
organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political 
organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); 
shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared 
history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been 
part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are 
based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) 
method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively;  
 
  EUROPE (send) ASIA-PACIFIC (send) AMERICAS (send) 
Variable  Log (FDI outflows) Log (FDI outflows) Log (FDI outflows) 
C 
-9.74 *** -3.99 *** -14.19 *** 
(Log) GDPrec 
0.74 *** 0.75 *** 0.87 *** 
(Log) GDP send 
1.48 *** 0.43 *** 1.53 *** 
Openness rec 
0.32 *** 0.40 *** 0.65 *** 
Openness send 
0.99 *** -1.73 *** 2.92 *** 
(Log) Distance 
-0.54 *** -0.19  0.20  
Same Continent 
-0.01  0.52 *** 0.68 *** 
Border 
0.04  NA  0.01  
Shared Econ. Org. 
0.23 *** 0.22 *** 0.28 *** 
Same Legal System 
0.10 *** 0.00  0.21 *** 
Shared History 
0.47 *** -0.11  0.27 *** 
Shared Language  
0.23 *** 0.36 *** 0.06  
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
-0.03 *** -0.06 *** -0.10 *** 
N 8,818 1,649 837 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.47 0.60 
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5.3.1. Near-home bias in FDI by continent 
In this analysis the data are divided by continent to control for any pattern among the 
countries that are investing in countries from the same continent. The data are divided 
according to the location of the FDI flows sending country on a particular continent. The 
division of the data by the continent criteria is done in three groups (despite the fact that there 
are six continents). Antarctica isn’t part of the data because it doesn’t have sovereign 
countries or permanent population. The African continent can only be considered for FDI 
inflows and not possible for FDI outflows. There is a representation for the African countries 
as a partner country by there isn’t a single African country that’s a member of the OECD and 
therefore Africa cannot be a segment of FDI outflows. Finally, I consider Australia and 
Oceania together with Asia forming a broader continental region, called Asia-Pacific. This is 
done so because Australia and Pacific data are limited to Australia and New Zealand and it 
doesn’t yield significant analysis. This combination of the two continents (or more commonly 
of the countries on the Asian Pacific Coast, called Asia Pacific) is frequently done in research 
studies in geography or economics and finance. Based on the aforementioned properties of the 
data I divide the data by continent in three groups: Europe, Americas and Asia-Pacific and 
Africa (for FDI inflows only).  
This estimation was done by grouping the bilateral country pairs according to their 
location on a particular continent. This is a regional consideration which is important because 
it offers great insight into any major differences between ways of doing business on different 
continents. The a priori expectation is the same as in the general regressions – near-home bias 
is expected to be present. There might be slight differences due to the differences in the 
cultures and societies of the peoples inhabiting different continents. There could also be some 
differences due to the differences in size of the continents – Europe is roughly the size of 
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Australia and the American and Asia Pacific region has a considerably greater geographic size 
with a smaller number of countries.   
 
I. Europe  
This section describes the results for near-home bias in FDI flows for the European 
continent. The results are presented first for FDI outflows then for FDI inflows.  
 
FDI outflows-Europe 
This regression in table 5.1 considers FDI outflows country pairs where the FDI 
sending country is located on the European continent. This is the largest data subset in this 
analysis because 23 of the 30 OECD countries are on the European continent [see table 3.1 
and 3.2 for a statistical breakdown]. The number of observations is 8,818 with 950 (cross 
sections) different bilateral country pairs across different years. The overall findings are 
consistent with the full panel analysis of FDI outflows in the previous chapter (table 4.2).  
The institutional and cultural proximity variables are all significant and with the expected 
signs. European countries prefer to invest in institutionally familiar places like the countries 
with which they share a membership in the same economic or political organisation or the 
same origin of the legal system. That means that French investors might find it easier to invest 
in Belgium rather than England. Europeans also prefer to invest in historically, linguistically 
and culturally familiar places a claim supported by the highly significant variables from this 
group. When it comes to the physical proximity, the only significant variable is the physical 
distance variable which is significant and negative confirming the detrimental effect distance 
has on FDI flows. The shared continent and border variables aren’t significant.  
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FDI inflows-Europe 
In the case of FDI inflows, this estimation has 5,460 observations with 571 different 
country pairs across the sample period (cross sections). It can be seen in table 5.2. 
The institutional and cultural proximity variables groups are all highly significant and with 
the expected signs in this analysis as well, confirming the findings in FDI outflows. The 
results tell a slightly different story in the physical proximity group where all three are 
negative and significant. The distance is expected to have that negative influence on FDI 
flows. The fact that the shared continent and shared border are negative in this case is slightly 
puzzling. In the case of FDI inflows, the FDI receiving country is an OECD member whereas 
the sending country can come from anywhere in the world which in this case may have 
caused this contradictory finding. Most of the OECD countries are on the European continent 
but the countries that invest in them are numerous and from all of the other continents.   
From the macro variables, three out of four have the expected positive sign, but the trade 
openness of the receiving country is insignificant.  
 
II. Asia-Pacific 
The sample in this analysis is more controlled because it is restricted to four countries 
in the far-Eastern part of the world that are also members of the OECD: Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and Korea and their partner countries. The sample contains around 1,649 
observations for FDI outflows with 149 different country pairs and 2,320 observations and 
341 cross sections in the case of FDI inflows.  
FDI outflows-Asia-Pacific 
Given the large distances among the four Asian-Pacific countries (Australia, Japan, 
Korea and New Zealand) physical proximity is not a significant factor in their foreign 
investment decisions (the distance variable isn’t significant). However, the significant  
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Table 5.2.  Near-home bias in FDI inflows by continent of  sending country 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to country i from country j at 
time t,  for the FDI inflows sending country located on a particular continent (Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Americas); 
The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the 
GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI 
sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border dummy (value of 
one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j 
share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share 
the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or 
language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial 
relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White 
(1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively;  
 
  EUROPE (send) 
ASIA-PACIFIC 
(send) AMERICAS (send) AFRICA (send) 
Variable  Log (FDI inflows) Log (FDI inflows) Log (FDI inflows) Log (FDI inflows) 
C 
-6.74 *** -6.26 *** -10.02 *** -17.47 *** 
(Log) GDPrec 
0.69 *** 0.87 *** 0.91 *** 1.15 *** 
(Log) GDP send 
1.32 *** 0.92 *** 1.25 *** 3.49 *** 
Openness rec 
0.24  0.49 *** 0.69 *** 0.99 *** 
Openness send 
0.85 *** 0.49 *** 0.95 *** -0.38  
(Log) Distance 
-1.01 *** -1.00 *** -0.53 *** -1.80 *** 
Same Continent 
-0.44 *** -0.50 *** 0.12  
NA  
Border 
-0.14 *** 0.31 ** 0.31 *** 
NA  
Shared Econ. Org. 
0.30 *** 0.80 *** 0.03  
NA  
Same Legal System 
0.08 *** 0.36 *** 0.06  
0.48  
Shared History 
0.36 *** -0.08  0.37 *** 
-0.04  
Shared Language  
0.23 *** 0.50 *** 0.37 *** 
0.87 *** 
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
-0.01 *** -0.01 ** 0.01 * 
0.03  
N 5,640 2,320 1,633 165 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.46 0.67 0.40 
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continent dummy clearly suggests that there is a strong preference for mutual foreign 
investments among themselves in the region. The shared history and legal system aren’t 
significant. However, the shared language is positive and significant and the cultural distance 
index is negative and significant indicating that a smaller difference in culture stimulates FDI 
flows.     
The openness of the FDI sending country has a negative and significant impact on FDI 
outflows which isn’t consistent with the expectation and is that much more puzzling because 
the four countries in this region (Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand) that are the FDI 
sending countries in this case can all be considered as open to trade. The other 
macroeconomic variables are as expected, positive and significant. 
   
FDI inflows- Asia-Pacific 
The FDI inflows estimation within this sample of Asian-Pacific countries shows an 
overall consistency with the expected results. This regression in shown in table 5.2. Of the 
near-home bias variables only the shared history variable isn’t significant whereas the others 
are significant and with the expected signs.  
 The distance is negative and significant but so is the shared continent which isn’t in 
accordance with the expectations. This result indicates that there are more FDI inflows to the 
four OECD member countries in the Asian-Pacific region from partner countries that aren’t 
on the same continent, which isn’t too outlandish to consider given the large number of 
possible partner countries in the other continents in comparison with this one.  
Here, the GDP coefficients for both receiving and sending country are significant and 
have a positive influence on FDI inflows within the Asian-Pacific region and the same is true 
for the country openness of both the FDI receiving and sending country - it has a stimulating 
effect on FDI inflows.  
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III. America 
These regressions have the highest R2 from the three continent data subsets, around 60%.  
This subset has 837 observations and 71 unique country pairs for FDI outflows and 1,633 
observations and 230 bilateral country pairs. It consists of three OECD member countries: 
USA, Canada and Mexico and their FDI partners.  
 
FDI outflows-America  
In the case of outflows, same as for Asia-Pacific, the physical distance isn’t significant 
most likely due to the large distances of the continents themselves and between them and the 
others. The same is true for the shared border. Same as Asia-Pacific the American countries 
do prefer to invest in countries in their own continent.  
Apart from the shared language which is insignificant, the rest of the cultural and institutional 
familiarity variables are significant and with the expected influence.   
All four macroeconomic variables are significant and positive which is fully consistent with 
the previous analyses.  
 
FDI inflows-America  
This case of the FDI inflows to the American countries (USA, Canada and Mexico) 
from the partner countries located in the rest of the world is not entirely consistent with the 
previous findings in the variables of interest of this study. Of the five variables in this group, 
only the shared history and language are positive and significant and have the expected 
stimulating influence on FDI inflows to this region. The institutional familiarity variables are 
insignificant as is the cultural distance index. In terms of physical proximity, the inflows 
significantly come from the bordering neighbours, which means that Mexico, Canada and the 
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US are most significantly investing amongst themselves. The physical distance has a negative 
influence on FDI inflows. The macro variables are all positive and significant as expected.  
 
IV. Africa   
While it is impossible to have an African data subgroup for FDI outflows because 
none of the OECD members is also an African country, in the case of FDI inflows from the 
African continent to the OECD member countries a small data sample allows us to estimate 
the regression. Several of the variables are excluded such as: the shared continent; shared 
border and shared economic and political organisation due to the aforementioned reasons. 
This leaves us with a sample of 165 observations and just 31 country pairs.  The results show 
that the most deterministic factors for the FDI inflows from the African continent are the 
macroeconomic variables. The greater the economic wealth in terms of GDP of the sending 
and receiving countries, the greater the FDI inflows. The greater the trade openness of the FDI 
receiving country the greater the FDI inflows. The physical distance is the only significant 
determinant from the physical proximity group and the shared language is the only other 
significant variable. This indicates that the former colonies (all of whom have the language of 
the colonizers as one of the official languages) prefer to invest in countries abroad with the 
same language for example, the former French colonies would prefer to invest in the French 
speaking countries.  
 
5.3.2. Near-home bias by individual countries 
This section performs estimations on each country individually. This strengthens and 
reaffirms the values of the results obtained from the estimations made on the whole panel 
dataset. It also helps to identify any country specific tendencies and particularities and offer 
insights into potential differences between countries which differ according to size and 
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development level. This analysis shows that the results found overall support the findings in 
the full panel regressions in the previous sections with some exceptions. The econometric 
models are adapted to the individual country dataset shortcomings by excluding a particular 
dummy variable where all of the values take the value of either zero or one (i.e. when the 
variable becomes non-varying). I only consider as significant variables the coefficients at 
significance levels of 1% and 5%.  
 
I. FDI outflows by country 
Table 5.3 reports the results for the FDI outflows for each country. I wasn’t able to run 
estimation for Canada due to a very small number of observations, which makes the total 
number of country regressions is 29 instead of 30. In some cases a variable had to be excluded 
because there weren’t any country pairs that had a particular relationship depicted by that 
dummy variable. This would be the shared border for all island countries, the shared language 
for some countries that have a language that’s not similar to any other and is only spoken in 
one country (such as: Greece, Hungary and Iceland) and in some cases the shared history 
variable and the cultural index.  
Although the bulk of the results remain broadly similar with the aggregate and 
continent evidence presented in Tables 4.2 and 5.1, there are nevertheless a number of 
important points to note. First, near-home bias characteristics are clearly more prominent 
among the largest FDI investors US, UK, Germany, France and Spain. For these 5 countries, 
distance, economic organisation, and shared history emerge as important determinants of FDI; 
with the exception of Germany, the legal origin is also a significant factor in foreign 
investment decisions by these countries.  
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Table 5.3. Near-home bias in FDI outflows by individual country  
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment flow from country i to country j at time t; The FDI outflows are from 
the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP 
for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value 
of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or 
political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy 
(one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of 
the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same 
country); cultural distance index (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Const. 
LGDP of 
FDI rec. 
country 
LGDP of 
FDI send 
country 
Opennes
s rec. 
country 
Opennes
s of send. 
country 
L 
distance 
Same 
Cont. 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. 
Organs.
Dummy 
Legal 
origin 
dummy 
Shared 
History 
Shared 
Lang. 
 
 
CD 
index 
Australia  -12.74 0.67 2.28 0.27 -1.01 -0.41 0.98 NA -0.15 0.49 0.50 0.12 -0.15 
 
*** *** *** ***   *   *** ***   
Austria  -14.22 0.58 2.56 0.27 0.28 -0.46 0.17 0.19 0.08 -0.54 0.56 0.45 -0.07 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***    *** *** * *** 
Belgium  -133.2 0.29 25.91 0.12 -2.57 -0.70 -0.47 0.82 1.07 0.09 NA -0.36 0.17 
 ***  ***  *** ***  *** ***   * ** 
Canada  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Czech R.  -5.35 0.83 1.04 0.49 -1.89 -0.68 -0.17 -0.14 -0.05 0.48 1.34 NA -0.05 
 
 ***  ***      ** ***   
Denmark  -49.63 0.86 9.61 0.37 -3.01 -0.31 0.35 -0.20 0.15 0.32 NA NA -0.09 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** ** *  ***   *** 
Finland  -28.10 0.83 5.43 0.34 -0.38 -0.60 -0.07 -0.06 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.27 -0.23 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***   ***    *** 
France  -37.20 0.88 6.01 0.47 -0.46 -0.61 -0.13 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.44 -0.04 -0.10 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***  *** *** *** ***  *** 
Germany  -35.22 0.96 5.38 0.35 -1.92 -0.07 0.38 0.17 0.10 -0.47 -0.11 0.49 -0.10 
 
*** *** *** *** ***  *** *** * ***  *** *** 
Greece  -24.17 1.12 3.60 0.59 0.14 -0.38 1.01 -0.28 -0.16 -0.35 NA NA -0.09 
 
*** *** *** ***  *** ***      ** 
Hungary  -23.65 0.83 4.97 0.32 0.31 -1.57 -0.52 1.10 0.30 0.78 -0.42 NA 0.00 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***  ***  *** **   
Iceland  -16.66 0.15 6.39 0.10 -1.20 -2.20 -1.01 NA 0.40 0.33 -0.14 NA NA 
 
***  ***   *** *** 
 
*     
Ireland  -53.41 0.58 11.33 0.36 1.95 -2.43 -1.62 NA 0.68 -0.15 -0.04 0.31 -0.23 
 
*** *** *** ***  *** ***  *** ***   ** 
Italy  -29.64 1.13 4.15 0.47 -1.02 0.01 0.99 -0.12 -0.21 0.34 NA 0.24 -0.17 
 
*** *** *** ***   *** * *** ***   *** 
Japan  -0.36 1.17 -0.35 0.59 -3.17 -0.31 0.40 NA 0.07 -0.43 0.14  -0.05 
 
 ***  *** ***  **   ****   *** 
Korea  -12.16 0.66 2.30 0.15 -1.54 -0.60 0.20 NA -0.11 -0.41 -0.78 -0.03 0.05 
 
*** *** *** *** * ***   ** *** ***  * 
Luxemb. -141.7 1.02 34.20 0.28 -2.28 -1.50 -0.27 -0.60 0.65 0.50 0.30 -0.15 -0.12 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ***  ** *** ***    
Mexico  1066.8 0.71 -193 -1.05 91.8 0.12 -1.97 1.89 -0.05 1.16 -1.80 -0.35 -0.44 
 
      *** ***     *** 
Netherl.  -25.1 0.84 4.60 0.35 -1.03 -0.43 0.02 -0.59 0.14 0.03 0.21 0.33 -0.05 
 *** *** *** *** *** ***  *** ***  *** ** *** 
New Zeal. 11.84 0.78 -3.75 0.81 -0.36 0.51 2.26 NA -0.25 -0.13 0.63 0.03 -0.11 
 
* *** ** ***   **    ***   
Norway  -14.8 0.77 2.78 0.56 1.83 -1.09 -0.54 -0.23 0.41 0.43 NA NA -0.12 
 
*** *** *** ***  *** *      *** 
Poland  -3.83 1.03 0.25 0.53 2.90 -1.43 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 0.03 -0.12 NA -0.10 
 
 ***  *** ** ***       *** 
Portugal  -19.1 0.78 4.21 0.52 -0.98 -1.66 -0.35 0.44 -0.05 0.62 1.82 NA 0.13 
 
*** *** *** ***  *** ** *  *** ***  *** 
Slovakia  -49.2 1.31 9.65 1.30 -1.60 0.23 0.71 1.13 -0.72 0.81 0.20 -0.85 0.04 
 
*** *** *** ** *   **  ***  ***  
Spain  -32.12 0.83 5.49 0.53 1.74 -1.05 -0.01 0.15 0.17 0.47 0.52 0.80 -0.09 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ***  ** * *** *** *** *** 
Sweden  -29.8 1.00 4.78 0.43 0.53 0.01 0.63 0.32 0.10 0.17 0.70 -0.44 -0.16 
 
*** *** *** ***   *** **   *** * *** 
Switzerl. 21.33 0.71 -4.43 0.31 2.31 -0.30 -0.03 0.07 0.21 -0.35 NA -0.16 -0.09 
 
 ***  *** * ***   *** ***   *** 
Turkey  -4.05 0.27 1.20 0.34 -2.68 -0.61 -0.46 0.56 0.44 -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 NA 
 
* *** **  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** **  
UK  -21.87 0.72 3.38 0.30 0.66 -0.26 -0.20 0.08 0.34 0.18 0.37 -0.10 -0.02 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***   *** ** ***   
USA  -6.95 0.86 0.30 0.66 5.00 0.31 0.81 -0.05 0.34 0.21 0.26 0.02 -0.09 
 
* ***  *** * ** ***  *** *** ***  *** 
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There is also a small group of countries like Australia, Luxemburg, Netherlands and 
Sweden whose foreign investment decisions are also affected by some of the seven near-home 
bias variables. The remaining 16, relatively small countries, also display some evidence of 
near-home bias but they are limited across a narrow range of the near-home bias 
characteristics. It is worth noting, however, that foreign investment decisions by smaller 
countries are also not always consistent even with the better established economic 
determinants of FDI. Table 5.3, shows a negative and significant relation between the trade 
openness of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Turkey 
and their outflow of foreign direct investment.  
 Overall, across the 29 countries the most pertinent near-home bias variables in order 
of consistency are: distance, cultural index, legal origin, economic organisation, shared 
history, common border, same continent and common language. 
Of the near-home bias variables, the economic organisation dummy is expected to have a 
positive effect on FDI outflows. Countries are expected to invest in other countries that have 
similar organisation of the economic system. This variable is significant for 10 of the 29 
countries and it doesn’t have the expected positive influence on FDI outflows only for Italy.  
The same legal origin dummy is also expected to have a positive effect on FDI outflows. In 
this regression it is significant for 19 of 29 countries. However results show negative 
coefficient signs for: Austria, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Sweden and Switzerland. 
These countries’ outflows aren’t determined by the similarity of the legal system with their 
FDI partner countries. 
The shared history dummy is statistically significant for 14 of 23 countries and it exhibits a 
stimulating influence on FDI outflows except for: Hungary, Korea and Turkey where it has a 
negative coefficient while it has a stimulating effect on FDI outflows for the other 11 
countries. The shared language dummy isn’t taken into consideration for 6 of the 29 OECD 
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countries because they don’t share linguistic similarity with any other FDI partner in the 
sample. Of the remaining countries this variable is significant for 5 of 23 countries however it 
doesn’t have the expected positive stimulating influence on FDI outflows for Turkey and 
Slovakia probably because they share a common language with very few nations. It can be 
inferred that shared language plays a positive role in the FDI outflows for Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. The cultural distance index is significant for 18 of 27 countries which 
makes it very robust. It predominantly has the expected negative sign indicating that countries 
that have lesser cultural distance will attract more FDI flows. It only has an unexpected 
(positive) influence in Portugal.  
Of the proximity variables, the distance variable is expected to be negative with less FDI 
outflows to countries that are more distant from the FDI outflows sending country. The 
coefficients are significant for 19 of the 29 countries and have the expected negative sign for 
all of the statistically significant variables except in the case of the US where the distance has 
a positive effect on FDI outflows possibly because as the US is the world’s largest direct 
investor, it has a very wide range of countries where it invests.  
The shared continent dummy is significant for 13 of 29 countries and is expected to increase 
FDI outflows if the country pair is on the same continent. Negative influence on FDI outflows 
is found in: Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, Portugal and Turkey. The shared border dummy 
variable isn’t considered for 6 of the 29 OECD countries. From the rest it’s significant for 11 
of 23 countries and even though it mostly has a positive influence on FDI outflows it does 
exhibit a negative sign in the case of the Netherlands and Luxembourg where it decreases FDI 
outflows with bordering countries.  
The macroeconomic variables are significant for most countries. The GDP of the FDI 
receiving country are significant in 26 of the 29 countries and 23 of 29 for the GDP of the 
sending country. I expect a positive impact of the GDP variables on FDI outflows. The larger 
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the economy the higher the FDI outflows.  The openness of the FDI outflows receiving 
variable is significant for 25 of 29 countries and it has a positive effect on FDI outflows for all 
significant coefficients. The openness of the FDI outflows sending country however is 
significant only for 7 of the 29 countries and it has a negative and significant influence for all 
7 countries – they seem to engage less in FDI outflows when their openness is higher.  
 
II. FDI inflows by country 
This section describes the results of the geographical analysis of FDI inflows by 
individual country. These results support the findings for the corresponding analysis for FDI 
outflows. Table 5.4 reports results for the FDI inflows for each country. I’m unable to 
perform an estimation for Canada and Iceland which makes the total number of countries 28, 
in this case. 
From the institutional proximity variable group, the shared economic or political 
organisation dummy is significant for 16 of the 28 countries. All of the significant coefficients 
have a positive sign. This variable shows that investors prefer to invest in countries that have 
a similar organisation of the economic system to their own. The legal origin dummy is 
significant for 15 of 28 countries. It also has a positive expected coefficient sign. The sign is 
negative for four (Austria, Poland, Portugal and the UK) of the 15 significant coefficients. 
That means that FDI inflows are stimulated by institutional familiarity represented here by the 
same legal system origins.  The shared history variable is significant for 8 of 22 countries and 
it has the expected positive influence on FDI inflows in all significant variables. The shared 
language is significant for 9 of 21 countries and it doesn’t have the expected positive sign in 
the cases of: Belgium, Germany, Hungary and Switzerland. The cultural distance index is 
significant for 16 of the 28 countries however unlike the sign consistency in the case of FDI 
outflows, in this case there are 9 of the 16 significant countries that have a positive sign for  
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Table 5.4. Near-home bias in FDI inflows by individual country  
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to country i from country j at time t; The FDI inflows are from 
the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP 
for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value 
of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or 
political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy 
(one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of 
the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same 
country); cultural distance index (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Shared 
Lang. 
 
 
CD 
index 
Australia  -6.12 0.94 1.11 0.50 0.93 -1.10 1.02 NA 0.72 0.04 0.61 -0.06 -0.03 
 
  ***  *** ** **  **  ***   
Austria  -211.32 40.39 1.17 -8.93 0.43 -0.12 0.43 0.51 0.04 -0.57 -0.20 1.20 0.03 
 
*** *** *** *** ***     ***  *** * 
Belgium  -172.87 33.50 0.91 -4.74 0.38 -0.95 -0.22 0.41 0.34 -0.02 0.53 -0.30 -0.01 
 *** *** *** *** *** *      ***  
Canada  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Czech R.  10.79 -2.35 1.23 0.63 0.46 -2.07 -0.75 -0.07 0.90 -0.21 -0.07 NA 0.05 
 
  ***  *** *** ***  *** *   *** 
Denmark  -44.81 8.55 1.03 -2.49 0.72 -0.64 -0.12 -0.26 0.75 0.32 NA NA -0.05 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ***  *** *** ***   *** 
Finland  -33.53 6.84 0.97 0.30 0.46 -1.72 -0.61 -0.21 0.74 0.28 0.18 0.33 -0.04 
 
*** *** ***  *** *** **  ***    *** 
France  -32.82 5.49 0.86 -1.12 0.52 -1.15 -0.56 0.47 0.72 0.14 0.44 -0.02 0.04 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  *** 
Germany  -27.10 4.53 0.78 -1.06 0.49 -0.96 -0.41 0.07 0.54 0.35 -0.42 -0.42 -0.01 
 
*** *** *** ** *** *** ***  *** ***  ***  
Greece  10.01 -2.45 1.02 -6.65 0.51 -0.20 0.71 -1.42 0.13 0.62 NA NA 0.03 
 
** ** *** *** ***   ***  ***   ** 
Hungary  -22.39 4.03 1.30 -0.09 0.77 -1.24 -0.30 0.93 1.00 -0.33 -0.37 -1.34 0.04 
 
*** *** ***  *** ***  ** ***   *** *** 
Iceland  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Ireland  -19.82 4.45 0.78 -0.60 0.14 -1.13 -0.63 NA 0.19 -0.19 -0.14 0.30 -0.01 
 
*** *** ***   *** **       
Italy  -33.05 4.23 1.26 -1.90 1.02 0.36 1.05 0.39 0.21 0.23 NA 0.86 -0.02 
 
*** *** *** ** *** ** *** *** ** ***  *** *** 
Japan  -5.31 -0.81 1.29 -2.39 1.82 0.87 -0.30 NA 0.12 0.41 0.66 NA 0.02 
 
  *** *** *** ***    *** **  *** 
Korea  -12.16 0.80 1.09 0.86 0.90 0.17 -0.19 NA 0.08 0.39 0.93 0.03 0.05 
 
*** *** *** ** ***     *** ***  *** 
Luxemb. -115.37 27.15 1.40 -2.14 0.74 -1.09 0.15 -0.57 0.18 0.58 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *  **  ***    
Mexico  15.80 -2.84 1.71 -0.38 0.79 -2.22 -0.51 -1.01 0.22 -0.02 0.29 0.75 0.04 
 
** ** ***  *** *** *** *** ***  * *** *** 
Netherl.  -17.96 3.55 0.85 -0.75 0.35 -1.09 -0.69 -0.48 0.69 -0.10 0.23 0.58 -0.03 
 *** *** ***  *** *** *** *** ***   *** *** 
New Zeal. -12.36 2.40 1.00 1.00 0.92 -1.18 0.80 NA 0.44 0.06 0.98 0.17 -0.03 
 
  ***  ***    **  ***   
Norway  -17.86 1.15 1.52 6.26 1.41 -0.32 0.33 0.47 0.16 1.00 NA NA 0.02 
 
*** ** *** *** ***   **  ***    
Poland  1.82 -0.93 1.19 0.52 0.69 -1.02 0.25 0.00 0.57 -0.59 0.08 NA 0.01 
 
  ***  *** *** **  *** ***   ** 
Portugal  -27.48 5.95 0.72 2.37 0.17 -1.69 -0.09 -0.47 -0.02 -0.25 NA 0.78 -0.01 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***  *  ***  **  
Slovakia  -12.52 1.43 1.37 1.42 0.81 -1.34 -0.12 -1.01 0.92 0.46 0.94 0.11 0.01 
 
  ***  *** **  * ***  ***   
Spain  -50.00 7.88 1.91 -1.02 1.73 -1.23 0.31 -0.29 0.30 -0.12 0.63 -0.20 0.00 
 
*** *** ***  *** ***     ***   
Sweden  -54.14 9.52 1.37 -0.27 0.66 -0.88 0.12 0.23 0.35 0.33 0.18 0.36 -0.04 
 
*** *** ***  *** **   ** *   *** 
Switzerl. 13.79 -3.06 1.16 3.13 1.19 -1.33 -1.51 0.68 0.22 -0.08 NA -0.72 0.04 
 
  *** *** *** ** ** **    **  
Turkey  -11.61 1.32 1.10 2.93 0.26 -0.76 0.09 -0.63 -0.07 0.63 NA NA 0.05 
 
*  *** ** * ***    ***   *** 
UK  -14.37 3.04 0.64 -2.02 0.38 -1.35 -1.34 -0.68 1.07 -0.52 0.72 0.03 -0.04 
 
*** *** ***  *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  *** 
USA  -23.13 2.34 1.33 -0.21 1.13 0.22 1.06 -0.99 1.16 0.22 0.19 0.00 -0.02 
 
*** *** ***  ***  *** *** *** ** *  ** 
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this variable indicating that in the case of FDI inflows the cultural similarity isn’t a very 
strong predictor of FDI inflows.  
The distance is significant for 20 of the 28 countries. The expectation is that the 
distance to have a negative coefficient estimate. The a priori expectation is that the further 
away the FDI partner country, the lesser are the FDI flows. In this regression the distance 
coefficients have a negative sign all countries except Italy and Japan where the greater 
distance has a positive effect on FDI inflows.  
Of the macroeconomic variables, the GDP of the FDI receiving country and the GDP 
of the FDI sending country are significant as expected. The expected effect of the GDP is 
positive. The higher the GDP, the larger is the economy and thus the larger the FDI inflows 
towards it. The GDP coefficients of the FDI receiving country are significant for 20 out of the 
28 countries with a negative sign for Greece and Mexico. The GDP coefficients of the FDI 
sending country are significant and positive for all 28 out of the 30 countries which accents 
the overwhelming importance that the country must have a strong GDP for it to be a foreign 
direct investor to the OECD member countries. The country openness coefficients are 
significant for 14 of the 28 countries and like for the country openness in the FDI outflows 
sending country (which is its counterpart in this analysis) there are a lot of negative 
coefficients (9 of 14), indicating that most of the FDI inflows happen in the OECD member 
countries with smaller openness to trade.  The country openness for the FDI inflows sending 
country is significant for 25 of 29 countries and it has the expected positive effect on FDI 
inflows – the greater the trade openness of the FDI sending country the greater the FDI 
inflows from that country.  
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5.3.3. Near-home bias in FDI flows across time 
The sample is divided in two sub-periods, 1981-1992 and 1993-2005 in order to 
examine if there is any change in the presence of near-home bias over time. This is important 
knowing that there was significant capital market liberalization in the world in the early 90s. 
This might influence the near-home bias factors after the 90s in the sense that they might be 
less important due to greater capital mobility. The results of these two regressions are shown 
in tables 5.5 and 5.6 for FDI outflows and inflows, respectively. They support the general 
results from tables 4.2 and 4.3. The results for this analysis are presented in three columns: 
the first one shows regression for the entire sample period, from 1981 to 2005, the second and 
third columns show the regressions for the divided samples, from 1981-1992 and 1993-2005 
respectively.  
 
I. FDI outflows  
The results for the near-home bias across time periods for FDI outflows are presented 
in table 5.5. In general it can be observed that the institutional and cultural proximity factors 
have remained prevalent across time. The same can be said about the macroeconomic and 
physical proximity group of factors.  
In the institutional proximity group, the shared economic and political organisation 
variable is significant and positive in both time periods indicating that in the case of FDI 
outflows this kind of institutional proximity remains important with respect to the investment 
choices of the OECD members across time. The shared legal system origin is also positive 
and significant for both time sub-periods indicating that institutional familiarity doesn’t stop 
being important with time and at various capital market liberalisation degrees.  
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Table 5.5. Near-home bias in FDI outflows in two sub-periods; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment 
flow from country i to country j at time t; the time is split in two sub-periods: 1981-1992 
(2) and 1993-2005 (3). The FDI outflows are from the FDI sending country towards the 
FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI 
receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of 
exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of 
exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;   the log of the physical 
distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one 
if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one 
if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value 
of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); 
same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal 
systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or 
language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with 
respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country); 
cultural distance index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); The t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the 
White (1980) method; Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (Log )FDI Outflows 
1981-2005 
(Log )FDI Outflows 
1981-1992 
(Log )FDI Outflows 
1993-2005 
C -9.15*** -11.12*** -9.09*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.75*** 0.79*** 0.75*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.31*** 1.25*** 1.38*** 
Openness rec 0.36*** 0.60*** 0.33*** 
Openness send 0.89*** 1.31*** 0.91*** 
(Log) Distance -0.46*** 0.00 -0.57*** 
Same Continent 0.10*** 0.30*** 0.08*** 
Border 0.04 0.19*** -0.01 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 
Same Legal System 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 
Shared History 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 
Shared Language  0.30*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 
Cul. Dist. Index -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.04*** 
N 11,304 3,530 7,774 
Adj. R2 0.50 0.54 0.50 
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In the cultural proximity group of variables in the case of FDI outflows, the shared 
history and shared language are both positive and statistically significant in both sub-periods 
(1981-1992 and 1993-2005). The OECD member countries prefer to invest in culturally 
proximate locations, with which they share similar history and linguistic similarity. The 
cultural distance index has the expected negative sign in both sub-periods indicating that the 
greater is the cultural distance between two nations the lesser are the FDI flows between 
them.  
There is a minor difference in the sub-period regressions for the proximity group of 
variables. The shared continent variable is positive and significant over time indicating that 
the preference to invest within the same continent hasn’t changed over time. An interesting 
finding comes from the physical distance variable which isn’t significant for the earlier period 
(1991-1992) but is highly statistically significant for the later period (1993-2005). It appears 
that the physical distance plays a greater role now that the capital markets are more liquid. 
This means that the investors have the luxury of more choice of investment locations and they 
prefer to invest nearby. The shared border variable isn’t significant in the second, later period 
while it is significant in the first period.  
The macroeconomic group of variables are positive and significant for the two sub-
periods and both variables. The preference to invest in countries that are more open and have 
a greater economic size hasn’t changed throughout time and remains the most basic predictor 
of economic flows.  
In his paper on the limits of financial globalization Stulz (2005) argues that the near-
home bias in equity investments has diminished over time but remains strong. I do not find 
supporting evidence to show that near-home bias in FDI has diminished over time. In fact, it 
is a prevailing driving force in FDI outflows over time without signs to be reducing.  
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Table 5.6. Near-home bias in FDI inflows in two sub-periods; 
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI inflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to 
country i from country j at time t; the time is split in two sub-periods: 1981-1992 (2) and 1993-
2005 (3). The FDI inflows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. 
The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for 
the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI 
receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending 
country;   the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared 
continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared 
border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political 
organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or 
political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of 
their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or 
language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to 
having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural distance 
index (based on Kogut and Singh (1988)); The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have 
been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Fixed effects 
used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively; 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 (Log )FDI inflows 
1981-2005 
(Log )FDI inflows 
1981-1992 
(Log )FDI inflows 
1993-2005 
C -6.78*** -4.49*** -6.66*** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.80*** 0.56*** 0.81*** 
(Log) GDP send 1.04*** 1.00*** 1.05*** 
Openness rec 0.38*** -0.76*** 0.48*** 
Openness send 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.53*** 
(Log) Distance -0.84*** -0.86*** -0.95*** 
Same Continent -0.17*** -0.28* -0.19*** 
Border -0.05* -0.08*** -0.08** 
Shared Econ. Org. 0.61*** 0.39*** 0.72*** 
Same Legal System 0.16*** 0.12** 0.18*** 
Shared History 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 
Shared Language 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 
Cul. Dist. Index 0.004** 0.00 -0.01*** 
N 9,758 2,989 6,769 
Adj. R2 0.52 0.50 0.54 
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II. FDI inflows  
The analysis of near-home bias across time in the case of FDI inflows is shown in 
table 5.6. The overall findings from the previous table as well as the full panel analysis from 
the previous chapter are generally confirmed with some minor exceptions.  
In the institutional proximity group, the shared economic and political organisation 
and shared origin of the legal system variables are both positive and significant across the 
both time periods in this analysis. The institutional proximity in the case of FDI inflows 
confirms the importance of institutional familiarity in FDI flows.  
The cultural group of variables shows that the shared history and shared language 
variables are both significant and positive. This shows that cultural proximity also remains to 
be significant in the case of FDI inflows. The cultural distance index is only significant in the 
case of the second period (1992-2005) whereas it is not for the first one (1981-1992).  
In the physical proximity group of variables, the physical distance is both significant 
and negative as expected indicating that in the case of FDI inflows (to the OECD countries), 
the distance matters over time and this hasn’t changed over time. The shared continent is 
significant only in the second sub-period but is negative indicating that in the case of FDI 
inflows, they come to the host countries from another continent. The same issue can be noted 
for the shared border which is significant and negative in both sub-periods which means that 
the FDI inflows happen from more distant counties than immediate neighbours.  
In the case of the macroeconomic variable group, the GDP of the sending and 
receiving countries is both positive and significant determinant of FDI inflows in both sub-
periods.  The openness of the sending country is positive and significant in both cases while it 
is negative in the case of the receiving country in the early sub-period (1981-1992). In 
general, the FDI outflows analysis is somewhat more pronounced and consistent that the FDI 
inflows analysis in the case of near-home bias in FDI flows across time.  
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Table 5.7.  Near-home bias in FDI outflows to developing/developed countries  
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment outflow from 
country i to country j at time t,  when the FDI receiving country is ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ 
according to the World Bank classification; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards 
the FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of 
the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the 
FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending 
country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border 
dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation 
dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political 
organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal 
systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the 
minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past 
colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on 
Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** 
stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
 
  
                Developing 
countries Developed countries 
Independent Variables 
↓ 
Dependent Variable 
→ 
  Log (FDI outflows) Log (FDI outflows) 
C 
-7.22 *** -4.30 *** 
(Log) GDPrec 
0.72 *** 0.73 *** 
(Log) GDP send 
0.69 *** 0.70 *** 
Openness rec 
0.20 *** 0.40 *** 
Openness send 
2.45 *** 2.41 *** 
(Log) Distance 
-0.01  -0.76 *** 
Same Continent 
0.44 *** -0.22 *** 
Border 
0.22 *** -0.15 *** 
Shared Econ. Org. 
-0.11 ** 0.33 *** 
Same Legal System 
0.15 *** 0.16 *** 
Shared History 
0.58 *** 0.26 *** 
Shared Language  
0.17 *** 0.35 *** 
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
0.08 *** -0.08 *** 
                             N              3,630 7,674 
                    Adjusted R2              0.45 0.50 
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5.3.4. Near-home bias in FDI outflows across country income groups 
 This section presents the results of near-home bias in FDI outflows in different 
country income groups. This classification is taken from the World Bank. Because of data 
restrictions this analysis can only be estimated for the case of FDI outflows.  
 
I.  Near-home bias in FDI outflows to developing or developed countries 
The results of near-home bias in FDI outflows in developing and developed countries 
are presented in table 5.5. The developing countries are generally the low and middle income 
countries. It helps to broadly group them together to increase the number of observations and 
compare the results when they are further divided into more income groups when the 
regressions have fewer observations.  
 
Developing countries  
The results for near-home bias in FDI outflows into developing countries are in the 
left side of table 5.5. The motives for companies investing in lower income countries are 
diverse and range from the resource seeking investments when there isn’t much of a choice to 
low cost labour seeking investments. These results will help determine which factors are most 
important when companies decide to invest in poorer countries.  
In the institutional proximity group of variables, the shared economic and political 
organisation dummy variable is significant at the 5% level however with a negative sign 
which is contrary to the expectation. One possible explanation for this could be that the 
developing countries are less likely to be in many of the international economic or political 
organisations where the OECD countries are members. The shared legal system origin 
variable is positive and significant indicating the preference for the OECD countries to invest 
in developing countries with familiar institutional structure. In the cultural proximity group, 
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the cultural distance index is, contrary to expectations, positive and significant. This indicates 
that countries with greater distance in culture attract higher FDI flows. A possible explanation 
for this would be that the majority of the low income countries are in different continents 
from the OECD countries which also makes them more culturally different in the sense that 
this index measures. This doesn’t deter FDI flows to these places. The shared history and the 
shared language are positive and statistically significant indicating that investments in the 
developing countries are preferred to be in places with higher cultural familiarity. This is 
important information for developing countries since when it comes to FDI flows, they 
usually are dependent on FDI inflows for technological know-how spillovers as well as 
unemployment reduction effects that they may have in the host economy. The significance of 
these factors points out that if a richer OECD country decides to invest in for example, a 
developing country in Africa, it will invest in a country with which it shares a language and 
history. That means that the UK, France or Belgium will seek to invest more in their own 
former colonies (which are all now considered to be developing countries).  
The main finding in the physical proximity variable group is that the physical distance 
isn’t statistically significant even though the distance is one of the most robust variables in 
any international flows analysis. This suggests that in the case of investing in developing 
countries the physical distance is a neglected factor because the motives for investing in these 
countries vary and are not necessarily deterred by the sheer physical distance. The shared 
continent and border are positive and significant indicating that there is a greater chance that 
the OECD countries will invest in a nearby regional developing country if it’s available. This 
makes sense especially when we consider that some MNEs from the services industry are 
seeking the nearest developing market to expand their operations into and make use of 
economies of scale and the profits from perhaps lesser competition on the markets.  
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The macroeconomics factors are all positive and significant. The greater the GDP of 
both the FDI sending and receiving country the greater the FDI outflows; the same is true for 
country openness: the greater the openness of the sending and receiving countries, the greater 
the FDI outflows.  
 
Developed countries 
The results for near-home bias in FDI outflows into developed countries can be found on 
the right side of table 5.5. This regression follows closely the general findings for near-home 
bias in FDI flows and is very similar to the findings in the full panel analysis and the 
European analysis.  The only difference is that the shared continent and border aren’t 
statistically significant in this case and the physical distance is the only significant variable in 
the physical proximity group. This is the exact opposite result when it is compared with the 
previous analysis on developing countries where the physical distance was the only 
insignificant variable. The institutional proximity group shows that both of its variables, the 
shared economic and political organisation and legal origin variables are positive and 
significant indicating that greater institutional proximity results in greater FDI outflows 
between developed countries. The same is true for the cultural proximity between countries. 
The shared history and language variables increase the FDI outflows in developed countries. 
The cultural distance index is negative and significant which as expected, shows that there are 
less FDI outflows to more culturally distant places. In the macroeconomic variable group, all 
four variables show the expected finding that the greater the GDP and country openness of 
both the sending and receiving country, the greater will the FDI outflows be to developed 
countries.  
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Table 5.8.  Near-home bias in FDI outflows to different income group countries  
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment outflow from country i to country 
j at time t,  when the FDI receiving country is part of one of the four different income groups according to the World 
Bank; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log 
of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports 
plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the 
FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if 
country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if 
country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same 
official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to 
having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on 
Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
 
  
Low-income group 
($995 or less) 
Lower-middle 
income group ($996-
$3,945) 
Upper-middle 
income group 
($3,946 – $ 12,195) 
High income group 
($ 12,195 or more) 
Independent 
Variables ↓ 
Dependent 
Variable→ Log (FDI outflows) Log (FDI outflows) Log (FDI outflows) Log (FDI outflows) 
C -5.78 *** -6.38 *** -7.64 *** -3.69 *** 
(Log) GDPrec 0.34 *** 0.69 *** 0.83 *** 0.72 *** 
(Log) GDP send 0.58 ** 0.87 *** 0.59 *** 0.66 *** 
Openness rec 0.22 * 0.66 *** 0.12 ** 0.42 *** 
Openness send 0.26  1.89 *** 3.07 *** 2.51 *** 
(Log) Distance 0.30  -0.55 *** 0.09  -0.90 *** 
Same Continent NA  0.45 *** 0.39 *** -0.37 *** 
Border NA  NA  0.22 *** -0.21 *** 
Shared Econ. Org. NA  NA  -0.24 *** 0.50 *** 
Same Legal System 0.01  0.08 ** 0.09 * 0.17 *** 
Shared History 0.47 *** 0.45 *** 0.66 *** 0.23 *** 
Shared Language 0.07  0.05  0.28 *** 0.38 *** 
Cul. Dist. Ind. NA  0.10 *** 0.10 *** -0.08 *** 
N 371 1,649 2,324 7,476 
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.47 0.45 0.51 
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II. Near-home bias in FDI outflows according to different income groups 
The results for near-home bias in FDI outflows into four different income group countries 
can be found on the right side of table 5.8. The division follows the World Bank classification 
of all countries into one of four income groups according to the country’s gross national 
income. This classification divides the observations unevenly with the smallest number of 
observations in the first, low-income country group and the highest in the last high income 
group. The classification is done based on the FDI receiving country being classified into one 
of these four groups.  
 
Low-income group  
This regression has only 371 observations and only three of all available variables are 
statistically significant. Four of the variables (culture distance index, shared economic or 
political organisation, shared border and shared continent) weren’t available for this 
estimation. Of the 8 remaining, three variables are statistically significant: the GDP of the 
sending and receiving countries and the shared history. This indicates that the FDI outflows 
from the OECD member countries towards the lowest income group countries are greatly 
determined by the GDP levels in both countries as well as the cultural proximity represented 
through the shared history variable. This regression also fits the expectation that given the 
choice, the former colonisers like the UK and France for example would invest in one of their 
former colonial countries in Africa as opposed to other African countries. The low income 
country group mostly contains African countries and their shared colonial past is represented 
through the shared history group. These results also show the importance of having several 
indicators for cultural proximity instead of just considering one such as Hofstede’s cultural 
distances.  
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Lower-Middle Income Group   
The lower-middle income country group regression has 1,649 observations which is a 
great deal more than the previous group and also has the availability of many of the variables 
which weren’t available in the previous regression. All four macro variables are positive and 
significant indicating that the macroeconomic factors are all important across countries with 
different incomes.  
In the institutional proximity group, the shared economic and political union variable isn’t 
available while the shared legal system origin is positive and significant indicating that the 
OECD countries prefer to invest in lower-middle income country groups with similar 
institutional organisation.  
In the cultural proximity variable group, the shared history is significant and positive, the 
same as in the previous income group while the shared language variable isn’t significant. 
The cultural distance index is positive and significant indicating that contrary to expectations, 
the FDI outflows in lower-middle income county groups do occur between peoples with 
difference social culture but in spite of this there are FDI flows. These results point out to the 
fact that the interpretation of cultural similarity as determinant of FDI flows should be done 
with caution.  
In the physical proximity group, the shared border isn’t available while the shared 
continent variable is positive and significant indicating that where possible, the OECD 
member countries will elect to invest in a lower middle country located on their own 
continent. This claim is supported with the negative sign on the physical distance variable 
indicating that as distance from the lower middle income country grows there is less FDI 
outflows towards it.  
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Upper-Middle Income Group 
This income group has 2,324 observations which is much more than the previous country 
group estimation. This is also reflected by the fact that all of the variables are available for 
this estimation. The results are overall consistent with some exceptions.  
The institutional proximity group shows a negative and significant shared membership to an 
economic or political organisation variable indicating that this isn’t a shared feature among 
the country pairs when it comes to investing in upper-middle income group countries. The 
shared origin of the legal system isn’t significant.  
In the cultural proximity variable group, the shared history and shared language 
variables are positive and significant indicating the increased importance of cultural similarity 
when it comes to investing to richer countries (as opposed with the previous groups). In this 
case as well as the previous income group, the cultural distance index is positive and 
significant which is contrary to the expected. This indicates that the socio-cultural traits of 
nations that are captured by Hofstede’s cultural dimensions aren’t always the best 
representative for the cultural familiarity which increases the FDI flows among countries.  
The physical proximity as represented through the physical distance variable isn’t 
significant in this analysis however the shared continent and shared border variables are both 
positive and significant and capture the importance of physical proximity in investments to 
upper-middle income group countries. All four of the macroeconomic variables are positive 
and significant which confirms that when it comes to the income stratification of the sample, 
the macro variables prove to be especially important for any destination of FDI flows.  
 
High Income Group 
This regression has the highest number of observations, 7,476 and all of the variables are 
available. In terms of the significance of the variables, three of the four variable groups have 
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great consistency with the expected results while the proximity variable group has some 
exceptions.  
The institutional proximity variable group shows its two variables, the shared economic 
and political organisation and the shared origin of the legal system as positive and significant 
in predicting the FDI outflows to high income countries. This indicates that regardless of the 
fact that it may come to investing in rich countries which presumably have highly developed 
and adaptable institutions for foreign investments, direct investors still prefer to invest in 
countries where they have institutional similarity represented with the two variables in this 
group.  
In the cultural proximity group, all three variables have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. The shared history and shared language are positive and significant 
indicating the importance for countries to share this kind of cultural similarity regardless of 
the fact that it comes to investing among high income countries. The cultural distance index is 
negative and significant indicating that socio-cultural traits matter when there is a choice of 
investments in high income countries.  
The physical proximity group shows the greatest discrepancy with the general results with 
the physical distance variable being negative and significant as expected. The other two, the 
shared continent and shared border variables are negative and significant which indicates that 
when it comes to investing in rich countries, the distance matters less. All four of the 
macroeconomic variables are positive and highly significant indicating that the economic size 
and openness to trade aren’t negligible at any income level of the countries in the bilateral 
country pairs.  
5.4. Conclusion 
This segmented analysis of near-home bias in FDI flows shows that there is home country 
bias at regional and country levels, across time and various income country groups. The 
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geographic analysis confirms the general panel results from the previous chapter with the 
continent analysis offering much stronger evidence of near-home bias and the country 
analysis having greater specificity across countries.  
The time sub-period analysis splits the sample in two consistent with the capital market 
liberalisation period. One of the main logical reasons why this proneness from direct investors 
to near-home bias would be observed is the fact that there were many obstacles in the capital 
markets. If this is true then we should also observe these near-home bias effects lessen over 
time. This analysis finds no supporting evidence that would support that the near-home bias 
has diminished over time.  
Finally, FDI flows to countries of different income groups for different reasons. It can be 
observed that the home country bias is persistent across different country income groups. The 
direct investments outflows into high-income countries are strongly prone to institutional and 
cultural familiarity and proximity. The same can be observed for low-income countries.  This 
regression also shows that there is no substitute for good macroeconomic properties of 
countries. However, economic size isn’t something that can change overnight and most of the 
countries in the world can be considered to be average. If they wish to attract more FDI and 
subsequently enjoy the benefits to the economy that come with FDI inflows they should pay 
attention to taking advantage of any of the familiarity and proximity factors which seem to be 
especially important when the FDI decisions are made.  
Considering one behavioural finance concept such as near-home bias naturally leads to the 
question if other known issues in this area of finance might influence FDI flows. In the next 
chapter I consider the possibility that there might be herding among FDI investors which has 
been already documented for various investors in the equity markets.  
 175 
6. Herding in FDI Outflows 
6.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to test for the presence of herding in FDI outflows. 
Herding is a well known phenomenon in the equity markets but it hasn’t so far been tested in 
the context of FDI flows. Due to the capital markets liberalisation in the past twenty years 
there is an increased possibility for companies to invest abroad in a vast number of countries. 
This possibility makes them susceptible to the same issues like investors in the equity 
markets.  The data used in this analysis is as described in chapter 3. Tables 3.6a, 3.6b and 3.11 
provide the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the data used in the analysis in this 
chapter as discussed previously in the data chapter. In the sections below I develop the 
empirical model for the econometric analysis and further discuss the results.  
The term herding behaviour was initially used by economists to explain people’s proneness to 
follow fashions and fads (Rook, 2006). Its origins in social psychology refer to the instinctive 
tendency to behave like the others (Fiol and O’Connor, 2003). From an evolutionary stance it 
has an adaptive function (Devenow and Welch, 1996). Animals travel in herds to protect 
themselves against the unknown surroundings and it’s the same adaptive motivation behind 
the decisions of financial investors to follow others (Prechter, 2001). This phenomenon of 
herd behaviour has been well documented in the equity markets but it’s not at all common to 
see it in the context of FDI.  
There are several hypotheses tested in this chapter. First, I test whether FDI investors herd 
around a world leader and a regional leader contemporaneously (during the same time 
period). Then, I test to see if portfolio investors herd FDI investors and whether the amount of 
regional investments herds other FDI investors inter-temporally (in different time periods).  
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6.2. Model 
Measuring herding can be a very elusive task (Welch, 2000). It is usually defined 
(Sias, 2004) as investors buying or selling equity during the same period t, which means it’s 
perceived to occur simultaneously i.e. contemporaneously. Although it’s possible for herding 
to occur during the same period, it’s equally intuitive to think of herding as something that 
happens between periods (Choi and Sias, 2009) i.e. inter-temporally. The data in this study 
are aggregate annual data on FDI outflows which also indicate this dual possibility: herding 
during the same year and over time. Even though the FDI investments typically would require 
a longer time for a decision to be made, it’s quite possible that firms that are looking for a 
foreign direct investment would look to the perceived or actual leader in their field and make 
an investment mirroring that leader’s location decision during the same time period (a year). 
This would be more pronounced in the easier-to-transfer industries, such as the services 
industries, but it would also be the case with the resource seeking FDI. The leader would also 
be the company that has the most information for newly available resource destinations, so for 
example if a UK coffee manufacturer buys a new plant in Kenya instead of Brazil, this would 
be quickly perceived as a signal for better investment opportunities among less 
knowledgeable investors say, from smaller countries. I test for this kind of contemporaneous, 
reputational herding possibility by adapting the widely used Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) model which measures herding in the context of the difference in investments from an 
expected value, which in this case is the amount of investments that a leader makes. I adapt 
the model to test what determines this difference from a set of known FDI factors. Since there 
is no a priori benchmark value on what this difference should be, i.e. positive or negative as 
in the equity markets (where a positive difference indicates herding in buying and conversely, 
negative in selling), I consider it in absolute terms: big or small difference from the amount of 
investment in a country that a leader makes.  
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In the second case of inter-temporal herding I adapt a model from Choi and Sias (2009). The 
notion here is that there should be a positive correlation in the investments in the same equity, 
industry or in this case, FDI destination country. I further adapt the model following Choi and 
Sias (2009) to test whether an investment momentum is generated for a particular country by 
increased portfolio equity investments or total foreign direct investments from a country 
neighbourhood (region) which will herd FDI investors over time. 
    
6.2.1. Herding around a leader (contemporaneous analysis) 
The most frequently used herding measure in the literature is the one developed by 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) which defines the herding measure as herding by 
money managers who are buying into or selling out of stock i during quarter t 
(contemporaneously). The measure (H(i)) can be written as:  
 �� = � ����+ �� − ��  � – ���                           (6.1) 
Where: B(i) is the number of money managers who increase their holdings in the stock in the 
quarter (net buyers), S(i) is the number of money managers who decrease their holdings (net 
sellers), p(t) is the expected proportion of money managers buying in that quarter relative to 
the number active, and AF(i) is an adjustment factor. The adjustment factor in their case is to 
adjust for the possible differences in the number of money investors buying or selling stock i 
in each quarter.   
  
Herding around a world leader 
When the FDI outflows of this chapter are considered, I can define the investors in 
stock i,t, as the country i investing in country j at time t. In this case a proxy for the expected 
amount of investment i.e. the expected buyers of stock i,t can be proxied by the amount of 
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investment made to country j by the world leader (which in this study is set to be USA as the 
largest direct investor in the world) and as a proportion of the country’s GDP so that the two 
can be comparable. I do not include an adjustment factor; the data are aggregate country level 
data and the data don’t include the individual number of firms that have invested in a 
particular country, just their total value of investments. These investments are expressed as 
part of the country’s GDP so that the values are comparable among countries. Therefore, the 
equation above is transformed into:  
 
Hi,j,t  =  |  
FDI i ,j ,t
GDP i ,t
  −   FDI USA ,j,t
GDP USA ,t
 |                                                                          (6.2)                       
 
The introduction of a world leader is also consistent with the reputational theory as a 
possible reason for herding in equity markets. This measure should be considered in terms of 
greater and smaller value of the herding measure. This is not a formal measurement of 
herding but rather an indication of the degree of herding (less or more) with respect to the sets 
of factors that influence FDI flows. These factors have an expected influence (sign) on FDI 
flows (as discussed and analysed in the previous chapters) and the aim of this analysis is to 
detect how they influence this herding measure as defined in equation 6.2. An increase in the 
dependent variable (a positive effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable) 
indicates less herding (the difference in equation (6.2.) grows). Conversely a decrease in the 
dependent variable indicates more herding (the difference in equation (6.2.) lowers). 
Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses with respect to the different independent 
variables would be formulated as: 
- For GDP: 
H0: There is less herding when the GDP of the sending or receiving countries increases; 
H1: There is more herding when the GDP of the sending or receiving countries decreases;  
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- For Openness: 
H0: There is less herding when the OPENNESS of the sending or receiving countries 
increases; 
H1: There is more herding when the OPENNESS of the sending or receiving countries 
decreases;  
- For physical distance: 
H0: There is less herding when the DISTANCE between country i and j decreases; 
H1: There is more herding when the DISTANCE between country i and j increases;  
 -For shared continent and border:  
H0: There is less herding when country i and j share a CONTINENT or BORDER; 
H1: There is more herding when country i and j don’t share a CONTINENT or BORDER;  
-For institutional proximity:  
H0: There is less herding when country i and j share membership to the same ECONOMIC or 
POLITICAL ORGANISATION or share the same origin of the LEGAL SYSTEM; 
H1: There is more herding when country i and j don’t share membership to the same 
ECONOMIC or POLITICAL ORGANISATION or share the same origin of the LEGAL 
SYSTEM; 
  -For cultural proximity:  
H0: There is less herding when country i and j share a LANGUAGE or HISTORY; 
H1: There is more herding when country i and j don’t share a LANGUAGE or HISTORY; 
 -For cultural distance index: 
H0: There is less herding when country i and j are more CULTURALLY PROXIMATE; 
H1: There is more herding when country i and j are less CULTURALLY PROXIMATE; 
I expect there to be a greater difference (less herding) when the firms make their 
decisions to invest in j based on other criteria such (macroeconomic, familiarity factors) 
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whereas when this difference is smaller I expect that country i decided to follow the world 
leader into country j because it doesn’t have the familiarity factors in order to invest in j. In 
other words, investors from country i might wait until the world leader (USA) invests in 
country j and consider this to be a positive signal for the investment potential of country j and 
choose to invest in j themselves. In order to be able to test this premise we must consider 
several control factors (macroeconomic, physical, institutional and cultural distance) between 
the two countries i and j at time t. As noted above, time wise herding can be considered in two 
ways: contemporaneously if the data allow for this and inter-temporally (between periods). In 
this case I consider the distance from a world leader to occur contemporaneously i.e. within 
the same year.  
 
|FDI outflows i,j,t /GDPi,t – FDI outflows USA, j,t / GDPusa,t| = β0  +  
β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  
β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  
β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  
β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t               (6.3) 
                           
Where: 
FDI outflows are direct investment flows from the FDI outflows sending country i (OECD 
member towards an FDI receiving country j (any country of the world) at time t minus the 
FDI outflows of the perceived world leader, at time t. The dependent variables are:  a set of 
variables captures the main economic characteristics of the target country that one would 
expect to influence the investors. I use the GDP (GDPsend and GDPrec) for the both 
countries in the FDI bilateral relationship which is the first indicator of economic attraction 
for making and receiving investments. The country openness to trade has been noted to have a 
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stimulating influence on the FDI flows to that country and I represent this influence with the 
country’s exports plus import as a percent of GDP of the FDI outflows receiving and sending 
country.  
This group of variables is followed by proxies for the physical proximity impact on 
FDI outflows. Distance measures the direct distance between the two countries in the country 
pair and has an expected negative influence on FDI outflows. The second proxy is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the countries in the pair share a border. This is a variable 
that will show that if herding occurs whether it occurs especially in cross-border direct 
investments or it’s just general proximity that is more important for FDI flows.  
Finally, I include a set of institutional and cultural control variables to check for the influence 
of social and cultural proximity in addition to the effects of past FDI flows and portfolio 
equity investments and in a setting of varying levels distance and geographic areas. The four 
variables are: shared economic and political organisation, shared origin of the legal systems in 
the country pair, shared history and shared official or minority language between the two 
countries in the country pair. Together these four variables capture various aspects of cultural, 
social and political similarities between countries that are shown to have an effect on 
investors. The Hausman test below shows that fixed effects should be used. The Hausman test 
was previously discussed in greater detail in section 4.6.2.  
Table 6.1: Hausman Test for the econometric panel estimation in chapter 6 
 
Ho: there is no misspecification in the RE model  
H1: there is misspecification in the RE model, use FE 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: HAUSMANTEST   
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Period random 126.770973 11 0.0000 
     
     
 
       Reject H0   
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Herding around a regional leader 
By examining the herding measure as a distance in the amount invested per capita 
from a perceived world leader, the question of this relation in terms of a regional leader arises 
naturally. In this sample, there is the possibility to analyse regions in the context of 
continents: Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Americas. Due to a very small number of 
observations in the case of FDI outflows from the American continent (82 observations) I am 
unable to estimate this model. The same analysis as in the previous model is repeated except 
in this case the sample is limited to FDI outflows countries located on the same continent.  
Therefore, the model for this section is written in the same way as in the previous analysis as 
specified in equation 6.3., except in this case the sample is limited to FDI sending countries 
located on the European continent in the first case and in the Asia-Pacific region in the second 
case. The distance in investment is measured as distance from the UK and Japan for the 
European and Asia-Pacific region, respectively. The rest of the variables for this analysis are 
the same as previously specified.  
 
6.2.2. Herding in FDI (Inter-temporal analysis) 
The herding in the equity markets is most frequently measured as a deviation from the 
expected market values. The herding measure most commonly used is these studies is the one 
developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) defined as a statistic that measures the 
average tendency of money managers to buy and sell a particular stock at a particular time. 
Another approach to considering herding would be to adopt a more institutional measure and 
consider the number of countries investing in a particular destination during the same time 
period as well as across time periods. The herding among institutional investors (Choi and 
Sias, 2009) is defined as the correlation between institutional investors’ demand this period 
and last. This can be written as:  
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 ∆k,t  =  ∑ Dn ,k ,tNk ,tNk ,tn=1                                   (6.4) 
 
Where, D k,t is a dummy variable that’s equal to 1 if the institutional investor n increases his 
position in industry k in quarter t; N k,t  is the number of institutions trading in industry k at 
quarter t.  
Or in an expanded form: 
 
∆k;t =                                #Institutional buyers of industry k in quarter t  
 (#Institutional buyers of industry k in quarter t + #Institutional sellers of industry k in quarter t) 
                      (6.5) 
The herding measure then is expressed as the correlation between ∆k,t and ∆k,t-1. 
In the FDI context of this study, the same notion can be expressed by replacing the 
institutional investors with foreign direct investors from country i to country j at time t. Then 
the measure of ∆k,t from above becomes the number of country i’s that have invested in 
country j’s at time t divided by the total number of country i  that can invest in j, which is the 
total number of OECD countries in the sample (a maximum number of 30).  
When equation 6.4 is adapted, it can be written as: 
 
∆i,t  =  ∑ D i ,j ,tN i ,tN i ,tn=1                         (6.6) 
 
Where D i,j,t is the number of country i (FDI outflows sending countries) that have invested 
in country j (FDI outflows receiving country); Ni,t is the total possible number of countries i 
(sending countries) that could have invested in j (30 OECD countries and 170 possible j 
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countries in any of the years in this sample period of 1981-2005). From there, following Choi 
and Sias (2009) and Sias (2004) I can say that there is herding in FDI if there is strong, 
positive correlation between the ratio of the number of countries that have invested in j at time 
t and the number of countries that invested in j at time t-1 and the total number of countries 
that could have invested in j in the given time periods or:  
ρ (∆i,t, ∆i,t-1)                      (6.7) 
 Sias and Choi (2009) also use the lags of the institutional demand and returns to test whether 
the momentum they generate explains why institutional investors herd. They estimate the 
following regression:  
 
∆k,t = β1,t*∆k,t-1 +  β1,t * Rk,t-1 + εk,t                   (6.8) 
 
Where ∆k,t is the institutional demand as defined in the previous section; ∆k,t-1  is the 
institutional demand lag and Rk,t-1 is the industry returns lag in the quarterly regressions.  
Adapting from this framework, I am testing to see whether an increase (or investment 
momentum) in portfolio equity flows in the FDI receiving country will incite FDI investments 
in that market. I’m also testing to see whether a general momentum that’s created by the total 
regional amount of FDI flows to a receiving country influences FDI investors to also invest in 
that market. I test this in the general model, using the control.  
 
Portfolio investors herd FDI investors  
A market that is perceived as attractive for making portfolio investments may 
encourage direct investors to follow suit. Therefore the past and present equity portfolio flows 
attract FDI flows to the host market given the other control factors that I’ve used before.  
This econometric specification is written as the following:  
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FDI outflows i,j,t  = β0  +  
Β11 (PEI j,t) + β12 (PEI j,t-1) + β13 (PEI j,t-2) 
β21 log (GDPrec) + β22 log (GDPsend) + β23 log (Openness rec) + β24 log (Openness send) +  
β31 log (DIST i,j) + β32  SAMECONT + β33 BORDER +  
β41 ECONORGD + β42 LEGALOR +  
β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                          (6.9)  
 
Where PEI
 i,j,t,, PEI j,t-1, and PEI j,t-2  denotes the Portfolio Equity Investment (as described in the 
data section) for three periods, t, t-1 or t-2 for the FDI outflows receiving country j.  
 
Herding around the total regional FDI  
This analysis uses bilateral country pairs that are on the same continent. A new 
variable is constructed that denotes the amount of investments from one continent to a 
particular country but without the amount of FDI outflows from the sending country is being 
considered at the moment. So, if we’re considering Austria’s outflows to Slovenia at time t, 
the newly constructed variable would show the total amount of FDI outflows from all 
investing countries on the European continent in Slovenia at time t but without the FDI 
outflow of Austria to Slovenia in that year. This is done so that we can see whether countries 
from the same region (continent) follow each other’s lead in investing in the region.  
The econometric specification is written as follows:  
 
FDI outflows i,j,t  = β0  +  
Β11 (FDI ∑region-i, j,t) + β12 (FDI ∑region-i, j,t-1) + 
β21 log (GDPrec) + β22 log (GDPsend) + β23 log (Openness rec) + β24 log (Openness send) +  
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β31 log (DIST i,j) + β32  SAMECONT + β33 BORDER +  
β41 ECONORGD + β42 LEGALOR +  
β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                           (6.10) 
 
Where FDI ∑region -i, j,t, or FDI ∑region -i, j,t-1 denotes the total FDI outflows from Europe 
to country j less the FDI outflow of country i at time t and time t-1. The rest of the variables 
are as described in the data chapter (3).  
 
 
 
6.3. Herding in FDI outflows results 
 
The following section presents the results of the herding in FDI outflows analysis. It 
begins with a discussion on the contemporaneous herding analysis and continues with the 
inter-temporal analysis. The results for this chapter’s empirical analysis can be found in tables 
6.2 through to 6.6.  
 
6.3.1. Herding around a world leader  
This section presents the results for the herding in FDI outflows represented through 
the absolute difference in the level of FDI outflows of the sending country i and the US as a 
world leader. They can be found in table 6.2. When the difference in the level of investment 
to the US (or when the herding measure or the dependent variable in this analysis) is greater, 
then this indicates less herding and vice versa.  
With this interpretation in mind, the GDP of the sending country has a negative and 
significant sign indicating increasing herding from the FDI sending countries with higher 
GDP. The GDP of the receiving country is positive and significant indicating less herding as 
the FDI receiving country is richer. This could be interpreted in the context of one of the 
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explanations for herding in the literature: following the more informed investors. The richer 
the receiving country, the more likely it is that there will be more available investment 
information and greater institutional familiarity.  
The openness indicator of the FDI outflows sending country is negative indicating 
more herding when the sending country is more open. The openness of the receiving country 
is positive and significant indicating that there is less herding. This implies that there would 
be more herding in the case of investing in less open countries. 
In terms of physical proximity, results show that the physical distance and continent are 
negative and significant indicating that there is more herding when the countries are further 
apart and when they’re not on the same continent.  
From the results in table 6.2, we can see that from the institutional proximity 
variables, the shared legal system origin is significant and positive indicating less herding 
when the countries are more institutionally familiar. This is consistent with the findings in the 
previous chapters that the countries prefer to invest in places that are more institutionally 
familiar. The same finding is applied to the following variables of institutional and cultural 
familiarity. They are all positive and significant indicating less herding when the countries 
have these factors in common. The cultural distance index is negative and significant 
indicating less herding when the cultural distance between the countries is smaller.  
These results show that OECD member countries prefer to invest in familiar places however 
when it comes to investment in otherwise unfamiliar places, then they would choose to follow 
the investment destinations of the US.  
6.3.2. Herding around a regional leader  
This section presents the results which can be found in table 6.3, for the herding in 
FDI outflows represented as following one of the two regional leaders: UK and Japan which 
represent regional leaders for Europe and Asia-Pacific, respectively. I expect the same  
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 Table 6.2. Herding around a world leader (US);  
 
Dependent variable is |FDIoutflows i,j,t / GDPsend - FDIoutflowsusa,j,t / GDPusa | 
which is the absolute value of the foreign direct investment outflow from country i to country 
j at time t,  divided by country i’s GDP minus the FDI outflows of the US to country j at time 
t divided by US’s GDP; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI 
receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of 
the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over 
GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in 
kilometres; shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared 
economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership 
in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i 
and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j 
share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country 
i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been 
part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** 
stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; The coefficients 
have been multiplied by 10^5. 
 
 |FDI outflowsi,j,t / GDPsend –FDI 
outflowsusa,j,t / GDPusa| 
 
C 8.66 *** 
L GDP SEND -1.18 *** 
L GDP REC 0.10 *** 
openness REC 0.06 *** 
Openness SEND -1.03 *** 
L Distance -0.44 *** 
Continent dummy -0.23 ** 
BORDER -0.09 NA 
Ec. Organisation 0.10 *** 
Legal origin 0.08 *** 
Language 0.10 * 
History 0.25 *** 
CD index -0.07 *** 
Adj.R^2                   0.31 
 
Observations (N)                  7,503 
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findings as in the previous analysis: more herding when there is less common factors between 
the country pairs. The dependent variable here represents the absolute difference in the 
amount invested (divided by GDP) GDP with respect to the regional leader’s investment in 
the same country j.  
 
 
European Leader – United Kingdom 
In the case of the UK, the same results for the macroeconomic variables can be found, 
as with the world leader analysis. There is less herding as the GDP of the receiving country 
grows indicating that in the case of big markets, there is less herding because firms will try to 
invest in bigger markets regardless of the familiarity levels i.e. if the market is big enough 
they will go seek to acquire the necessary information. The sending country’s GDP has a 
negative sign, indicating that there is more herding among the sending countries with higher 
GDP. Even though there is no particular theoretical expectation that this should be so one 
explanation for this could be the nature of the sample. In this case the FDI sending country is 
an OECD member and the countries that have provided more data are also the ones with a 
higher GDP which in this case appears as they are herding more than the rest.  
Of the two country openness indicators the trade openness of the sending country is negative 
and significant indicating more herding for more open sending countries, a result that is 
consistent with the GDP of the sending country.  
Of the physical proximity indicators, all three variables in this group are negative and 
significant indicating more herding when there is greater physical distance between countries, 
more herding when the countries are on a different continent and when they don’t share a 
border. This is to be expected as typically, companies are less familiar with faraway 
investment opportunities and would choose to follow the ‘more knowledgeable’ investors 
from the region, in this case – the UK.   
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Table 6.3. Herding around a regional leader (UK or Japan);  
 
Dependent variable is |FDIoutflowsi,j,t / GDPsend - FDIoutflows(reg.leader),j,t / 
GDP(reg.leader),t| which is the absolute value of the foreign direct investment outflow from 
country i to country j at time t,  divided by country i’s GDP minus the FDI outflows of the 
regional leader (UK or Japan) to country j at time t divided by the regional leader’s GDP; 
Country i is located on the same continent as the regional leader. The FDI flows are from the 
FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the 
GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the 
physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border dummy (value of 
one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political 
organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their 
legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or 
language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to 
having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the 
cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White 
(1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; The coefficients have been multiplied by 10^5. 
 
 |FDI outflowsi,j,t / GDPsend – FDI 
outflowsuk,j,t / GDPuk| 
|FDIoutflowsi,j,t/GDPsend -  
FDIoutflowsjpn,j,t/GDPjpn| 
C 6.35 *** 17.80 *** 
L GDP REC 0.05 ** 0.21 *** 
L GDP SEND -0.75 *** -2.99 *** 
openness REC 0.04 * 0.15 ** 
Openness SEND -2.47 *** 2.76 *** 
L Distance -0.35 *** -0.67 *** 
Continent dummy -0.14 *** 0.02  
BORDER -0.23 ***                   NA  
Ec. Organisation 0.14 *** 0.32 *** 
Legal origin 0.09 *** 0.21 ** 
Language 0.07  0.19  
History 0.32 *** 0.15 ** 
CD index -0.06 *** -0.12 *** 
#N 7,827  737  
Adj.R^2 0.26                        0.59 
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The five variables for the institutional and cultural familiarity between the country 
pairs are positive and significant except in the case of the shared language and the cultural 
distance index which is expected to be negative. There is less herding when the country pair 
countries share: the same economic or political organisation; share the same origin of the 
legal system and the same history, while as the cultural distance between two nations grows, 
there would be more herding. These results indicate that when the countries have greater 
institutional and cultural familiarity they tend to herd less or put in other words, when the 
company isn’t familiar with an investment destination, it will choose to follow the regional 
leader – the UK.  
 
Asia-Pacific Leader – Japan 
In the case of Asia-Pacific, I find the same overall results as in the case of Europe. The 
GDP of the receiving country is positive while the one for the FDI sending country is 
negative indicating the same results as above, less herding when the GDP of the receiving  
country is greater while there is more herding among the richer sending countries in the 
Asian-Pacific region. Both of the country openness indicators are positive which, shows less 
herding with greater country openness. Greater physical distance increases herding in the 
Asian-Pacific region. There is less herding when the countries share institutional familiarity: 
the same economic or political organisation membership and same origin of the legal system. 
The cultural distance index also suggests less herding when the cultural distance between two 
nations is greater and less herding when the two countries share the same history.  
Overall, I find that companies would take investment cues from the regional leader, 
UK or Japan when they don’t have any economic, proximity, institutional or cultural 
familiarity factors to guide their way in choosing an investment destination.  
 
 
 192 
. 
 
 
 
  
Table 6.3. Herding around a regional leader (UK or Japan);  
 
Dependent variable is |FDIoutflowsi,j,t / GDPsend - FDIoutflows(reg.leader),j,t / 
GDP(reg.leader),t| which is the absolute value of the foreign direct investment outflow from 
country i to country j at time t,  divided by country i’s GDP minus the FDI outflows of the regional 
leader (UK or Japan) to country j at time t divided by the regional leader’s GDP; Country i is located 
on the same continent as the regional leader. The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country 
towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving 
country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports 
over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in 
kilometres; shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic 
or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same 
economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same 
origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official 
language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with 
respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the 
cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are based on standard 
errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  
Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively; The coefficients have been multiplied by 10^5 
 
 |FDI outflowsi,j,t / GDPsend – FDI 
outflowsuk,j,t / GDPuk| 
|FDIoutflowsi,j,t/GDPsend -  
FDIoutflowsjpn,j,t/GDPjpn| 
C 6.35 *** 17.80 *** 
L GDP REC 0.05 ** 0.21 *** 
L GDP SEND -0.75 *** -2.99 *** 
openness REC 0.04 * 0.15 ** 
Openness SEND -2.47 *** 2.76 *** 
L Distance -0.35 *** -0.67 *** 
Continent dummy -0.14 *** 0.02  
BORDER -0.23 ***                             NA  
Ec. Organisation 0.14 *** 0.32 *** 
Legal origin 0.09 *** 0.21 ** 
Language 0.07  0.19  
History 0.32 *** 0.15 ** 
CD index -0.06 *** -0.12 *** 
#N 7,827   737  
Adj.R^2 0.26                  0.59 
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6.3.3. Inter-temporal analysis of herding in FDI flows 
This section discusses the results of the inter-temporal approach to considering 
herding that was estimated following Sias and Choi (2009). The results of the correlation as 
described in equation 6.6 and 6.7 are presented are presented below in table 6.4.  
Table 6.4. Inter-temporal correlation in FDI outflows 
CONTINENT OF THE 
RECEIVING COUNTRY 
CORRELATION ρ (∆I,T, ∆I,T-1) NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS 
All countries (j) 95% 2,616 
EUROPE (as receiving 
continent) 
92% 750 
Asia (as receiving continent) 94% 632 
Africa (as receiving continent) 91% 616 
Americas (as receiving 
continent) 
95% 531 
Pacific (as receiving continent) 92% 87 
 
The table (6.4) shows the correlations results for the whole panel dataset and 
separately for countries that are receiving the FDI outflows and are located on any of the five 
continents. We can see that there is a very high overall correlation between the number of 
countries that have invested in county j at time t and the number of countries that have 
invested in country j at time t-1.   
 
6.3.4. Portfolio investors are herding direct investors 
This table (6.5) presents the results when portfolio investors are herding direct 
investors. Portfolio equity investors generate momentum in a country market which is 
expected to stimulate FDI flows to that country. When direct investors see the increased 
activity in the equity market of the receiving country they will be stimulated to invest there.  
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Table 6.5 shows four regressions with different combinations of lags of portfolio 
equity investments in the receiving country. The expectation is that the portfolio equity flows 
will be significant in explaining the FDI flows to the receiving country. It is expected that the 
PEI will generate investment momentum in the market which will in turn incite and 
encourage FDI investors. This is because intuition tells us that an increased activity in the 
equity markets signals that such a market is a better investment option compared to a market 
that doesn’t have an increase in the equity markets investments.  Due to data availability I am 
only able to include the PEI at time t, t-1 and t-2. The results show that the PEI in the FDI 
receiving country are significant at the second lag (t-2) with the others being insignificant. 
This indicates that it would take at least 2 years after the local market has had an increased 
PEI activity for the direct investors to perceive it as an attractive investment destination. This 
finding points to a need for further lags to be examined in a dataset that would allow for that.  
The rest of the variables (in the main analysis with three time periods) have the 
expected signs consistent with the previous findings. The GDP of the sending country as well 
as the openness to trade for both the sending and receiving countries have a positive and 
stimulating effect on the FDI outflows when portfolio equity flows are also considered in the 
receiving country. The main puzzling finding in this analysis is the sign on the distance and 
continent variables which should have negative and positive signs respectively but in this 
analysis the opposite can be observed. In the data chapter (3) I noted that the correlation 
between these two variables can be considered high (81%) and it is very likely that in this 
particular analysis this is the reason for the observed inconsistency in the results of these two 
variables. From the rest of the variables, the shared border and shared economic and political 
organisation aren’t significant. The shared legal origin variable is positive and significant for 
FDI flows once the PEI in the receiving country are considered. 
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Table 6.5. Portfolio investors herd direct investors;  
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to country i from 
country j at time t; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory 
variables are: Portfolio Equity Investments (PEI) in the FDI receiving country at time t, t-1 or t-2; Log of the 
GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports 
plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) 
for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared 
border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal 
origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if 
country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i 
and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same 
country) and the cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are based on standard 
errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed 
effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 
PEI t  PEI t -1  PEI t-2  PEI t;t-
1;t-2 
 
C -5.22 *** -5.14 *** -5.07 *** -5.02 ***  
L PEI rec, t 000      0.00   
L PEI rec, t-1   0.01 *   0.00   
L PEI rec, t-2     0.01 ** 0.01 **  
L GDP REC 0.71 *** 0.72 *** 0.72 *** 0.01 *  
L GDP SEND 0.73 *** 0.73 *** 0.73 *** 0.72 ***  
Openness REC 0.32 *** 0.31 *** 0.30 *** 0.72 ***  
Openness SEND 2.62 *** 2.61 *** 2.60 *** 0.29 ***  
L Distance -0.53 *** -0.54 *** -0.57 *** 2.61 ***  
Continent dummy 0.03  0.02  0.01  -0.57 ***  
BORDER 0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01   
Ec. Organisation 0.16 *** 0.16 *** 0.13 *** -0.01   
Legal origin 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.14 *** 0.13 ***  
Language 0.32 *** 0.31 *** 0.30 *** 0.13 ***  
History 0.35 *** 0.35 *** 0.35 *** 0.29 ***  
CD index -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** 0.34 ***  
Adj.R^2 0.48  0.48  0.48  0.48   
Observations (N) 9,030  8,219  8,219  7,692   
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In the cultural proximity group, the shared history and shared language variables are both 
positive and significant indicating greater FDI outflows among culturally proximate countries 
when the PEI are also considered. The positive sign for the cultural distance index is contrary 
to the expectation in this regression.  
This analysis shows that portfolio equity investments in one country have a 
stimulating effect on FDI investments with a lag of at least two years for this to take effect. 
The portfolio activity generates a certain momentum of future direct investments but due to 
data restrictions we cannot see results of more time lags.  
 
6.3.5. Total regional FDIs herd other investors 
The results in table 6.6 show whether an increase in the total amount of regional 
(European) investments to country j will attract further investments from country i into 
country j. The aim here is to detect whether firms follow the investment inclinations of the 
neighbourhood (region). The dataset only allows for the European investments to country j 
only at time t and t-1 to be estimated. The same data constrains prevent me from performing 
the same analysis for the other two regions: Asia-Pacific and America, as they have a much 
smaller overall number of observations than Europe. Therefore the regional analysis for this 
particular context will be limited to the European region.   
If we focus only on the newly added variable, the total regional FDI investments to 
country j, the results show that the investments are significant only at time t with the first lag 
being insignificant. This finding indicates that these results aren’t very consistent. The rest of 
the variables which are part of the model are expected to have signs as in the previous 
analyses in chapters 4 and 5. The physical distance has a negative effect on FDI outflows in 
the European region. The shared legal origin does have a positive effect on the FDI outflows 
among European countries as does the shared language indicating that cultural and 
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Table 6.6. Total Regional (European) direct investments herd other investors;  
 
Dependant variable is log (FDI outflows i,j,t) which equals foreign direct investment inflow to 
country i from country j at time t; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the 
FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Total European FDI outflows to country j at time t, t-
1 or t-2; The country i is excluded from the European total because that value is represented on the 
dependant variable side;  Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI 
sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving 
country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the 
log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border dummy (value 
of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value 
of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same 
legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared 
language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); 
shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial 
relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on 
Kogut and Singh (1988). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, 
**, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively; 
 
 EUR j, t-1 EUR j, t-1 EUR j, t, t-1 
C -1.71 *** -4.79 *** -6.38 *** 
LOG EUR to j, t 0.01    0.02 *** 
LOG EUR to j, t-1   0.00  0.00  
L GDP REC 0.04  0.43 *** 0.58 *** 
L GDP SEND 0.83 *** 0.78 *** 1.05 *** 
Openness REC 0.46 *** 0.40 *** 0.70 *** 
Openness SEND 4.86 *** 5.82 *** 5.23 *** 
L Distance -0.98 *** -0.62 *** -0.99 *** 
Border -0.19 *** 0.18  -0.32 *** 
Ec. Organisation NA *** 0.19 * -1.32 *** 
Legal origin 0.27  0.09  0.34 *** 
Language 0.00 *** 0.83 *** 0.86 *** 
History 0.24 *** 0.25  0.16  
CD index -0.05 *** 0.02  0.05 *** 
Adj.R^2 0.45  0.57  0.62  
Observations (N) 953  728  198  
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institutional familiarity still plays a role in FDI outflows despite the fact that there is an 
increased investing from the neighbourhood. The greater the GDP of the sending and 
receiving country the greater the FDI outflows among the European countries and similarly, 
the greater the trade openness the greater the FDI outflows among European countries.  
There are some unexpected signs in the same variables: the cultural distance index has 
a positive sign: The shared border also has a negative sign conversely to the expectation 
however this result is probably due to the fact that this analysis considers only European 
countries. The economic organisation dummy has a negative sign which is also not expected 
and indicates that more FDI flows happen between European countries that don’t have this 
trait in common, contrary to the previous findings. However, this small sample analysis 
considers only the European countries which is probably why this finding might be observed. 
Another inconsistency is the positive sign for the cultural distance index in the last regression 
which is expected to have a negative influence on the European FDI flows.  
These results appear to indicate that FDI flows are increasing simultaneously as the 
total sum of the investments from the regional neighbourhood, judging by the last estimation 
in table 6.6. However, this analysis must be taken with caution because the results aren’t very 
robust and due to lack of data to test with other time period lags.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
I test for herding in the context of the difference in investment amount from world and 
regional leaders and through the influence of the PEI and total regional investments in 
different time periods. I find supporting evidence for herding in FDI outflows at an aggregate 
and regional level.  
First, I find that the herding is secondary to the familiarity factors and occurs in the cases 
when companies do not have the institutional and cultural proximity to another country. The 
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difference in the amount invested from a world or a regional leader falls when companies 
don’t have other factors of economic activity or familiarity. In such cases they follow the 
investment pattern of the world leader, the US or the regional leaders, the UK and Japan. This 
finding is consistent also with the home country bias findings.  
Next I find that FDI investors are, prone to choose an investment location with a high 
portfolio equity investment activity at least after two years. That means that it takes two years 
for direct investment to be generated from an increased activity in the equity markets. Finally 
I find inconclusive evidence that suggests that increased FDI investments from the 
neighbourhood into one country will encourage the country to also choose that country as an 
FDI destination.  
Overall, I can conclude that when it comes to unfamiliar territory, companies aren’t 
discouraged to invest but rather choose the investments made by a world or a regional leader 
as a signal for an investment destination. This finding also suggests that the effects of herding 
in FDI are secondary to the effects of near-home bias which guides investments according to 
several familiarity factors.  
Given the fact that FDIs are of benefit to any economy and that many of the developing 
countries are actively seeking to attract them it would be prudent to estimate which factors 
increase the probability of having FDI flows and by how much so that countries would be 
able to tailor their policies in order to attract more FDI flows. This question is further 
examined and is the focus of the study in the next chapter (7).   
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7. Probability of Attracting FDI Flows 
7.1. Introduction 
 
While there might not be a lot that can be done in a short time frame in terms of changing 
a country’s macroeconomic environment (GDP, trade openness) and its geographical 
proximity to potential direct investors is fairly permanent, the institutional and cultural factors 
are something that can be changed or addressed in order to make the country more attractive 
for FDIs. Institutional alignment and change is something that is already a reality among the 
EU member countries however those countries make up for approximately 15% of the total 
number of countries in the world. For smaller, developing or emerging countries FDI inflows 
are often considered to be a lifeline in the perception of their citizens and consequently 
they’re frequently a favoured political campaign promise. Therefore it is very important to see 
how certain factors influence the probability of FDI flows considering that countries are 
always competing to attract more FDI. I find results to support this expectation: greater 
institutional and cultural proximity increase the probability of FDI outflows and inflows and 
this finding is the case at a global, regional and country level.  
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the probability of FDI flows occurring between 
two countries using the FDI groups of factors established in Chapter 4. Positive FDI flows are 
denoted as net decreases in assets (FDI outflows) and net increases in liabilities (FDI inflows) 
and are recorded as credits in the balance of payments. By considering both the positive 
values and the non-relationship (zero FDI) values it would examined whether the probability 
of a direct investment occurring indeed increases among countries that are more proximate 
and countries that have more in common and the effect that these determinants have on this 
probability could be quantified. This can be estimated using a probabilistic (binary dependent 
variable) type of model. I use probit to estimate the probability of an FDI relationship 
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between two countries going from zero to a positive investment and the effect of the 
determinants on this probability.  
Using a binary dependant variable method set to be zero if there isn’t an FDI relationship 
between country i and j and 1 if there is a positive relationship will show how the 
aforementioned factors increase or decrease the probability of an FDI relationship between 
two countries occurring. I estimate the marginal effect that each independent variable has on 
this probability of having an FDI relationship between two countries. The basic descriptive 
statistics for the analysis in this chapter, previously discussed in chapter 3, can be found in 
tables 3.7a;b and 3.10a;b. 
 
7.2. Model  
I analyse four groups of factors that influence the probability of having an FDI 
relationship using a probit regression analysis in the context of the probability of having a 
general FDI flows relationship between two countries in a country pair in order to identify 
which factors help in having above average FDI flows. This is important since most countries 
strive to attract more FDI flows in their economies as this has generally beneficial effects for 
the overall economy.  
For the purpose of this analysis I consider positive FDI inflows or outflows and data 
on no-FDI relationship (zero FDI). The main descriptive statistics for this analysis are 
presented in tables 3.7a;b and 3.11a;b and were discussed in the data sections (in chapter 3). 
The number of observations for the analyses in this chapter have increased to 22,989 
observations with 2,872 unique bilateral pairs for FDI outflows and 25,390 and 3,066 unique 
country pairs for FDI inflows, because of the addition of the zero FDI observations. 
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Estimation technique 
  The linear probability response models (logit, probit, etc.)  are techniques for 
analysing the relationship between fixed level independent variables and a dependent variable 
that’s constrained to vary between 0 and 1. Below I discuss the econometric representation of 
a probit model following Gujarati (2004, ch.15).  
Using OLS for econometric estimations when the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable (a qualitative variable) presents a number of problems such as: non-normality of the 
errors (ui,j,t); heteroskedastic variances of the errors; questionable value of the R2 as a measure 
of the goodness of fit and non-fulfilment of the conditional probability that the event 
occurring in the dependent variable given the independent variables will move between 0 and 
1. The probabilistic models (like logit and probit) will guarantee that the estimated 
probabilities of the dependent variable will lie within the 0-1 limits. Therefore, one would 
need a (probability) model that has these two crucial features: as the independent variables 
(Xi,j,t) increase, the conditional probability that the event in dependent variable will occur 
given the independent variables [Pi = E(Y = 1 | X)] increases but never steps outside the 0–1 
interval, and that the relationship between Pi and Xi,j,t  is nonlinear, that is, it approaches zero 
at slower and slower rates as (Xi,j,t)  gets small and approaches one at slower and slower rates 
as (Xi,j,t)  gets very large. The two most commonly used conditional probability models are 
logit (uses a cumulative logistic function) and probit (uses a normal cumulative distribution 
function and is sometimes also known as normit).  
Both logit and probit methods would give similar results. The finer point differences 
between the two techniques are beyond the scope of this thesis. In the FDI literature studies 
use both logit and probit but the probit is has been used slightly more frequently in more 
recent studies. Therefore, I also use it for this study.  
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This chapter uses a dependent variable that represents a decision of country i to invest 
in country j at time t. This decision depends on an unobservable utility index Ui,j,t (or a latent 
variable, or a threshold) that is determined by several explanatory variables [� �γ ����=4�=1 ] in such 
a way that the greater the value of this Ui,j,t, the greater the probability of a country i investing 
in a country j at time t. This can be represented with the following equation: 
 
 Ui,j,t = β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4) + ui,j,t                                                      (7.1.) 
 
Where: [i, j, t, denote FDI flows from county i to j and time, respectively]; γ1 is for the 
macroeconomic variables that denote the economic size of the markets and the country 
openness; γ2 is for the physical proximity group; γ3 represents the institutional proximity 
variable group and the final group is the cultural distance group, γ4;  
The further specified econometric specification of these variables is as follows:  
Ui,j,t (outflows) = β0  +  
β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  
β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  
β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  
β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                               (7.2.a) 
 
Ui,j,t (inflows) = β0  +  
β11 log (GDPrec) + β12 log (GDPsend) + β13 log (Openness rec) + β14 log (Openness send) +  
β21 log (DIST i,j) + β22  SAMECONT + β23 BORDER +  
β31 ECONORGD + β32 LEGALOR +  
β43 SAMEHIST + β44 COMLANG + β45 CDindex   + εi,j,t                                                   (7.2.b) 
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This utility index Ui,j,t  is related to the actual decision of a country to invest or not invest in 
country j by way of a critical or threshold level or the index Ui,j,t* such that if Ui,j,t exceeds 
this critical value of Ui,j,t*, there will be an FDI flow from country i to country j at time t. This 
threshold Ui,j,t* is unobservable but it’s assumed to be normally distributed with the same 
mean and variance.  Given the assumption of normality, the probability that  Ui,j,t* is less than 
or equal to Ui,j,t can be computed from the standardized CDF as:  
 
Pi = P(Y=1| X) = P (Ui,j,t* < Ui,j,t) = P (Zi < β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4)) =  
F (β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4))             (7. 3) 
 
Where P(Y=1| γ) means the probability that the event specified by the binary dependent 
variable will occur given the values of the explanatory factors (jointly) denoted by γ. The 
events in this case are specified as either:  
 
 Yi,j,t (for either FDI outflows or inflows) 
 
 
    = 0 (no FDI flows relationship) 
Yi,j,t    
             = 1 (positive FDI flows relationship) 
 
 
Continuing to explain equation (7.3), Zi is the standard normal variable i.e. Z ~ N (0, σ2). F is 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) which when written explicitly in 
the present context is:  
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F (Ui,j,t) = 1√2� ∫ �−�22��Ui,j,t−∞  = F (Ui,j,t) = 
=  
1√2� ∫ �−�22��β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4)−∞                 (7.4) 
 
 
Since P represents the probability that an event will occur, here - the probability of county i 
investing in country j at time t, it is measured by the area of the standard normal curve from 
−∞ to Ui,j,t. To obtain information on this utility index Ui,j,t as well as on the regression 
coefficients β 4
1
, the inverse of equation 7.2 would be taken to obtain:  
 
Ui,j,t = F-1(Ui,j,t) = F-1 (Pi)= (β0 + β1(γ1) + β2(γ2) + β3(γ3) + β4(γ4))            (7.5)
  
 
Where F-1 is the inverse CDF; In order to obtain the index values of (Ui,j,t) and the values for 
the coefficients β 4
1
, a level for all the explanatory variables γ 4
1
 would first have to be set and 
then calculate.  
 
Marginal Effects of the independent variables 
In the context of the probabilistic models, the quantitative impact that each of the 
independent variables have on the dependent variable is called a marginal effect. In linear 
models such as the OLS, the relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
has perfect proportionality because of the linear nature of the model. The probabilistic models 
are non-linear and therefore each independent variable has a different marginal effect on the 
dependent for every observation in the sample. Each of these marginal effects for every 
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independent variable can be estimated using an econometric software package (Eviews in this 
case). Once they are calculated, they can be used for interpretation simply by taking the 
average of all of the individual marginal effects for all observations per independent variable. 
For example, the marginal effect that the shared border has on the dependent variable in any 
of the estimations in this chapter is the mean of the individual marginal effects for all 
observations in the shared border variable. The interpretation of the marginal effect that the 
independent variable has on the probability whether there will be FDI flows between two 
countries is interpreted through a unit change in the independent variable.  In the case of the 
independent variables which are also dummy variables the interpretation is straightforward 
and if for example the shared border variable had a marginal effect of 5% on the dependent 
variable this would be interpreted as a 5% increase of the probability of having an FDI 
relationship between two countries when the two countries in the bilateral pair share a border. 
In the case when the independent variables aren’t dummy variables but are estimated with 
logarithms the interpretation is slightly more complex. The marginal effect for each 
independent variable is an average of the marginal effects for all observations of that variable 
in the regression. Therefore I would also have to take into account the average value of the 
independent variable for which I wish to interpret the marginal effect. For an independent 
variable that has the form of log (x) a unit increase in the log (x) means a 100% increase in x 
(the original value of the variable). Thus, if the average GDP of the receiving country is 
around $US 400 billion and it has a marginal effect of e.g. 15% the interpretation would be an 
increase of 400 billion in the GDP would increase the probability of an FDI flow between two 
countries by 15%. Obviously, the interpretations for these variables are a greater 
approximation because it’s an average from a lot of different countries and one would have to 
look at specific country observations to get a better idea of the country specific sensitivity to 
changes in GDP for example.   
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7.3. Probability of attracting FDI flows results  
 
This section discusses the findings of the probit analysis of FDI flows. I test to see if the 
chosen factors increase the probability of an FDI relationship taking place between two 
countries and if so, by how much. Thus the dependant variable takes the value of 1 if the there 
is a reported positive FDI inflow or outflow and zero if there is a zero relationship reported.  
I show how the probability of having FDI flows between two countries increases through the 
previously established sets of variable groups: macroeconomic, physical, institutional and 
cultural proximity. Similarly to the empirical analysis in the previous chapters, I also show 
this analysis on a regional and country level. In this chapter, the country analysis for several 
countries is unavailable due to data restrictions coming from either a generally insufficient 
number of observations or an unsuitable cross section to time dimension ratio for the 
estimations to be executed by the software program. Thus the country-level results should be 
interpreted with caution.  
 
7.3.1. Probability of having an FDI relationship (full panel)  
Table 7.1 shows results for the probability of a relationship occurring between the FDI 
inflows and outflows bilateral country pairs. The results are consistent with the findings in 
chapters 4 & 5 and all the signs of the variables have the expected influence on the probability 
of an FDI relationship occurring between two countries. Table 7.1 shows the coefficients of 
the independent variables in the probit analysis as well as their individual average marginal 
effect on the dependent variable which will give us a clearer picture on the magnitude of the 
impact that the factors have on FDI flows. The marginal effects are interpreted as percentages. 
The interpretation of the marginal effect that the independent variable has on the probability 
whether there will be FDI flows between two countries is interpreted through a unit change in 
the independent variable whatever the unit of the dependent variable is.      
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FDI outflows  
The results for FDI outflows are presented on the right-hand side of table 7.1. The 
institutional and cultural familiarity factors are positive and significant with the exception of 
the cultural distance index which is expected to be negative. The shared membership of an 
economic or a political organisation will increase the probability of having FDI flows by 3%. 
This factor, albeit not terribly strong, is something that is country policy-dependent and by 
knowing this fact, countries should seek to join the international organisations in order to 
benefit from increased FDIs. The shared origin of the legal system which represents an 
institutional familiarity has a stimulating effect on the probability of having an FDI outflow to 
a particular destination. Sharing a legal system origin will increase the probability of having 
an FDI relationship with the other country by 2%. With this in mind, although the legal 
system can’t be dramatically changed, countries should seek to implement solutions which 
would make the institutional organisation more familiar to all investors by either making the 
legal environment in co-ordinance with the international or perhaps complementary to the 
countries with which the country in question shares a membership to an economic and 
political organisation. Shared history between countries increases the probability of having 
FDI flows among them by 14%. Since having history in common isn’t something that can be 
amended, countries should take advantage of this significant effect that this familiarity has on 
FDI flows and orient their policy in a direction that stimulates and facilitates investment ties 
with countries with which they have history in common. This variable consists of having 
shared a colonial past of any sort and having been in the same country sometime in the past. 
Since the predominant colonial relationships are in Africa or South America and many of  
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Table 7.1.  Probability of having an FDI flows relationship - full panel 
 
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is an FDI relationship between country i to j at time t; The 
FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the 
GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI 
sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if 
country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if 
country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same 
official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to 
having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based 
on Kogut and Singh (1988). The z-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
 
 
FDI inflows FDI inflows 
average 
marginal effect 
on dep. variab. 
FDI outflows FDI outflows average 
marginal effect on 
dependent variable 
Variable  
Y=1 (FDI relationsh.) Y=1 (FDI relationsh.) 
Y=0 ( no relationsh.) Y=0 ( no relationsh.) 
C 
-10.03 *** n/a -10.97 *** n/a 
(Log) GDPrec 
0.84 *** 0.18 0.91 *** 0.17 
(Log) GDP send 
1.22 *** 0.26 1.43 *** 0.26 
Openness rec 
0.70 *** 0.15 0.25 *** 0.05 
Openness send 
0.57 *** 0.12 0.75 *** 0.14 
(Log) Distance 
-0.46 *** -0.10 -0.47 *** -0.09 
Same Continent 
0.25 *** 0.05 0.44 *** 0.09 
Border 
0.33 *** 0.07 -0.01  -0.001 
Shared Econ. Org. 
0.61 *** 0.13 0.14 *** 0.03 
Same Legal System 
0.23 *** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.02 
Shared History 
0.63 *** 0.14 0.75 *** 0.14 
Shared Language  
0.67 *** 0.15 0.39 *** 0.07 
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
-0.01 *** -0.02 0.01 *** 0.002 
N 13,802 
 
13,838 
 
N of y =1 9,758  11,304  
N of y=0 4,044  2,534  
McFadden  R2 0.37 
 
0.31 
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these countries are also developing countries that depend on FDI know-how and 
technological spillovers, they should seek to exploit this fact in order to get more FDI from 
the other countries with which they no doubt share similar culture and perhaps institutional 
similarity. The shared language also has a stimulating influence on the probability of having 
FDI flows. It will increase the probability that the two countries in the pair have an FDI 
relationship by 7%. Similarly with the shared history, the languages aren’t something that can 
be changed, however countries could seek to promote investments between countries with 
which they share this trait in common or adapt the institutional aspects of foreign direct 
investing to investors with lesser familiarity. In the case of FDI outflows the cultural distance 
index is significant but doesn’t have the expected negative sign. Furthermore, it only has a 
negligible marginal effect on having an FDI relationship of 0.2% (when compared to the other 
factors). I expect that when the cultural distance between two countries is smaller, the 
probability of having FDI flows will be higher.   
In the physical proximity group, the shared border isn’t significant in the case of FDI 
outflows. The distance has a negative impact on the probability of FDI outflows, indicating 
that on average, as the distance grows by approximately 6000 km, the probability of having an 
FDI relationship with another country falls by 9%. This isn’t a factor that can be changed with 
anything other than perhaps progress in the means of production and transport but it’s surely 
within limited reach of country policy changes. The same is true for countries that are located 
on the same continent, there isn’t much that can be changed about this even though the result 
shows that there is a 9% greater probability to have FDI flows in the two countries are on the 
same continent.  
The greater the GDP or both the sending and receiving countries, the greater the probability 
that there will be and FDI outflow from county i to j at time t. On average, an increase in the 
GDP of the receiving country by around $US 400 billion will increase the probability of 
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having an FDI flow between two average countries by 17% while an average increase in the 
GDP of the sending country by around US$ 1 trillion (the average of the GDP of the FDI 
outflows sending country is much greater than the average for the receiving country in this 
sample) will increase the probability of an FDI outflow from one country to a country where 
there hasn’t been an FDI investment by 26%.  The same is true for the country openness to 
trade – it increases the probability of FDI outflows to country j,t. An increase in the openness 
to trade (a percent of exports plus imports over GDP)  of the receiving country by around 75% 
will increase the probability of FDI occurring by 5% while an increase in the sending 
country’s openness by approximately 69% will increase making an FDI by 14%. This result is 
consistent with the externalization theory of FDI flows which states that the MNEs will first 
start to export their products before venturing to make an FDI. Though changes to these 
macro-variables can’t be made in the short run, by setting this as a long term goal, countries 
could significantly increase the probability of FDI flows. Since the country’s GDP is 
dependent on a lot of factors, this policy is perhaps better suited for the country openness to 
trade in terms of lowering the barriers to trade. If it is known that openness to trade increases 
the probability of FDI flows, this is one area that could be improved policy-wise, in a relative 
short-term. This will force the domestic markets to become more competitive which will in 
turn have a stimulating effect on the country’s GDP. Ultimately this is one of the main known 
benefits of having FDI flows and something why smaller and poorer countries seek to 
increase having FDIs.   
 
FDI inflows  
The FDI inflows results are in the left-hand side of table 7.1 and show that all of the 
variables are statistically significant and hold the expected sign. The FDI inflows results are 
more pronounced than the FDI outflows panel results.  
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In the institutional proximity group, the shared membership of an economic or a political 
organisation and the same origin of the legal system will increase the probability of having 
FDI inflows. The shared economic and political organisation increases having FDI flows by 
13%. This indicates that the OECD countries have an increased probability that their FDI will 
come from fellow members in the OECD, EU, etc. The shared origin of the legal system will 
increase the probability of having FDIs by 5%. Though not especially high, this institutional 
influence is not negligible. Same as in the case of FDI outflows, countries should seek to 
increase the country’s institutional familiarity or exploit this familiarity in order to increase 
the FDI inflows to their country.  
From the cultural proximity variable group, the shared history between countries and the 
shared language increase the probability of having FDI inflows to them. The shared history 
increases the probability of having FDI by 14% (same as in the case of FDI outflows). The 
shared language will in this case increase having an FDI flow by 15%, double of the 
influence of this factor in the case of FDI outflows. Since these factors can’t be modified with 
policy, countries should take advantage of this familiarity and seek to stimulate investment 
ties with countries with which they share this familiarity. In the case of FDI inflows the 
cultural distance index is significant and it has the expected negative sign. When the cultural 
distance between two countries is smaller, the probability of having FDI inflows will be 
higher.  Increasing the cultural distance by one unit (an index point) will decrease the 
probability of FDI by 2%.  
In the physical proximity group, the shared border and shared continent have a positive 
influence on the probability of having FDI inflows, indicating that the probability of FDI 
inflows is greater from countries with which there is a shared border or a general regional 
closeness. Sharing a border with another country will increase the probability of having FDI 
from that country by 7%. Being on the same continent will increase the probability of having 
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FDI flows from a country on the same continent by 5%. The distance has a negative impact 
on the probability of FDI inflows, indicating that on greater distances the probability of FDIs 
is smaller. As the distance increases by around 6000 km, the probability of having a FDI 
relationship with another country at that distance decreases by 10%. As I noted before, the 
physical proximity group of factors isn’t something that can be influenced on other than 
factors beyond reach of a government.   
The greater the GDP or both the sending and receiving countries, the greater is the probability 
that there will be an FDI inflow to county i from j at time t. An increase in the GDP of the 
receiving country by approximately 870 billion will increase the probability of FDI by 18% 
while an increase in the GDP of the sending country by approximately 400 billion will 
increase the probability of FDI flows occurring by 26% (same as in the case of FDI outflows). 
The same is true for the country openness to trade – it increases the probability of FDI 
inflows from country j,t. In the case of the openness of the receiving country, an increase in 
this of around 70% will increase the probability of having FDI by 15% while an increase in 
the openness of the sending country by approximately 79% will increase the probability of 
making an FDI by 12%. Same as the case of outflows, this is something that can be slowly 
influenced and acted upon, in order to increase the probability of FDI inflows.  
 
7.3.2. Probability of having an FDI relationship by continent  
This analysis focuses on the probability of an FDI flow occurring from countries 
located on the same continent. This will give us a clearer picture whether there is something 
more specific in terms of the factors that determine this probability when it comes to a 
specific region and whether some factors matter more in certain regions than others. Since the 
in the previous analysis I described in greater detail the expected influence of the explanatory 
variables on the probability that the event specified by the dependent will occur, in this 
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section I will focus on any differences or particularities there may be. The results are 
presented similarly to the full panel analysis previously, for FDI inflows and outflows by 
individual continent.   
 
Europe 
Table 7.2 presents the results of the regional probit analysis for the case of FDI 
inflows and outflows when the FDI sending country is located on the European continent. As 
most of the OECD countries are located in Europe (23 of 30), this analysis has the most 
observations.  
 
FDI outflows 
The results for FDI outflows of the European continent are presented on the left-hand 
side of table 7.3. They show the probability of an FDI outflow occurring from the countries 
located in Europe. In this case, the results are fully consistent with the full panel analysis 
findings.   
From the institutional and cultural proximity group of variables, the shared economic and 
political organisation dummy is positive and significant and will increase the probability of 
the European countries investing in a country with which they share this economic or political 
membership by 6%. The shared legal system origin variable isn’t statistically significant. On 
the cultural familiarity group, the shared history in the country pair is positive and significant 
and will increase the probability of a European country investing in another country with 
which it shares history by 13% which is more than negligible. This means that the European 
countries invest predominantly among themselves as there is a lot of shared history among 
European countries and with the courtiers with which they had colonial ties which are  
 
 
 215 
  
Table 7.2. Probability of having an FDI flows relationship - EUROPE 
 
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is a positive FDI flow from country i to j at time t; this is for the 
FDI flows sending country located in Europe; The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving. 
The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending country;  
trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; 
shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy 
(value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy 
(one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same 
official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having 
had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on Kogut 
and Singh (1988). The z-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively;  
 
  
FDI outflows 
EUROPE (send) FDI outflows average 
marginal effect on 
dependent variable 
FDI inflows 
EUROPE (send) 
FDI inflows average 
marginal effect on  
dependent variable 
Variable  
Y=1 (FDI relationsh.) Y=1 (FDI relationsh.) 
Y=0 ( no relationsh.) Y=0 ( no relationsh.) 
C 
-13.62 *** n/a -10.37*** n/a 
(Log) GDPrec 
0.90 *** 0.16 0.66*** 0.11 
(Log) GDP send 
1.77 *** 0.32 1.72*** 0.28 
Openness rec 
0.25 *** 0.05 0.25*** 0.04 
Openness send 
0.92 *** 0.16 0.91*** 0.14 
(Log) Distance 
-0.27 *** -0.05 -0.70*** -0.11 
Same Continent 
0.48 *** 0.09 -0.07 -0.01 
Border 
0.14  0.03 0.50*** 0.08 
Shared Econ. Org. 
0.31 *** 0.06 0.38*** 0.06 
Same Legal System 
0.04  0.00 0.29*** 0.05 
Shared History 
0.69 *** 0.13 0.08 0.02 
Shared Language  
0.58 *** 0.10 0.85*** 0.14 
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
0.01 *** 0.002 0.00 -0.00 
N 10,687 
 
6,696 
 
N of y =1 1,869  5,640  
N of y=0 8,818  1,056  
McFadden  R2 0.31 
 
0.35 
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typically on another continent. This may explain why the physical distance factor will only 
diminish the probability of having FDIs by 5% as opposed to a typically higher percentage in 
the other regressions. The shared language will increase the probability of a European 
country investing in a linguistically similar country by 10%. The cultural distance index is 
positive and significant which is quite unexpected, however its influence is negligible as it 
will affect the probability of FDI by only 0.02%.  
From the physical proximity group, an increase in the distance by around 5000 km on average 
as mentioned earlier will only diminish the probability of having an FDI outflow from a 
European country by 5% which means that the European countries do invest at faraway 
places. The location of a country in Europe will increase the probability of an FDI outflow 
from a fellow European country by 9%. The shared border variable isn’t significant.  
From the macroeconomic variables, the GDP of the receiving country will increase the FDI 
probability by 16% when the GDP of the receiving country increases by $US 388 billion 
whereas an increase in GDP of the sending country by approximately $US 1 trillion will 
increase the FDI probability by 32%. This indicates that the richer the sending country, the 
greater the probability that it will make FDIs in any location in the world. In the country 
openness variables we can observe the same situation. While both of these variables increase 
the probability of FDI outflows occurring from a European country, there is a much greater 
probability that the outflows will occur if the sending country is more open, with the sending 
country FDI probability increasing by 16% and the receiving by 5% when on average the 
sending and receiving countries have an increased trade openness by 77% and 75% 
respectively.  
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FDI inflows  
The results for the FDI inflows regression for the European continent are in the right-
hand side of table 7.2. In this case the FDI inflows sending country is located in Europe while 
the receiving country can be any of the OECD countries. The analyses in this table show an 
overall confirmation of the findings from the full panel analysis.  
Of the institutional proximity variables, both of them are positive and significant. The shared 
political and economic organisation dummy variable will increase the probability of FDI 
inflows by 6%, while sharing the same origin of the legal system will increase this probability 
by 5%. In the cultural proximity group only the shared language variable is significant and 
will increase the probability of FDI inflows from Europe by 14%. The other two variables in 
this group aren’t significant. In the physical proximity group, a shared border will increase the 
probability of FDI inflows from European countries to their neighbours by 8%. The distance 
in this case will decrease the probability of having an FDI relationship from Europe by 11% 
when the distance increases by approximately 3600km. In terms of the macroeconomic 
variables, the sending country’s traits have a significantly higher importance in predicting FDI 
flows similarly to the case of European outflows. Both the GDP and the trade openness have a 
higher influence on the probability of having an FDI relationship. When the GDP of the 
receiving and sending country increases by approximately $US 845 billion and $US 344 
billion it will increase the probability of FDI inflows occurring with 11% and 28%  
respectively. An increase in the trade openness by 68% and 85% for the receiving and sending 
country will increase the FDI probability by 4% and 14%for the receiving and sending 
country.  
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Table 7.3. Probability of having an FDI flows relationship – ASIA-PACIFIC 
 
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is a positive FDI flow from country i to j at time t; this is for the 
FDI flows sending country located in Asia-Pacific;  The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the FDI 
receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the FDI sending 
country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of 
exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in 
kilometres; shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation 
dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin 
dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share 
the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to 
having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country) and the cultural distance index based on 
Kogut and Singh (1988). The z-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant 
coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
  
FDI outflows ASIA-
PACIFIC (send) FDI outflows average 
marginal effect on 
dependent variable 
FDI inflows ASIA-
PACIFIC (send) FDI inflows average 
marginal effect on  
dependent variable Variable  
Y=1 (FDI relationsh.) Y=1 (FDI relationsh.) 
Y=0 ( no relationsh.) Y=0 ( no relationsh.) 
C 
-2.36  n/a -12.29 *** n/a  
(Log) GDPrec 
1.41 *** 0.23 1.02 *** 0.29  
(Log) GDP send 
0.93 *** 0.15 1.26 *** 0.34  
Openness rec 
0.97 *** 0.16 0.98 *** 0.27  
Openness send 
-1.55 *** -0.25 0.52 *** 0.14  
(Log) Distance 
-2.28 *** -0.36 -0.21 ** -0.06  
Same Continent 
-0.16  -0.03 -0.18 ** -0.05  
Border 
NA  NA 0.08  0.03  
Shared Econ. Org. 
-0.21 ** -0.04 0.54 *** 0.15  
Same Legal System 
-0.06  -0.01 -0.11 * -0.03  
Shared History 
0.94 * 0.15 0.76 *** 0.21  
Shared Language  
0.44 *** 0.07 0.81 *** 0.23  
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
-0.03 *** -0.005 -0.02 *** -0.006  
N 2,148 
 
3,714  
N of y =1 499  2320  
N of y=0 1,649  1394  
McFadden  R2 0.46 
 
0.26  
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Asia-Pacific 
Table 7.3 shows the results of the probit analysis for the FDI inflows and outflows that 
occur from the Asian-Pacific region. The number of observations is somewhat smaller when 
compared to Europe. The Asian-Pacific continent analysis shows overall similar findings but 
has two variables that have the opposite influence on the probability of having FDIs than the 
expected.  
 
FDI outflows 
The FDI outflows results are shown in the left side of table 7.3. They generally follow 
the general panel results but have some particularities. In the institutional and cultural 
proximity groups, the shared legal origin and history aren’t significant. The cultural distance 
index is significant but similarly to the other regressions it has a negligible influence of 0.5%. 
The probability of FDI outflows from Asia-Pacific will diminish by 0.5% the more culturally 
distant the partner country is. The shared language on the other hand will increase the 
probability of an FDI relationship occurring by 7%. The shared economic and political 
organisation variable has a negative effect on the probability of FDI flows which is contrary 
to the expectation; according to the results, diminish the probability of FDI by 4%. One 
explanation might be due to the fact that the Asian countries do not have their own regional 
organisation represented in this variable that might highlight this common trait. In the 
physical proximity group, the only significant variable is the physical distance which has one 
of the greatest impacts in all of the analyses in this chapter thus far. An increase in the 
distance by approximately 10,000 km will lower the probability of having an FDI by 36%. 
This means that the Asian-Pacific countries prefer to invest within the region. The greater 
openness of the FDI outflows sending country (an OECD member) has a negative impact on 
the probability of having an FDI outflow and will decrease the probability of having an FDI 
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by 25%, when the trade openness increases by 46% which is contrary to the theoretical 
expectation. The openness of the receiving country will increase the probability of FDI 
outflows by 16% when the openness increases on average by 74%. The GDP of the receiving 
and sending countries will increase the probability of an FDI occurring from Asia-Pacific by 
23% and 15% respectively when the average GDP increases by US$ 140 and $US 500 for the 
receiving and sending country respectively.  
 
FDI inflows  
The results for FDI inflows from the Asian-Pacific region can be found on the right 
side of table 7.3. The results are predominantly consistent with the general expectations for 
the variables. The exception here is the same continent variable which indicates that the 
probability of FDI occurring will be 5% less if the country pair is on the same continent. This 
is possibly because in this analysis there are countries from two continents (Asia and Pacific). 
The shared economic or political organisation will increase the FDI inflows from Asia-Pacific 
by 15% which is a sharp increase from this variable in the case of FDI outflows. In this case 
of FDI inflows from Asia-Pacific there is a great impact on the other two variables from this 
group. The shared history will increase the probability of an FDI inflow from Asia-Pacific by 
21% whereas the probability of FDI will increase by 23% when there is a shared language in 
common. This tells us that when it comes to Asian-Pacific countries, it really matters a great 
deal if they share a cultural similarity with their investment partners. This should be very 
useful in country policy matters regarding FDIs. The cultural distance index, though 
significant, has a very marginal diminishing effect on the probability of FDI inflows of 0.6%. 
The distance in the case of FDI inflows from the Asian-Pacific region, unlike the case of FDI 
outflows has a much smaller effect on the probability of FDI flows. It will lessen this 
probability by 6% compared to the 36% in the case of FDI outflows when the average 
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distance increases by around 8000 km. Differences like this one highlight the importance of 
considering both FDI inflows and outflows when there is an unbalanced panel dataset. In the 
macro-factors, all four variables have a positive and significant influence with a more evened 
out influence of the sending and receiving countries’ macro traits compared to the European 
analysis. The GDP of the receiving and sending countries will increase the probability of an 
FDI inflow by 29% and 34% respectively when the GDP increases by $US 950 and $US 400 
billion whereas the country openness unit increase will increase the chance of having an FDI 
by 27% and 14% respectively when the average trade openness increases by 69% and 85%.  
 
America 
The American continent regression should be interpreted with some caution because it 
has the least amount of predictor power. This is due to two facts; it has the smallest number of 
observations and it represents the FDI outflows of only three countries: US, Canada and 
Mexico towards their partner countries which is only representative of North America. The 
case of FDI inflows becomes more important in this case as it represents the FDI flows of 
more countries from the Americas.  
 
FDI outflows  
For the American continent in the case of FDI outflows, the GDP seems to be a very 
strong predictor of the probability of FDI outflows; the probability of having an FDI 
relationship increases by 10% and 28% with an average increase of GDP of the receiving and 
sending countries by $US 585 and $US 640 billion respectively. The shared legal system will 
increase the probability of FDI outflows from North America by 7%. The shared history also 
matters and the probability of FDI outflows increases by 10% if the countries have history in 
common. The rest of the variables are insignificant. This regression has around 1,000 
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observations and with a high quasi-R2, it seems that when it comes to the American FDI 
outflows, the probability whether they will invest abroad is strongly determined by the 
macroeconomic factors and familiarity factors such as shared origin of the legal system and 
shared history with another country.   
FDI inflows  
This table shows results for the probability of a relationship occurring between the FDI 
inflows from the American continent. The Americas analysis generally follows the previous 
findings except in this case the shared economic and political organisation variable is negative 
and indicates that there is a 5% less chance of an FDI inflow when this variable takes the 
value of one which is contrary to the expected. The shared origin of the legal system is 
positive and significant and will increase the probability of an FDI inflow by 6%. The cultural 
proximity variables are important in the likelihood of having an FDI inflow from the 
American continent with the shared history increasing the probability of FDI by 17% and the 
shared language increasing this probability by 15%. This finding is similar to the findings for 
the FDI inflows from the Asian-Pacific region. The cultural distance index is significant but 
like in the other regressions it has a very marginal influence of just 0.5%. The physical 
distance plays a very big role in this analysis and will diminish the probability of an FDI 
inflow from the American continent by 42% with an average increase in distance by 9000km.  
All four macro-factors are positive and significant. The GDP of the receiving and sending 
countries will increase the likelihood of an FDI inflow by 22% and 30% respectively when 
the GDP increases by $US 880 and $US 930 billion respectively. Likewise, the trade 
openness of the receiving and sending countries will increase the probability of FDI inflows 
from the American continent by 22% and 30% respectively when the openness increases by 
approximately 70% and 64%. Overall it may be concluded that the FDI inflows analysis is 
more consistent and more informative than the one for FDI outflows in the case of America. 
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Table 7.4. Probability of having an FDI flows relationship - AMERICA 
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is a positive FDI flow from country i to j at time t; this is 
for the FDI flows sending country located in America;  The FDI flows are from the FDI sending country towards the 
FDI receiving. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the 
FDI sending country;  trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country; the log of the physical distance 
between the country i and j in kilometres; shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared 
economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or 
political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); 
shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history 
(one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the 
same country) and the cultural distance index based on Kogut and Singh (1988). The z-statistics are based on standard 
errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method;  Fixed effects 
used; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
  
FDI outflows 
AMERICAS (send) 
FDI outflows 
average marginal 
effect on dependent 
variable 
FDI inflows 
AMERICAS (send) FDI inflows average 
marginal effect on  
dependent variable Variable  
Y=1 (FDIrelationsh.) Y=1 (FDIrelationsh.) 
Y=0 ( no relationsh.) Y=0 ( no relationsh.) 
C 
-38.77 *** n/a  -6.22 *** n/a 
(Log) GDPrec 
1.63 *** 0.10  1.03 *** 0.22 
(Log) GDP send 
4.52 *** 0.28  1.39 *** 0.30 
Openness rec 
-0.02  -0.002  1.14 *** 0.24 
Openness send 
1.73  0.11  1.10 *** 0.23 
(Log) Distance 
0.13  0.008  -2.01 *** -0.42 
Same Continent 
1.03 * 0.07  0.05  0.02 
Border 
NA  NA  NA  NA 
Shared Econ. Org. 
0.50 * 0.03  -0.24 ** -0.05 
Same Legal System 
1.06 *** 0.07  0.26 *** 0.06 
Shared History 
1.59 *** 0.10  0.79 *** 0.17 
Shared Language  
0.45  0.03  0.68 *** 0.15 
Cul. Dist. Ind. 
0.01  0.00  -0.02 *** -0.005 
N 1,003 
 
3,047 
 
N of y =1 837  1,633  
N of y=0 166  1,414  
McFadden  R2 0.75 
 
0.46 
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Table 7.5. Probability of having an FDI outflows flows relationship – by individual country  
 
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is an FDI outflows relationship between country i to j at time t; The FDI outflows are from the 
FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for 
the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus 
imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value 
of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or 
political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy 
(one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of 
the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same 
country); cultural distance index (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The z-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Const. 
LGDP of 
FDI rec. 
country 
LGDP of 
FDI send 
country 
Opennes
s rec. 
country 
Opennes
s of send. 
country 
L 
distance 
Same 
Cont. 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. 
Organs.
Dummy 
Legal 
origin 
dummy 
Shared 
History 
Shared 
Lang. 
 
 
CD 
index 
Australia  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
            
 
Austria  -116.17 2.05 20.73 0.93 -4.08 0.01 1.20 -0.78 -0.08 -1.61 1.95 3.99 -0.02 
 
*** *** *** *** ***  *** *  *** *** ***  
Belgium  -29.54 3.14 -5.87 -0.08 3.52 9.99 11.01 -6.70 7.34 0.31 14.96 NA 0.09 
       *       
Canada  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Czech R.  -11.25 1.14 1.23 0.51 0.91 -0.76 1.03 5.98 -0.14 0.84 NA 0.55 0.00 
 
 ***  ***   *   **    
Denmark  39.90 1.31 -10.94 0.59 14.46 -0.20 0.45 -0.58 0.39 0.68 NA NA -0.03 
 
*** *** *** *** ***    * *   *** 
Finland  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
France  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Germany  -36.10 1.06 4.54 0.88 -0.06 1.01 0.71 -0.57 1.01 5.94 7.00 0.32 0.01 
 
*** *** ** ***  **   ***     
Greece  -75.28 0.98 12.74 -0.03 12.79 -0.55 1.25 5.94 -0.08 -0.57 NA NA 0.01 
 
** *** **  **  **       
Hungary  -29.44 1.11 5.47 1.06 2.00 -1.58 -0.47 8.35 1.06 0.21 NA 0.09 -0.04 
 
 ***  ***  ***   ***     
Iceland  -163.89 -0.14 36.09 -0.06 2.32 7.11 0.49 NA 2.95 1.48 NA NA -2.46 
 
     *   **     
Ireland  -74.66 3.43 13.43 1.33 7.30 -6.50 -3.79 NA 2.03 3.00 -2.82 -0.49 -0.20 
 
     ** *   **   * 
Italy  70.87 1.65 -13.59 0.42 8.13 -0.10 1.08 5.49 0.08 0.05 -0.07 NA -0.05 
 
*** *** *** * **  **      * 
Japan  103.53 2.61 -17.20 2.10 -16.59 0.17 0.33 NA 1.60 4.08 NA 1.63 -0.07 
 
** *** *** **     *    * 
Korea  -1.45 1.29 0.01 1.05 -0.24 -1.26 0.06 NA -0.30 -0.12 5.13 0.79 -0.05 
 
 ***  ***  **      *** *** 
Luxemb. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Mexico  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Netherl.  -153.23 1.11 27.32 0.18 -7.83 1.94 1.27 0.00 9.45 -0.83 6.15 -7.73 0.03 
 *** *** ***  * *** *   *    
New Zeal. 45.99 1.84 -9.13 1.36 4.08 -4.11 4.99 NA 0.01 0.31 1.10 -0.15 0.00 
 
*** *** *** ***  ***     *   
Norway  47.79 1.77 -11.14 3.83 4.15 -1.60 -0.72 -1.37 2.50 7.59 NA NA 0.02 
 
* *** * *     ***     
Poland  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Portugal  103.00 1.51 -22.84 -2.54 7.67 -1.33 0.06 6.54 0.90 1.55 NA 1.03 0.21 
 
** ** ***       *   ** 
Slovakia  70.77 1.25 -18.45 -0.24 6.78 -2.31 -1.00 7.64 -0.03 0.15 0.04 1.66 0.00 
 
 ***    ***      *  
Spain  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Sweden  -39.88 1.60 4.94 1.25 1.50 1.37 1.08 7.42 1.03 -0.45 8.71 -8.36 0.00 
 
** ***  **  ** *  **     
Switzerl. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Turkey  -54.69 1.20 10.55 0.39 -9.15 -1.71 0.03 0.58 -0.04 0.14 -0.25 1.31 NA 
 
*** *** *** *** ** ***  *    *  
UK  14.72 1.84 -5.35 1.03 6.40 1.81 1.87 0.04 -0.27 6.60 0.29 -0.18 -0.04 
 
 ***  *  *** ***      * 
USA  -121.91 1.30 15.00 -0.36 -17.95 4.35 1.19 6.99 1.86 7.94 6.37 0.39 0.06 
 ** *** *   **   ***     
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7.3.3. Probability of having an FDI relationship by country  
FDI outflows  
Table 7.5 (above) shows results for the probability of an FDI outflows relationship 
occurring by country, while table 7.6 (below) shows that marginal effects of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable for this analysis. Similarly to the country analyses in 
chapter 5, due to data limitations some of the country regressions cannot be performed (the 
number of countries in this analysis is 21) and the general results aren’t very strong compared 
to the continent and full panel analysis or even when compared to the country analysis in 
chapter 5. The probit model estimations prove to be more difficult to estimate with a limited 
number of observations than the OLS.   
From the 21 country regressions the strongest predictive power lies with the GDP and 
openness to trade of the receiving country. The GDP of the FDI outflows sending country has 
10 significant variables out of 21 but 5 of them have a negative sign. About 50% of the 
distance variables are significant but most of them do not have the anticipated negative 
influence on the probability of FDI outflows between two countries. Of the other variables of 
interest, only the shared economic or political organisation variable has some significant 
variables. Of them, shared membership to an economic organisation will increase the 
probability of FDI relationship of Iceland to other countries by 42% by 19% for Hungary and 
12% for Norway. Sharing the same legal system origin will increase the FDI potential for the 
Czech Republic by 19% and 24% for Ireland. The shared history will increase the probability 
of an FDI relationship of Austria by 36% and a shared language with Austria will increase the 
probability of FDI flows occurring by 74%. This indicates that Austrian FDI outflows occur 
predominantly in countries which are nearby (with whom Austria shared history) and also 
where there is a German speaking population (also nearby countries). All of this suggests that 
it’s very difficult to draw any general conclusions from the individual country analysis due to 
data limitations.  
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Table 7.6. Marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable - FDI outflows  
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is an FDI outflows relationship between country i to j at time t; The FDI outflows are 
from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; 
log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in 
kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if 
country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same 
economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared 
language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share 
history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). The t-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) 
method; NA stands for not available; insig. stands for statistically insignificant variable; 
 
 
LGDP of 
FDI rec. 
country 
LGDP of 
FDI send 
country 
Opennes
s rec. 
country 
Opennes
s of send. 
country 
L 
distance 
Same 
Cont. 
Shared 
Border 
Econ. 
Organs.
Dummy 
Legal 
origin 
dummy 
Shared 
History 
Shared 
Lang. 
 
 
CD 
index 
Australia  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Austria  0.38 3.80 0.17 -0.75 Insig. 0.22 Insig. Insig. -0.30 0.36 0.74 Insig. 
Belgium  Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA Insig. 
Canada  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Czech R.  0.19 Insig. 0.12 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.19 NA Insig. Insig. 
Denmark  0.23 -1.90 0.11 2.50 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA NA -0.004 
Finland  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
France  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Germany  0.09 0.38 0.08 Insig. 0.08 Insig. Insig. 0.09 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Greece  0.24 3.07 Insig. 3.01 Insig. 0.30 Insig. Insig. Insig. NA NA Insig. 
Hungary  0.20 Insig. 0.19 Insig. -0.29 Insig. Insig. 0.19 Insig. NA Insig. Insig. 
Iceland  Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA 0.42 Insig. NA NA Insig. 
Ireland  Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. -0.52 Insig. NA Insig. 0.24 Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Italy  0.18 -1.43 Insig. 0.85 Insig. 0.12 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA Insig. 
Japan  0.13 -8.23 0.10 Insig. Insig. Insig. NA Insig. Insig. NA Insig. Insig. 
Korea  0.32 Insig. 0.26 Insig. -0.32 Insig. NA Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.20 0.02 
Luxemb. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mexico  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Netherl.  0.41 0.94 Insig. Insig. 0.07 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
New Zeal. 0.34 -1.68 0.25 Insig. 0.76 Insig. NA Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Norway  0.09 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.12 Insig. NA NA Insig 
Poland  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Portugal  0.18 -2.76 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA Insig. 0.03 
Slovakia  0.23 Insig. Insig. Insig. -0.43 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Spain  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sweden  0.13 Insig. 0.10 Insig. 0.11 Insig. Insig. 0.08 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Switzerl. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Turkey  0.16 1.40 0.05 -1.20 -0.23 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA 
UK  0.09 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.09 0.09 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
USA  0.04 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.13 Insig. Insig. 0.06 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
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Table 7.7. Probability of an FDI inflows relationship – by individual country  
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is an FDI inflows relationship between country i to j at time t The FDI inflows are from the FDI 
sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; log of the GDP for the 
FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports 
over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if 
the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if country i and j share a border); shared economic or political 
organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if 
country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the 
minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same 
country); cultural distance index (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The z-statistics are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity using the White (1980) method; Note that *, **, *** stand for significant coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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CD 
index 
Australia  226.77 -28.84 2.48 -112.51 5.49 -12.03 -9.98 NA 2.73 10.05 -3.03 -0.87 0.01 
 
        *     
Austria  24.34 -5.31 1.62 3.05 0.63 -1.94 0.12 4.33 0.27 7.61 1.57 5.46 -0.10 
 
  ***  ** ***       *** 
Belgium  -104.94 10.07 4.61 10.69 0.06 2.82 7.07 0.24 -0.40 -1.37 8.38 1.60 0.06 
   **    *       
Canada  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Czech R.  -21.12 3.71 1.59 2.92 0.78 -2.68 -0.49 6.21 0.69 -0.68 -0.75 NA 0.22 
 
  ***  *** ***   **    ** 
Denmark  119.27 -22.54 1.49 -6.95 1.22 -2.44 -1.38 6.61 1.01 1.53 NA NA -0.04 
 
*** *** ***  ** *** *  * ***   * 
Finland  15.04 -5.53 1.91 6.48 1.23 -0.68 0.98 1.25 0.96 7.16 NA NA -0.06 
 
  *** ** ***    **     
France  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Germany  -20.14 1.95 1.41 1.97 0.73 0.06 0.93 0.30 0.25 -1.43 -0.63 0.52 -0.03 
 
*** * *** ** ***  ***   ***   * 
Greece  -12.10 1.96 1.33 -1.79 0.73 -1.50 0.20 -1.78 0.63 0.20 NA NA 0.02 
 
  ***  *** ***  * **     
Hungary  -64.55 12.55 1.39 1.58 0.88 -1.12 0.38 7.70 1.44 0.42 -0.87 NA -0.01 
 
*** *** ***  *** **   ***     
Iceland  -25.78 5.96 1.25 2.17 1.31 -1.64 -0.24 -0.31 1.25 6.94 NA NA NA 
 
*  ***  **    **     
Ireland  -22.42 5.20 1.36 -4.11 0.51 -1.10 -1.46 NA 0.75 -0.77 7.36 0.30 -0.03 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ** ***  ***    * 
Italy  15.16 -3.68 1.32 1.91 0.50 -0.31 0.52 6.56 0.60 -0.10 NA -0.15 0.00 
 
  ***  **    ***     
Japan  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Korea  -26.25 2.06 1.60 0.35 1.19 1.15 1.17 NA -0.10 0.23 5.89 0.16 0.10 
 
*** *** ***  *** *** ***      *** 
Luxemb. -
1136.78 277.02 1.03 -27.23 2.17 0.47 6.29 -13.54 6.57 0.64 -1.61 6.75 -0.20 
 
* * * * **        ** 
Mexico  -49.06 8.55 2.03 -0.07 0.39 -2.63 0.00 4.97 0.12 0.17 0.76 0.74 0.11 
 
*** *** ***  *** ***     ** ** *** 
Netherl.  -32.65 4.47 1.93 -3.15 1.07 0.47 1.20 5.37 0.67 0.07 0.69 -1.00 -0.03 
 ** * *** * ***  **  **  *  ** 
New Zeal. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Norway  -118.28 17.97 5.57 13.92 3.08 -3.65 0.22 -9.55 0.51 16.97 NA NA -0.16 
 
  ***  **        ** 
Poland  -40.06 6.58 1.81 -1.61 0.45 -0.81 1.12 -1.98 0.37 1.29 NA NA 0.11 
 
** * ***    ** ***  *   ** 
Portugal  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Slovakia  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Spain  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Sweden  -52.35 7.51 2.05 5.47 1.71 -0.79 0.12 8.58 0.80 -0.93 7.73 -7.28 -0.02 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *   *** *    
Switzerl. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
 
             
Turkey  -52.05 9.60 1.22 -10.66 0.53 -0.88 0.36 1.00 0.84 -0.16 -0.13 0.04 NA 
 
*** *** *** *** *** ***  *** ***     
UK  7.59 -2.62 1.69 5.21 0.44 -1.14 0.23 4.22 0.89 0.23 2.03 0.57 0.03 
 
  ***   **   ***  ***   
USA  -66.52 5.98 2.28 15.21 1.10 3.10 1.35 6.45 2.07 -0.60 7.29 0.48 -0.03 
 *  ***  *    ***     
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FDI inflows 
Table 7.6 (above) shows the results of the probit analysis for the probability of an FDI 
inflows relationship occurring in the individual country analysis, while table 7.7(below) 
shows the marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable for this 
analysis. Similarly to the FDI outflows analysis, the most significant variables in the 
individual country analysis is the GDP and trade openness for the FDI inflows sending 
country which is the same as the FDI outflows receiving country in the previous case. The 
macroeconomic variables aren’t the best examples for interpretation because they should be 
ideally considered on a case by case basis i.e. for each observation. The marginal effects are 
considered for an average value of each country. Therefore, countries with different GDP are 
put together in the same interpretation as countries with high GDP. It makes a great difference 
if the countries with a smaller GDP double it in amount as opposed to countries with an 
already high GDP.  This is why the marginal effects of the GDP for a probit analysis like this 
one are better suited if they are considered for individual bilateral country pairs.  
From the other variables, the physical distance and shared economic and political 
organisation variable are predominantly significant with the other variables being only 
sporadically significant. On a country by country basis, the shared economic and political 
organisation variable seems to make a great difference in the probability whether two 
countries will be engaged in an FDI relationship. Considering this variable, it will increase the 
probability of FDI for Ireland by 19%, for Hungary by 20%, for US and Sweden by 12% and 
Turkey and the Czech Republic by 10%.  Sharing a legal system origin with a country will 
increase the FDI probability by 24% for Denmark and Iceland. They have a Scandinavian 
legal system origin which indicates that their FDI inflows are mostly from its fellow countries 
with this type of system. The cultural distance index continues to show negligible effects on 
the probability of having an FDI relationship with another country.  
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Table 7.7. Marginal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable - FDI inflows  
Dependant variable is a binary choice with 1 if there is an FDI inflows relationship between country i to j at time t The FDI inflows are 
from the FDI sending country towards the FDI receiving country. The explanatory variables are: Log of the GDP of the FDI receiving country; 
log of the GDP for the FDI sending country; trade openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI receiving country; trade 
openness (ratio of exports plus imports over GDP) for the FDI sending country;  the log of the physical distance between the country i and j in 
kilometres; shared continent dummy (value of one if the two country i and j are one the same continent); shared border dummy (value of one if 
country i and j share a border); shared economic or political organisation dummy (value of one if country i and j share membership in the same 
economic or political organisation); same legal origin dummy (one if country i and j share the same origin of their legal systems); shared 
language (one if country i and j share the same official language or language of the minorities); shared history (one if country i and j share 
history with respect to having had a past colonial relationship or having been part of the same country); cultural distance index (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988). NA stands for not available; insig. stands for statistically insignificant variable;  
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CD 
index 
Australia Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Austria Insig. 0.27 Insig. 0.11 -0.33 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. -0.02 
Belgium Insig. 0.26 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Canada NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Czech R. Insig. 0.22 Insig. 0.10 -0.36 Insig. Insig. 0.10 Insig. Insig. Insig. -0.02 
Denmark -3.52 0.23 Insig. 0.19 0.38 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.24 NA NA Insig 
Finland Insig. 0.14 0.48 0.09 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.07 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
France NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Germany Insig. 0.28 0.39 0.14 Insig. 0.18 Insig. Insig. -0.28 Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Greece Insig. 0.30 Insig. 0.17 -0.34 Insig. Insig. 0.15 Insig. NA NA Insig 
Hungary 1.76 0.20 Insig. 0.13 -0.16 Insig. Insig. 0.20 Insig. Insig. NA Insig. 
Iceland Insig. 1.12 Insig. 0.25 Insig. Insig. NA. Insig. 0.24 NA NA NA 
Ireland 1.27 0.33 -1.00 0.13 -0.27 -0.36 NA 0.19 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Italy Insig. 0.27 Insig. 0.39 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.12 Insig. NA Insig. Insig. 
Japan NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Korea 0.48 0.37 Insig. 0.28 0.27 0.27 NA Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.02 
Luxemb. Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.12 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. -0.01 
Mexico 1.58 0.38 Insig. 0.07 0.49 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.14 0.14 0.02 
Netherl. Insig. 0.24 Insig. 0.13 Insig. 0.15 Insig. 0.08 Insig. Insig. Insig. -0.004 
New Zeal. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Norway Insig. 0.27 Insig. 0.15 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. NA NA -0.007 
Poland Insig. 0.20 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.125 -0.22 Insig. Insig. NA NA 0.01 
Portugal NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Slovakia NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Spain NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sweden 1.05 0.29 0.77 0.24 Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.12 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
Switzerl. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Turkey 1.08 0.14 -1.20 0.06 -0.10 Insig. 0.12 0.10 Insig. Insig. Insig. NA 
UK Insig. 0.20 Insig. Insig. -0.13 Insig. Insig. 0.11 Insig. 0.24 Insig. Insig. 
USA Insig. 0.13 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 0.12 Insig. Insig. Insig. Insig. 
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7.4. Conclusion 
FDI flows can be of great economic, political and technological importance for many 
countries. What the countries can do is increase their familiarity and reliability in the eyes of 
investors abroad via the institutional and cultural factors. The reliability of the institutions and 
their closeness to an international benchmark such as a membership to an economic or a 
political organisation or an alignment of the legal aspects of investment to international 
standards increases the probability of FDI flows. The same is true for cultural familiarity. If 
the countries make the investment process more familiar in terms of language and customs 
they would increase their FDI flows. Increasing the institutional familiarity by joining an 
international economic or political union will increase the probability of having FDI inflows 
by 13%. Cultural proximity factors increase the probability of FDI inflows and outflows by 
14% in the case when countries share history. Shared language increases the probability of 
having an FDI inflows relationship with another country by 15%. The shared history is 
important for FDI inflows is Europe and it will increase the FDI outflows relationship with 
another country by 13% and a shared language will increase them by 10% while a shared 
language in European inflows increases this probability by 14%. The shared history is a very 
prominent factor for the outflows and inflows in Asia-Pacific and it will increase the 
probability of having an FDI relationship by 15% for FDI outflows and 21% for FDI inflows 
while sharing a language will increase the FDI inflows probability by 23%. The shared 
history is a very prominent factor for the Asia-Pacific region. These cultural factors play a big 
role in increasing the probability of FDI inflows relationship for America. A shared history 
will increase it by 17% and a shared language by 15%. The country results are varied but a 
shared economic or political organisation membership is overall a very important factor and 
increases the probability of having an FDI relationship.  
 231 
The country size and openness to trade are confirmed to be a significant predictor of 
FDI flows among countries as are the geographical proximity factors. The results are very 
strong and consistent in the full panel and regional continent analyses with the individual 
country analysis being less consistent mainly due to data limitations. However, in terms of 
increasing the probability, when the averages of these variables are high, it will take a great 
increase in the values of these variables for the probability of FDI to really move up. That’s 
because once there is a certain level of macroeconomic factors attained, the probability of FDI 
flows between two countries depends on other, more institutional factors such as the 
membership to the economic or political organisations.  
Limited as the country analysis may be, it conclusively points out to the importance of 
institutional familiarity which can be used by countries to increase the probability that they 
will have FDI inflows in general as well as an above average amount. For example a shared 
membership to an international organisation increases the probability that there will be a 
significant FDI flows for smaller and more remote European countries such as Iceland, 
Ireland or Denmark. The institutional factors also help the probability of a positive FDI flow 
for more emerging countries of the OECD members such as Turkey, Czech Republic or 
Hungary. This in addition to the country openness is something that can be influenced 
relatively easily whereas the other determinants such as the geographic location can’t be 
changed.   
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8. Thesis Conclusion 
8.1. Introduction 
The impact of the human factor in the economic decisions is nothing new. Clark (1918) 
has stated that economists may attempt to ignore psychology but it is impossible to ignore 
human nature. All investments are carried out by people who are shaped by their own 
individual sets of cultural and moral traits, location and institutional preferences and 
familiarity, which shouldn’t be ignored when we examine their investment decisions. This 
thesis contributes to the understanding of FDI determinants and corporate decision making by 
incorporating human behaviour. I contribute by integrating behavioural finance notions and 
implementing them in an FDI context. I contribute to the literature by showing that corporate 
managers herd and prefer to invest in familiar locations in their decision on FDI. I further 
contribute to the FDI literature by testing institutional, cultural, geographical and 
macroeconomic determinants in a very broad, bilateral country pair setting using a large 
dataset. I contribute by investigating near-home bias and herding in FDI flows and provides 
generality of the results at a global, regional and country levels, over time and across different 
country income groups. I also contribute to the FDI policy literature by quantifying the effect 
of FDI determinants on the probability that two countries will have an FDI relationship. The 
use of the entire OECD dataset on FDI flows is a novel application of this dataset for the 
purpose of studying near-home bias and herding in FDI. 
The main finding of this thesis is that home country bias and herding can also be observed 
in FDI flows and not only in equity markets. I find empirical evidence for near-home bias in 
FDI flows at a global level. Near-home bias is also observed both in general and throughout 
geographically different regions, across time and in various country income groups. I find that 
near-home bias has not diminished over time. I find that there is herding in FDI outflows in 
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several contexts: FDI investors herd around a world and a regional leader when they don’t 
have familiarity factors to rely upon; portfolio investors herd FDI investors with a lag of (at 
least) two years and current regional FDI investments herd FDI investors from other countries 
in an FDI host country. Finally, I quantify probability impact of the near-home bias factors in 
a binary dependant variable model and consider them from a country policy perspective. I 
find that apart from macroeconomic variables, the institutional and cultural familiarity 
significantly increases the probability that there will be positive FDI flows between two 
countries that otherwise might not have an FDI relationship. The findings in this thesis which 
are done on FDI flows are consistent with the findings in the behavioural finance literature 
which is conducted for the equity markets and international flows.   
The following sections go over the main findings and contributions for the individual 
empirical analyses in this thesis. They follow the previously established structure of the 
chapters.  I conclude with a discussion on the limitations of this thesis and the possible 
directions for further research of these issues.  
8. 2. Near-home bias in FDI flows 
The analysis in chapter 4, investigates near-home bias in foreign direct investments 
using data on the FDI outflows and inflows of the 30 OECD countries and their FDI partners 
for the period 1981-2005.   
The results show that corporate investors prefer destinations that are familiar with and 
they prefer to invest in countries that they share a border with. Physical proximity is an 
indicator of familiarity because countries that are closer to each other tend to have similar 
features their cultures and business environments.  Direct investors also prefer to invest in 
countries with similar economic and legal systems to their own. Institutional similarities are 
important indicators for business climate familiarity. A commonly spoken language between 
the host and source countries, low cultural distance and a shared history play a big role in 
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corporate decisions regarding FDI. These physical, institutional and cultural groups of factors 
create a near-home bias in the FDI flows in the world.   
 
8.3. Segmented Analysis of Near-home bias in FDI flows 
This stratified analysis of FDI flows shows that there is home country bias at regional and 
country levels, across time and various income country groups. The geographic analysis 
confirms the general panel results from the previous analysis with the continent analysis 
offering much stronger evidence of near-home bias and the country analysis having greater 
specificity across countries. Near-home bias in FDI flows is found to be present across 
different continental regions without exception. The individual country analysis is more 
varied and shows stronger evidence of near-home bias for the more developed countries in the 
OECD.  
The time sub-period analysis splits the sample in two consistent with the capital market 
liberalisation period. One of the main logical reasons why we would observe this proneness 
from direct investors to near-home bias is the fact that there were many obstacles in the equity 
markets. If this is true then we should also observe its effects lessen over time. The capital 
market liberalisation in the past twenty years should have had a negative effect on the near-
home bias effects in the equity markets if one considers that barriers to investments are the 
main cause for near-home bias. I do not find supporting evidence that the home country bias 
has diminished over time.  
Finally, FDI flows to countries of different income groups for different reasons. It can be 
observed that the home country bias is persistent across different country income groups. One 
might expect that there should be greater near-home bias when it comes to the low income or 
developing countries because this is also associated with greater risk and increased costliness 
of doing business in such places. I do not find that the near-home bias effect has subsided for 
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rich countries or that it is more pronounced in low income countries but instead can be 
observer throughout. The direct investments outflows into high-income countries are strongly 
prone to institutional and cultural familiarity and proximity. The same can be observed for 
low-income countries.   
 
8.4. Herding in FDI flows 
I test for herding in the context of the difference in investment amount from a world 
and regional leaders and through the influence of the portfolio equity investments and total 
regional direct investments in different time periods. There is supporting evidence for herding 
in FDI outflows at an aggregate and regional level.  
First, I find that the difference in the amount invested from a world or a regional 
leader falls when companies don’t have other factors of economic activity or familiarity. In 
such cases they follow the investment pattern of the world leader, the US or the regional 
leaders, the UK and Japan. This finding is consistent also with the home country bias 
findings.  
Second, there is evidence that FDI investors are, among other factors, prone to choose 
an investment location with a high portfolio equity investment activity after two years. That 
means that it takes two years for direct investment to be generated from an increased activity 
in the equity markets. Finally I find inconclusive evidence that suggests that increased FDI 
investments from the neighbourhood into one country will encourage the country to also 
choose that country as an FDI destination.  
Overall, I can conclude that when investors consider unfamiliar territories, companies 
choose to follow the investments made by a world or a regional leader as a signal for an 
investment destination. This finding also suggests that the effects of herding in FDI are 
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secondary to the effects of near-home bias which guides investments according to several 
familiarity factors.  
8.5. Predicting the probability of FDI flows 
FDI flows can be of great economic, political and technological importance for many 
countries. What the countries can do is increase their familiarity and reliability in the eyes of 
investors abroad via the institutional and cultural factors. The reliability of the institutions and 
their closeness to an international benchmark such as a membership to an economic or a 
political organisation or an alignment of the legal aspects of investment to international 
standards increases the probability of FDI flows. I find that the institutional and cultural 
proximity between two countries has the greatest impact on the probability of two countries 
having positive FDI flows. Increasing the institutional familiarity by joining an international 
economic or political union will increase the probability of having FDI inflows by 13%. 
Cultural proximity factors increase the probability of FDI inflows and outflows by 14% in the 
case when countries share history. Shared language increases the probability of having an FDI 
inflows relationship with another country by 15%. The shared history is important for FDI 
inflows is Europe and it will increase the FDI outflows relationship with another country by 
13% and a shared language will increase them by 10% while a shared language in European 
inflows increases this probability by 14%. The shared history is a very prominent factor for 
the outflows and inflows in Asia-Pacific and it will increase the probability of having an FDI 
relationship by 15% for FDI outflows and 21% for FDI inflows while sharing a language will 
increase the FDI inflows probability by 23%. The shared history is a very prominent factor for 
the Asia-Pacific region. These cultural factors play a big role in increasing the probability of 
FDI inflows relationship for America. A shared history will increase it by 17% and a shared 
language by 15%. The country size and openness to trade are confirmed to be a significant 
predictor of FDI flows among countries as are the geographical proximity factors. The results 
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are strong and consistent in the full panel and regional continent analyses with the individual 
country analysis being less consistent mainly due to data limitations.  
8.6. Limitations and future research  
This thesis shows empirical evidence that there is near-home bias and herding in FDI 
flows at a country level. The majority of available data on FDI when it comes to many 
countries in the world come as country level data which is also a drawback. This means that 
we cannot see the differences across industries as well as additional information that would 
come from having firm level data. The application of this analysis on industry and firm level 
data emerges as a natural extension to the analysis in this thesis. The industry differences in 
FDI would be a crucial addition to the near-home bias and herding analysis. At present, the 
OECD industry datasets are one-sided i.e. the FDI position is only recorded as an aggregate to 
and from OECD member countries instead of in a bilateral way like the rest of the data used 
in this thesis. This prevents any analysis into the research questions in this thesis across 
industries. I am convinced that this type of analysis would become available in the future as it 
becomes technologically easier for countries to record and provide data. The importance of 
this industry divided analysis comes from the different type of direct investments. As 
discussed in the literature review on the FDI theories, the motivation for the expansion of a 
multinational enterprise can vary from resource-seeking investments, to market expanding 
investments. Some multinational companies don’t have much choice regarding the location of 
the FDI host country. They are resource-oriented and dependent. A European company that 
manufactures coffee for example cannot choose to buy a plant in a near-by European country 
simply because the coffee plantations are located predominantly in Africa or Latin America. 
Therefore, the near-home bias that a company from this industry would exhibit isn’t likely to 
be affected by physical proximity but rather more towards institutional or cultural familiarity. 
Conversely, an international company in the financial services industry would probably elect 
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to invest in the near-by markets with greater institutional convenience and similarity as well 
as physical proximity. This industry type of distinction of FDI will have implications for any 
future herding analysis as well as home country bias research regardless whether the data are 
bilateral or unilateral aggregate country level.  
This thesis looks into near-home bias and herding in positive FDI flows. These flows 
occur between two countries and this thesis captures the common features between the two 
countries in an FDI relationship and what determines and predisposes this relationship once 
an FDI flow is made. It cannot discern whether that FDI decision was profitable or not. The 
financial aspect of the corporate decision to make a particular FDI should be a target for 
future research. The very nature of the FDI statistics provided by the OECD does not provide 
any information on the profitability of the investments but rather on the amount of the FDI 
inward or outward positions that a country has with another country. Also, adding firm-
related financial data to a dataset of this size and scope is very difficult to say the least. The 
financial aspects both from a traditionally financial and a behavioural finance point of view 
would further develop the FDI literature which at present, in my view, isn’t integrated enough 
with the finance literature. In the past this was mostly due to the fact that FDI was a long-term 
and infrequent investment. But the world is far more developed and FDIs are increasing in 
both volume and frequency. Inevitably, this leads to largely the same issues that equity 
markets investors face. There is another behavioural finance phenomenon that has to do with 
investment remorse which would be ideally suited with studying the profitability aspects of 
the corporate FDI decisions that are also a consequence of near-home bias and herding. 
Ideally, firm level data would add this financial aspect to the analysis and it would be possible 
to test the implications on profitability of the investment choices for FDI made by the MNEs.  
The analysis in this thesis shows evidence of near-home bias across country pairs 
which are considered to be the source and final host of the FDI investment. The data are at 
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country level and don’t show any other owners which could link other countries in an FDI 
relationship. Therefore, another limitation and basis for future research can be derived from 
the nature of this data and comes from the definition of a host (or investing) country. As noted 
in the FDI definition section in chapter 2, there are two possible ways to consider an FDI 
position, by immediate host country and by ultimate host country. This distinction should be 
required by the data providers and introduced in the future editions of the databases in order 
to account for the increased complexity of the FDI ownership structure in current times. The 
OECD benchmark requirement is for countries to provide the immediate host or investing 
country (depending on the inward/outward FDI position in question) with additional 
information on the ultimate host or investing country where possible. These types of data are 
unavailable at present and would provide a solid base for future expansion of the research 
questions in this thesis. An example of this is the investment patterns into Eastern Europe for 
example. The German Telecom first started expanding in the proximate and neighbouring 
Hungarian market and subsequently and indirectly continued expansion when the Hungarian 
telecom (owned by the German Telecom) made further acquisitions in the more proximate 
and familiar markets in the Balkans. In the current framework these FDI would be considered 
on individual basis and there is evident presence of home country bias in this example but a 
further analysis through knowing the original and ultimate source of the investment will help 
discern the influence in corporate finance decision and managerial style between various 
countries and the relationship between multinational companies that are connected and inter-
linked through FDI.  
The analysis of herding in this thesis involves a dependent variable that calculates the 
difference in direct investment from a world (USA) and regional leaders (UK and Japan). 
Further work in this area could be extended to include an additional analysis by bringing the 
leaders’ FDI outflows into country j (as defined in chapter 6) on the right-hand side of the 
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regression equation. This exercise would also represent a proxy for herding in FDI by 
following a perceived market leader. A statistically significant variable of the market leader 
would indicate that there is herd behaviour from the rest of the investors in county j and how 
does the world or regional FDI leader investment behaviour impact the rest of the direct 
investors’ behaviour regarding FDI in the receiving country. This type of analysis would also 
include the leaders’ FDI flows at different lags which in turn would complement the analysis 
in chapter 6 that includes portfolio equity flows. This analysis shows that there are at least 
two years of time difference between an increased portfolio investment activity in the home 
market followed by an increased FDI activity. Using regressors of the market leaders in 
different time periods would either confirm or show the difference in this type of herd 
behaviour.  
The analysis of near-home bias in this thesis includes fundamental macroeconomic 
variables such as the country’s GDP and its openness. These two variables are most 
commonly used in FDI studies using a gravity model. A possible extension to this analysis 
would be to include an additional variable: Gross Domestic Fixed Capital. These data include 
the domestic investment in productive assets such as buildings and equipment and does not 
include investment in financial assets and stock. The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle shows that 
there is a positive correlation between domestic saving and domestic investment even when 
there is good capital mobility in the international markets. Using this type of data would 
connect the home bias puzzle with the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle and determine what portion 
of the perceived home bias can be explained through the retained home investment, 
something which is studied by the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. These two are some of the very 
well documented puzzles in international economics and finance and it might be the case that 
there are some common features between them which would help explain or reduce the 
degree of the observed biases.     
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Appendix 
Complete list of countries that can be found in at least one country pair in the dataset 
 
COUNTRY 
CODE COUNTRY  NAME 
CONTINENT 
LOCATION 
ALB Albania Europe 
DZA Algeria Africa 
AGO Angola Africa 
ATG Antigua and Barbuda America 
ARG Argentina America 
ARM Armenia Asia 
AUS Australia Pacific 
AUT Austria Europe 
AZE Azerbaijan Asia 
BHR Bahrain Asia 
BGD Bangladesh Asia 
BRB Barbados America 
BLR Belarus Europe 
BEL Belgium and Luxembourg Europe 
BLZ Belize America 
BEN Benin Africa 
BTN Bhutan Asia 
BOL Bolivia America 
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina Europe 
BWA Botswana Africa 
BRA Brazil America 
BRN Brunei Darussalam Asia 
BGR Bulgaria Europe 
BFA Burkina Faso Africa 
BDI Burundi Africa 
KHM Cambodia Asia 
CMR Cameroon Africa 
CAN Canada America 
CPV Cape Verde Africa 
CAF Central African Republic Africa 
TCD Chad Africa 
CHL Chile America 
CHN China Asia 
COL Colombia America 
COM Comoros Africa 
COG Congo Africa 
CRI Costa Rica America 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire Africa 
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HRV Croatia Europe 
CYP Cyprus Europe 
CZE Czech Republic Europe 
DNK Denmark Europe 
DJI Djibouti Africa 
DMA Dominica America 
DOM Dominican Republic America 
ECU Ecuador America 
EGY Egypt Africa 
SLV El Salvador America 
GNQ Equatorial Guinea Africa 
ERI Eritrea Africa 
EST Estonia Europe 
ETH Ethiopia Africa 
FJI Fiji Pacific 
FIN Finland Europe 
FRA France Europe 
PYF French Polynesia Pacific 
GAB Gabon Africa 
GMB Gambia Africa 
GEO Georgia Asia 
DEU Germany Europe 
GHA Ghana Africa 
GRC Greece Europe 
GRD Grenada America 
GTM Guatemala America 
GIN Guinea Africa 
GNB Guinea-Bissau Africa 
GUY Guyana America 
HTI Haiti America 
HND Honduras America 
HKG Hong Kong Asia 
HUN Hungary Europe 
ISL Iceland Europe 
IND India Asia 
IDN Indonesia Asia 
IRN Iran Asia 
IRL Ireland Europe 
ISR Israel Asia 
ITA Italy Europe 
JAM Jamaica America 
JPN Japan Asia 
JOR Jordan Asia 
KAZ Kazakhstan Asia 
KEN Kenya Africa 
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KIR Kiribati Pacific 
KOR Korea Asia 
KWT Kuwait Asia 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan Asia 
LAO Lao People's Democratic Republic Asia 
LVA Latvia Europe 
LBN Lebanon Asia 
LSO Lesotho Africa 
LBR Liberia Africa 
LBY Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Africa 
LTU Lithuania Europe 
LUX Luxembourg Europe 
MKD Macedonia Europe 
MDG Madagascar Africa 
MWI Malawi Africa 
MYS Malaysia Asia 
MDV Maldives Asia 
MLI Mali Africa 
MLT Malta Europe 
MRT Mauritania Africa 
MUS Mauritius Africa 
MEX Mexico America 
MDA Moldova Europe 
MNG Mongolia Asia 
MAR Morocco Africa 
MOZ Mozambique Africa 
NAM Namibia Africa 
NPL Nepal Asia 
NLD Netherlands Europe 
NZL New Zealand Pacific 
NIC Nicaragua America 
NER Niger Africa 
NGA Nigeria Africa 
NOR Norway Europe 
OMN Oman Asia 
PAK Pakistan Asia 
PAN Panama America 
PNG Papua New Guinea Pacific 
PRY Paraguay America 
PER Peru America 
PHL Philippines Asia 
POL Poland Europe 
PRT Portugal Europe 
ROM Romania Europe 
RUS Russian Federation Asia 
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RWA Rwanda Africa 
KNA Saint Kitts and Nevis America 
LCA Saint Lucia America 
VCT Saint Vincent and the Grenadines America 
WSM Samoa Pacific 
SAU Saudi Arabia Asia 
SEN Senegal Africa 
SYC Seychelles Africa 
SLE Sierra Leone Africa 
SGP Singapore Asia 
SVK Slovakia Europe 
SVN Slovenia Europe 
SLB Solomon Islands Pacific 
ZAF South Africa Africa 
ESP Spain Europe 
LKA Sri Lanka Asia 
SDN Sudan Africa 
SUR Suriname America 
SWZ Swaziland Africa 
SWE Sweden Europe 
CHE Switzerland Europe 
SYR Syrian Arab Republic Asia 
TJK Tajikistan Asia 
TZA Tanzania Africa 
THA Thailand Asia 
TGO Togo Africa 
TON Tonga Pacific 
TTO Trinidad and Tobago America 
TUN Tunisia Africa 
TUR Turkey Europe 
TKM Turkmenistan Asia 
UGA Uganda Africa 
UKR Ukraine Europe 
ARE United Arab Emirates Asia 
GBR United Kingdom Europe 
USA United States of America America 
URY Uruguay America 
UZB Uzbekistan Asia 
VUT Vanuatu Pacific 
VEN Venezuela America 
VNM Viet Nam Asia 
YEM Yemen Asia 
ZMB Zambia Africa 
ZWE Zimbabwe Africa 
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CONTINENT 
NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES 
PERCENTAGE 
Europe 39 22% 
Americas 33 19% 
Africa 50 29% 
Pacific 10 6% 
Asia 42 24% 
Total 174 100% 
